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Abstract 
This thesis examines the crisis of the Argentinian state during the period of 
the 1983-1989 democratic government. It suggests that the 1976 military 
dictatorship attempted to resolve the crisis of the Argentinian state by implementing 
an economic structural reform and State Terrorism. The consequences of the 
economic structural reform and State Terrorism constrained the margin of 
manoeuvre of the 1983 democratic government. The main economic constraints were 
the huge external debt and the impoverishment of the working class. The main 
political constraint was the need to bring the military to trial while avoiding a direct 
confrontation with the Armed Forces. 
The huge external debt constrained not only Argentina's economic growth but 
also the Radical government's economic strategies. A 'monetarist' restructuring of 
the state was imposed on debtor countries through IMF 'conditionality' loans. While 
the Radical government initially opposed such a restructuring, it later gradually 
began to implement the IMF's requirements. 
The impoverishment of the working class intensified the government's 
confrontation with the trades union movement. The Radical government 
unsuccessfully attempted to control and demobilise the working class. The trades 
union movement and the workers were able to block state policies, becoming the 
ultimate barrier to the restructuring policies adopted by the state. 
The attempt to bring the military to trial exacerbated the relationship 
between the Radical government and the Armed Forces. The government was unable to 
implement its own policies towards human rights violations, which prevented a 
definitive solution to this problem. In addition, the failure to resolve this problem 
intensified internal unrest within the Armed Forces, fostering the breakdown of the 
Army's hierarchy. 
The main political objective of the Radical government was to consolidate 
democracy. The economic legacy of the military dictatorship obliged the government 
to deepen the 'monetarist' restructuring of the state and the impoverishment of the 
workers while consolidating democracy. Implementing 'market-oriented' reforms 
made the transition to democracy more difficult. 
The thesis suggests that the Radical government, although unable to resolve 
the crisis of the Argentinian state, was able to begin the path towards consolidating 
democracy due to its policies towards human rights violations, which undermined the 
political role of the Armed Forces. 
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Con la democracia se come, se cura y se educa 
(Alfonsin's slogan, 1983 electoral campaign) 
(Con la democracia) Creo que se come, se cura y se educa, pero no se 
hacen milagros 
(Alfonsin, 1992, p. 48) 
Introduction 
On the 10th of December 1983, Raül Alfonsin, leader of the Radical Partys , 
took office as President of Argentina ending seven years of military dictatorship. On 
the 30th of June 1989, he resigned showing the inability of his government to 
control the crisis of the Argentinian state. The President elect, Carlos Menem, from 
the Peronist Party, took office five months before Alfonsin's constitutional mandate 
expired. The fall of Alfonsin's government has not been analysed in depth. Although 
there is an extensive literature on the Radical Party's term in office, there has been 
no attempt to examine the interrelation between the economic and political factors 
underlying the government's fall. 
Existing studies exhibit the following serious weakness: the economic 
analyses overwhelmingly ignore the political process while existing political 
analyses fail to conceptualise the economic crisis. 
On a theoretical level this thesis challenges the view that a meaningful 
distinction can be drawn between 'economics' and 'politics'. Crisis is neither 
'economic' nor 'political'. Rather it expresses the instability of the labour-capital 
relation on which capitalist society is based. Although, as I will argue, crisis is often 
experienced in an economic form, the condition for the resolution of crisis is the 
restructuring of the state and the working class. This thesis demonstrates how 
Alfonsin attempted to restructure both the state and the working class and the 
Argentinian state's relationship to the global economy. 
2 
I. Existing accounts of Alfonsin's government 
A large number of economic analyses suggest that the Alfonsin government 
failed to prevent economic crisis because of the inability of its economic team to 
implement the second stage of the Austral Plan, rationalising the state apparatus 
through privatisations, and reducing the public deficit (Canavese and Di Tella, 
(1988); Heyman (1991); Kiguel and Liviatan (1991); and Machinea, (1990)). 
Some analyses argue that the government, due to its inability to resolve the economic 
crisis, fell because of the opposition of the National Economic Groups (Grupos 
Econömicos Nacionales - GEN)2 and agricultural exporters. In this sense, the events 
of the 6th of February 1989 -the run against the austral which led to hyperinflation 
and Alfonsin's resignation- are seen as a type of economic golpe (coup) (Majul 
(1990) and Garfunkel (1990)). The government's failure is explained in terms of a 
series of technical economic problems, while its downfall is primarily explained due 
to domestic opposition from some sectors of the upper bourgeoisie3 
In these accounts the external debt is studied principally as a problem which 
had little bearing on day-to-day 'domestic' economic decisions. However there are 
studies which focus on the negotiations between Argentina and its international 
creditors (Frenkel et al (1988), and Bouzas and Keifman (1990)). The relation 
between the GEN and the external debt, considering the role of the former in the 
accumulation of the Argentinian debt is studied in particular by Basualdo (1987). 
The aim of Basualdo's work is to show the 'political aspect' of the debt crisis. This 
analysis is significant since it attempts to go beyond the assumption that bad 
economic management (Volcker and Gyohten (1992)) or a conspiracy between 
bankers and military governments (Calcagno (1988)) was to blame for the debt. 
However, Basualdo's work ends in 1986, covering only three years of Alfonsin's 
government. 
3 
Other economic studies touch upon the influence of the process of 
democratisation on the resolution of the crisis (Machinea (1990); Canitrot (1991) 
and Palermo (1990)) suggesting that government policies towards the unions and 
the Armed Forces shaped economic policy. 
Machinea's (1990) work is an exhaustive economic analysis which also 
discusses democratisation. Thus, he explains some of the economic policies in the 
framework of the political process. In particular, he emphasises the role of the 
Armed Forces as a political constraint upon economic strategy. However, he still 
separates the economy from political factors, only recognising that some political 
measures influenced economic strategy. Palermo (1990) emphasises the role of the 
confrontation with the unions and the business organisations to explain the failure of 
the Austral Plan. He compares it with the Bolivian case where the New Political 
Economy was launched with the total support of the business sector while union 
activity was banned. Palermo argues that the Argentinian case failed due to a lack of 
domestic support. In many ways Palermo's work is simplistic. The main criticism 
made by Canitrot (1991) is that Palermo totally ignores the Armed Forces as a 
political constraint. Canitrot (1991) argues that in order to explain the failure of 
the Austral Plan, an analysis of the role of the Armed Forces and the United States 
government -as a crucial support for the economic strategy and the democratisation 
process- must not be ignored. In his comment on Palermo's article, Canitrot (1991, 
p. 128) also highlights the significance of the confrontation with the unions as a 
constraint upon economic strategy. However, Canitrot does not analyse in sufficient 
depth the influence of political factors on economic strategy. 
The work of Machinea, Palermo and Canitrot attempts to go beyond the 
characterisation of the Argentinian crisis as a series of technical economic problems 
and tries to study the influence of some political factors. However, they still view the 
'economic' and the 'political' as two separate spheres, and thus, no attempt is made to 
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systematically relate the economic and political spheres or conceptualise their 
relationship. 
The orthodox political studies of Alfonsin government suffer from a similar 
weakness. There is only a small bibliography covering the role of trade unions in the 
democratic government (Gaudio et al (1990); Beliz (1988); Fraga (1991); and 
McGuire (1992)). These works without exception are descriptive accounts of the 
relationship between the unions and the Radical government, and as such they fail to 
highlight the global aspect of the crisis facing Alfonsin. 
The Radical government of 1983 was an historical exception in Argentina. 
Since the emergence of Peronism4 in 1946, 'free elections'5 had always resulted in a 
Peronist victory. The 1958 and 1963 elections, when Peronism was banned, were 
considered as 'illegitimate' by the unions. The sindicalismo peronista 6 (Peronist 
unionism) fought against the governments elected in 1958 and 1963, unleashing 
social unrest which ended in military coups. Thus, when Alfonsin came to power in 
1983 his government had to coexist with a Peronist union movement which had 
previously helped bring down non-Peronist democratic governments. For Gaudio, 
Beliz, Fraga and McGuire this was the root of Alfonsin's confrontation with the 
unions. 
Some of these works focus on the internal struggles of the sindicalismo 
peronista and the unions' relationship with the Peronist Party, arguing that the 
confrontation with the government was a way of reorganising the union movement 
and finding it a role in the democratic transition (Gaudio et al (1990) and McGuire 
(1992)). The most important contribution of these analyses is that they situate 
Radicalism and unionism in their historical contexts, and thus contribute towards 
understanding the historical roots of the confrontation, that is the role previously 
played by the unions in the fall of Illia's Radical government?. The Radical Party 
considered Illia's fall to be the result of an alliance between the unions and the Armed 
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Forces (Alfonsin, 1992). Although it is true that this alliance has not been 
conclusively demonstrated, it is beyond doubt that at least a part of the Peronist 
union movement has traditionally collaborated with military dictatorships (Abös, 
1984). 
The remaining studies which look at the relationship between the trades 
unions and the government focus on the level that social conflict reached under 
Alfonsin. The central role of the CGT in opposing the government is analysed holding 
that this role was based entirely on the former's desire for influence (Beliz, 1988). 
In this sense, Beliz' account can be characterised as pluralist since it analyses the 
influence of an 'interest group' over state policies. Even within the context of 
pluralist analysis, Beliz' is quite simplistic. He simplifies the role of the CGT as 
seeking only 'influence', while ignoring the economic context within which the 
struggle of the CGT must be understood. In addition, social unrest during the Alfonsin 
period is studied without looking in depth at the causes of the conflict (Fraga, 19 91). 
Finally, it is important to recognise that the unions themselves have still not 
produced their own account of the Alfonsin years. Above all else, the literature on the 
role of the unions ignores the wider economic context and the position of the 
Argentinian state in the global political economy. In this sense, the analyses seem to 
understand the government's confrontation with the unions as a consequence of the 
endless opposition between the Radical Party and the Peronist Party. The political 
confrontation between sindicalismo peronista and the Radical government is divorced 
from the economic sphere. This is also true of the case studies which focus on the 
relation between the government and the Armed Forces. 
The literature on the relation between the Radical government and the Armed 
Forces is small and undeveloped. It tends to focus on one of two themes: first, the 
government's policies on human rights violations (Fontana (1987) and (1989) ; 
Pion-Berlin (1991); Acura and Smulovitz (1991); Fontana and Lienderrozas 
(1992) and Moneta et al (1985)); and second, internal divisions within the Army 
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(Löpez (1987); Norden (1990); Boron (1987); Waisbord (1987) and Verbistky 
(1987)). These works analyse, principally the role of the Armed Forces in the 
democratisation process and their reaction towards the government's policy on 
human rights violations. However, these studies ignore the relation between the role 
of the Armed Forces in the democratisation process and the economic situation. Torre 
(1990a) commits a similar error by analysing the democratic transition in the 
context of economic crisis without deeply analysing the significance of the Armed 
Forces as a constraint in the transition process. Unfortunately, Torre's analysis still 
focuses its attention on the economic crisis merely pointing out the existence of some 
political constraints. All these analyses ignore the relation between the human rights 
violation policies and the economic crisis. 
In a comparative study, Huntington (1993) recognises this relation arguing 
that the issue of human rights violations was left as a secondary priority after the 
failure of the Austral Plan and the re-emergence of high inflation. This led to the 
failure of the human rights violations policies since they needed broad popular 
support to succeed. When the economic crisis seemed to be impossible to resolve, 
Argentinian public opinion started to be more aware of inflation than of human rights 
violations. However, this is also a partial view since it looks at the influence of the 
economic situation on the human rights violations policies without taking into 
account the influence of the latter over the former. Thus, the existing analyses do not 
attempt to conceptualise the relationship between the Armed Forces, global economic 
crisis and the Argentinian state's relationship with the unions. 
If. Summary of the Thesis 
This thesis intends to overcome these weaknesses. It argues that in order to 
understand the Argentinian crisis the economy and polity cannot be divorced. In this 
sense, the singular concept of 'economic crisis' or 'political crisis' is misleading. The 
7 
thesis is based on a conceptualisation of crisis as a crisis of the capital relation, 
understood as the crisis of a specific form of class domination, a crisis of 
accumulation which includes the totality of capitalist social relations within a 
national state boundary. In this sense, the study analyses the crisis of the whole 
social structure taking into account the main manifestations of the crisis, in its 
economic, political and social forms. Crisis is, in this sense, a crisis of the capitalist 
state, understood as an historical form of class domination (Holloway and Picciotto, 
1977). When the state undergoes increasing fiscal, monetary and financial pressure 
to restructure social relations and to secure the reproduction of capital, and the 
institutional representation of capitalist and working class interests represents 
barriers to such restructuring -without providing any alternative resolution of the 
crisis-, an economic crisis becomes a political crisis (Clarke, 1988 and 1990). 
The state appears as the primary barrier to the resolution of the crisis and the 
realisation of the particular interests of both capitalists and working class. The 
response to this crisis is the restructuring of the state and of class relations. The 
driving force behind the restructuring is an attempt to resolve "the political crisis 
of the state by trying to disengage the state politically from the economy so as to 
depoliticise economic policy formation" (Clarke, 1990, p. 27). This is achieved by 
'monetarism' where money replaces the state as the agent of restructuring, the 
money form is imposed on the state, and large sections of the public sector are 
privatised. The significance of these measures is that they attempt to resolve the 
political crisis of the state by restructuring the state and the working class (Clarke, 
1988). Clarke argues that, although the state appears as the primary barrier to the 
resolution of the crisis, the ultimate barrier is the strength of the working class. 
This argument is demonstrated throughout this thesis. 
The strength of the Argentinian working class, together with the activities of 
the armed urban guerrilla led to the 1976 military dictatorship. The main objective 
of the dictatorship was to implement a disciplinamiento social 
8 which included 
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subordinating the working class in both economic and political spheres. This 
'restructuring' of Argentinian social relations was finally achieved, through the 
adoption of 'monetarism', giving money and market the power to discipline society. 
The analysis presented in this thesis of the economic structural reform applied by 
the dictatorship and its consequences supports this interpretation. 
The condition for the resolution of the crisis of the state is "the gradual, 
cumulative and simultaneous restructuring both of the state and of the working 
class" (Clarke, 1990, p. 27). This is the main theme of the thesis. It intends to show 
the restructuring of the Argentinian state from the military dictatorship to the , 
1983-1989 democratic government. The thesis overcomes the partiality of the 
economic and political analyses mentioned above, and attempts to discover the 
reasons why the Argentinian democratic government failed to successfully deal with 
the legacy of the military dictatorship. It argues that the reasons must be found in 
the crisis of the Argentinian state, and in particular in the state's relationship to the 
working class and the global economy. 
The thesis highlights the paradoxical situation inherited by the 1983-1989 
democratic government. While the ensuing economic crisis could not be adequately 
tackled without intensifying the military dictatorship's disciplinamiento social, 
beyond the economic sphere objectives had to be oriented towards the restoration and 
consolidation of democracy. The new democratic government had to confront rising 
inflation, recession, and a fiscal crisis, deepened by the burden of the external debt, 
which significantly reduced the capacity of the government to act. The democratic 
government was expected to resolve the economic crisis. At the same time, it was 
expected to restore political rights and to consolidate democracy. It was also expected 
to punish the Armed Forces' violations of human rights. Democracy was, thus, 
awaited as the solution for the Argentinian crisis. However, all these demands proved 
to be incompatible. As the thesis illustrates, democracy brought about political 
l 
rights together with greater poverty. The process of implementing market-oriented 
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reforms provoked serious pressure on the new democratic government, making the 
consolidation of democracy more difficult. 
Thus, the thesis analyses the restructuring of the Argentinian state during 
the 1983-1989 democratic government and concludes that during this time, 
paradoxically, the consolidation of democracy was accompanied by a deepening of the 
military dictatorship's disciplinamiento social. 
III. Plan of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. As it analyses the crisis of the 
Argentinian state, the first chapter reviews relevant aspects of contemporary state 
theory. It is not a review of all approaches to the state. Rather it is an analysis of 
some of the main approaches to understanding the development of the capitalist state, 
its relation to economic policy and the notion of crisis. It draws in particular on 
Marxist approaches to the development of the capitalist state in the context of the 
globalisation of capital to highlight the influence of global capital in the making of 
domestic economic strategy. 
The second chapter is an historical account of the economic and political 
situation of the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s. It highlights the development of the 
crisis of the Argentinian state which ultimately led to the 1976 military 
dictatorship. 
The third chapter analyses the economic structural reform applied by the 
1976 military dictatorship. The main objective of this reform was to discipline 
society. The chapter highlights the main legacies of this reform for the incoming 
democratic government. It also studies the causes of the collapse of the military 
dictatorship and the transition process to discover how the collapse and the 
transition would influence the democratic government. 
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The fourth chapter analyses the first two years of Alfonsin's government. It 
studies the first policies applied by the government to confront the main legacies of 
the dictatorship, namely the policies towards the external debt and the domestic 
economic strategy, and the policies towards the unions and the Armed Forces. It 
shows that the government attempted to constrain the unions by controlling their 
internal elections. As this strategy failed, the government sought to achieve a social 
and economic agreement with the unions. However in turn this strategy also failed. 
Regarding the Armed Forces, the government tried to apply its 'due obedience' 
proposal but this also came to grief due to the pressure of the Judiciary and the 
organisations for human rights since they believed that the 'due obedience' was a 
'hidden amnesty'. Thus, the government could not execute its own policies towards the 
Armed Forces. Lastly, the chapter deals with the treatment of the external debt, the 
most significant issue in the economic sphere. It also analyses the reasons for the 
failure of the first economic strategy of the democratic government. In summary, it 
shows how the failure of the external debt negotiations and of the domestic economic 
strategy prepared the ground for the launching of the Austral Plan. 
The fifth chapter studies the development of the crisis from the launching of 
the Austral Plan to the 1987 electoral defeat. It describes the main objectives and 
features of the economic reform. It also assesses the subsequent economic plans 
which were applied after the failure of the Austral. In the context of such economic 
reform, the chapter analyses the attempts of the government to control the unions. It 
analyses the main causes and consequences of the appointment of Carlos Alderete, 
from the Light and Power union, as Labour Minister. By this time, Argentina had 
undergone its first military rebellion. The chapter examines the development of the 
crisis in the light of these three main events: the launching of the Austral, the 
temporary agreement with the unions and the first military rebellion. 
11 
Chapter six analyses the last two years (1987-1989) of the democratic 
government when the economic crisis was at its peak. While in this period the degree 
of confrontation with the unions declined, the government was confronted by two 
military rebellions and a significant guerrilla attack on an army unit. This prompted 
speculation that another economic crisis would end in a political crisis and, as 
historically, in a military coup; however, the 1989 general elections and Alfonsin's 
resignation were peaceful events. The chapter examines the increasing economic 
crisis and the role of the unions and the Armed Forces as the historical barriers to 
the restructuring of the state. The chapter also charts the main economic and 
political consequences of Alfonsin's government. 
The final chapter concludes on the development of the crisis of the 
Argentinian state under the democratisation process and examines the reasons why 
the crisis could not be resolved by the 1983-1989 government. It also highlights 
the implications of this thesis for state theory, commenting on the relevance of its 
main approaches to the analysis of the development of the capitalist state, its social 
relations and its relations to global capital. There are three appendices in the thesis. 
The first offers basic statistics of the Argentinian political economy. The second is a 
list of Cabinet ministers in Alfonsin's government. Finally I offer an account of how I 
tackled the research process. 
1 The Radical Party, founded in September 1889, had as its main objectives the 
demand for honest elections, real representation and the establishment of universal 
male suffrage. In 1916, after the Saenz Pena law of 1912, that guaranteed a secret 
ballot and universal manhood suffrage, Hipölito Yrigoyen, leader of the Radical 
Party, was elected President. His successor, Marcelo T. de Alvear, was also from the 
Radical Party. Yrigoyen was elected President again in 1928. In 1930 the first 
military coup ended with fourteen years of democracy. After the appearance of 
Peronism in 1946, the Radical Party could only win elections from which Peronism 
was proscribed. In 1957 the Radical Party split into two new parties: one led by 
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Arturo Frondizi, Uniön Civica Radical Intransigente, and the other by Ricardo 
Balbin, Uniön Civica Radical del Pueblo. In 1958 Frondizi with the support of 
Peronism became President. In 1962 a military coup interrupted Frondizi's 
presidency and called for elections in 1963. Arturo Illia, from the Uniön Civica 
Radical del Pueblo, won the elections. Due to the proscription of Peronism and 
Perön's advice to his followers to abstain, with only 25 percent of the total vote cast 
Illia was appointed President. In 1966 a military coup interrupted his presidential 
period. In 1973, Raül Alfonsin organised an internal movement of the Radical Party 
for the presidential nomination for the approaching elections. The Movimiento de 
Renovaciön y Cambio lost the internal elections, and so, Ricardo Balbin was 
nominated presidential candidate of the Radical Party. He lost the general elections. 
Alfonsin tried to push Radicalism to the left to oppose the struggle begun by 
President Maria Estela Martinez de Perön (Isabel) to left-wing trade unions but 
Balbin opposed him. Under the 1976 military dictatorship, Alfonsin became an 
ardent defender of human rights. Balbin died in September 1981 and, after internal 
elections, Alfonsin became the presidential candidate of the Radical Party for the 
1983 general elections. For more detailed accounts see Rock (1975), Wynia 
(1992), del Mazo (1959), Luna (1958), and Puiggrös (1957). 
2 These groups have been defined by Kosacoff (1989, p. 18) as those national 
companies created in the 1950s that, during the 1970s, started a diversification 
process and achieved investment in the financial sector and in foreign countries. 
Generally, they have also created a new company through their association with 
foreign companies. These groups are, for instance, Bridas, Perez Companc, Macri, 
Bunge y Born, and Techint. For a detailed historical account of these groups see 
Azpiazu et al (1986), Acevedo et al (1990), Sguiglia (1991), Basualdo and 
Khavisse (1993), Majul (1992) and Ostiguy (1990). 
3 The upper bourgeoisie is formed by the trans nationalised and the pampeana 
bourgeoisie while the lower bourgeoisie is referred to as 'domestic'. The 
transnationalised bourgeoisie is constituted by the larger fractions of urban private 
capital (monopolistic or oligopolistic), both national and transnational, very much 
related to international capital. The Pampeana bourgeoisie is defined as the 
biggest 
landowners from the pampa (the most productive agricultural sector in Argentina) 
also related to international capital since they mainly export their production. 
The 
'domestic bourgeoisie' is the fraction, mainly from the industrial sector, which is 
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not internationally oriented and is constituted by national owners of small and 
medium size industries (O'Donnell, 1978, p. 26). 
4 Peronism emerged as a consequence of Colonel Juan Doming Perön's policies in the 
Secretary of Labour from 1943 to 1945. As indicated below, Perön, from his 
position, benefited the workers economically and socially. This made him the leader 
of the workers movement, which until 1943 had been very weak. Peron also 
promoted the unionisation of workers, making the trades union movement the arbiter 
between the workers and the state. Besides, through unionisation the workers 
achieved more social benefits and became politically organised. I deal in more detail 
with the emergence of Peronism in chapter two. 
5 Free elections meaning without the proscription of political parties, especially, 
Peronism. 
6 As indicated earlier, Perön promoted the unionisation of the working class. By 
organising the trades union movement, Perön became also its main leader. This gave 
rise to a 'Peronist trades union movement' which remained loyal to Perön even after 
his deal deal in more detail with the notion of sindicalismo peronista in chapter 
two. 
7 President Arturo Illia, who won the 1963 elections with only 25 percent of the 
total vote cast due to the proscription of Peronism, had to face an intense and endless 
struggle with the trade unions against his policies. Strikes and sit-in's undermined 
the power of an already-weak government and prompted the return to a military 
dictatorship (Wynia, 1992). 
8 Canitrot (1981, p. 132) emphasises that the 1976-1981 economic programme 
had a political objective: the disciplinamiento social (social discipline) which means 
the weakening of the working class which has become politically powerful through 
the Peronist Party. I analyse in detail the disciplinamiento social in chapter three. 
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Chapter 1 
The capitalist state, economic policy and global capital 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the relation between the state and 
economic policy in the current context of global capital, and to conceptualise crisis and 
the 'monetarist' restructuring of the state, as these are the central theoretical themes of 
this thesis. It does not present a complete review of the literature on contemporary 
state theory, rather it is an analysis of some of the main approaches in order to define 
which of them is most suitable for the purpose of this thesis. In the first section, I will 
analyse pluralism, statism, the Miliband/Poulantzas debate and some studies in the 
context of contemporary state theory debates. In the second section my principal focus is 
on Marxist accounts of the internationalisation of capital, its relationship to the 
capitalist state, and the notion of crisis and the 'monetarist' restructuring of the state. 
The conclusion highlights the inadequacies of some of the aforementioned approaches and 
presents an alternative approach suitable for the objectives of this thesis. The 
theoretical framework of this thesis draws on, and develops recent 'open Marxist' 
approaches to state theory. 
I. One isolated capitalist state? 
i. The pluralist approach 
Pluralists theories of the state are, in fact, approaches to liberal democratic 
models of government. The state itself does not figure prominently in pluralist accounts; 
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for, in discussing the state, pluralists refer to the government or state officials. 
Pluralists do not recognise the government as one part of the state apparatus; instead 
they theorise about government rather than the state. "They normally refer to the state 
empirically as discrete organisations (such as the courts, the civil service and public 
enterprises) or instead refer loosely to 'bureaucracy' including all those parts of the 
state outside the 'political' or 'elected' government" (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987, p. 
42). The state is seen as "the broker, the cipher, the switchboard, or the weathervane 
which acts in accordance with the balance of interest groups in society" (McLennan, 
1989, p. 22). Despite this conceptual gap between state and government, pluralist 
accounts have contributed to developing the study of the dynamics of group politics or 
interest groups. 
The first assumption of pluralist writers is the fragmentation of power and the 
existence of many power centres. Power is viewed as "A's capacity for acting in such a 
manner as to control B's responses" (Held, 1987, p. 189). Furthermore, as Held 
(1989, p. 45) defines, "it is also an inextricable part of an endless process of 
bargaining between numerous groups". Thus, from the pluralist point of view there are 
two important elements in society: individuals and organisations. Politics is concerned 
with sets of individuals maximising their common interests through the creation of 
different groups. These interest groups are organised around "economic or cultural 
'cleavages' such as social class or religion; but they may also be single-issue affairs 
about schooling or local concerns about leisure and the environment" (McLennan, 1984, 
p. 83). The interest group articulates "the claims and the needs of society and transmits 
them into the political process" (King, 1986, p. 115). Power is distributed between 
groups and any group can be organised and be sure that its interests are taken into 
account by the government. Pluralism fails to consider the differences between the 
power centres in society. It is easy to assume, from many pluralist accounts, that all 
interest groups have the same power and so the same opportunity to press their demands 
on the government. Pluralist accounts often fail to see that in capitalist societies 'some 
16 
are more equal than others'. This is partially recognised by Dahl (1978, p. 198), 
although, he still retains the same conceptual approach. 
IV 
The main assumption of pluralist writers is that individuals organised as 
interest groups can influence state policies. They have power to achieve their aims, the 
most important of which is the transformation of their shared interests into state 
policies. Thus, pluralism sees economic policy as an outcome of the pressure from 
different interest groups. Hence, interests groups become essential in democracies 
because they can counteract independent actions of politicians. Therefore, pluralist 
approaches see a powerless state confronted by powerful interest groups. The state is 
viewed as an arbiter or a judge between these groups or factions. It is also considered to 
be a neutral arena, a place where various interest groups can compete to influence the 
government. 
Pluralism can thereby be summarised as offering: 
"-a sociology of competing interest groups; -a conception of 
the state as a political mechanism responsive to the balance of 
societal demands; -an account of the democratic civic culture 
which sets a realistic minimum measure for the values of 
political participation and trust; -an empiricist and multi- 
factorial methodology of social science" (McLennan, 1989, p. 
18). 
In this sense, pluralism does not constitute a theory of the state, merely a 
description of the ideal workings of liberal democratic governments. Indeed, although 
pluralism has contributed to developing a new point of view with regard to capitalist 
societies, it looks at society more than at the state. Pluralists recognise a fragmented 
society because of the interests of individuals. They attempt to study the participation of 
individuals in a democratic society through interest groups. Pluralism is not a theory of 
the state since it emphasises the relationship between interest groups and the 
government instead of the state, and it stresses the part of society which has the power, 
and, of course, neglects the global system. 
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On a political level, pluralism failed to predict the inequality which has emerged 
in capitalist societies since the 1970s. It cannot adequately explain the reasons why 
some interest groups are more successful than others. At the heart of pluralism lies a 
tautology: interest groups are powerful because they influence state policies, and they 
influence state policies because they are powerful. The empiricism of considering 
powerful interest groups does not explain the role of the state and its relation to 
economic policy. Pluralist accounts study an obvious fact, that is, the unequal 
distribution of power in society but they neglect to analyse what is behind this fact. 
Finally, an approach developed to study the capitalist democratic state cannot be 
applied to those capitalist states which are not democracies. This is the case in this 
thesis. Argentina was not a democracy but a national state undergoing a transition from 
authoritarian to democratic rule. Therefore, given its emphasis on liberal democracy, 
pluralism can not be applied to most of Latin America, Africa or Eastern European 
countries. 
In response to the weakness of pluralist accounts, western Marxists writers in 
the 1960s tried to go further in understanding the capitalist state. The analysis of the 
debate between Miliband and Poulantzas is an essential reference point for understanding 
contemporary Marxist state theory. 
ii. Miliband-Poulantzas debate 
Miliband (1969) regards the state as a set of institutions with complex relations 
among them. The government, the administration, the military and the police, the 
judicial branch, sub-central government and parliamentary assemblies are the 
institutions "which make up the state, and whose interrelationship shapes the form of 
the state system" (Miliband, 1969, p. 50). The power of the state is exercised through 
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those institutions. The state elite is constituted by the people who occupy the leading 
positions in these institutions. 
As Miliband believes that a theory of the state "is also a theory of society and of 
the distribution of power in that society" (Miliband, 1969, p. 4), he emphasises the 
study of the relation between the state system and the dominant class. Therefore, his 
objective is to demonstrate, through an empirical study, the relationships which exist 
between the state system and the dominant class. In other words, to identify the people 
who occupy the leading positions in the state system. 
As he demonstrates, the ties between the dominant class and the state system are 
essential in advanced capitalist societies (Miliband, 1969, p. 45). Through that fact, he 
also demonstrates how power is distributed in a capitalist society. Power for him is 
linked to ownership and control of the means of production (Miliband, 1969, p. 16). He 
recognises the existence of a dominant economic class which exercises its power by its 
ownership and control of the means of production, as a consequence this class also 
controls the means of the political decision-making process (Mi(iband, 1969, p. 61). 
Furthermore Miliband points out the existence of a division between the 
ownership and the control of the means of production. This division creates 
managerialism. Managers are those who have the control of the means of production 
without being its owners (Miliband, 1969, p. 37). He emphasises this separation and 
studies the social composition of managers. Managers belong to the upper and upper- 
middle classes. They become an elite of the dominant class by controlling the means of 
production (Miliband, 1969, p. 37). Therefore, he tries to explain the distribution of 
power in advanced capitalist societies by looking at both the ownership as well as the 
control of economic wealth. Thus, the state system is not a neutral arena since 
politicians and civil servants belong also to the upper and upper-middle classes. 
Therefore unlike the pluralists he criticises, Miliband sees the state as capitalist 
because of the class character of state officials. 
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In contrast, Poulantzas (1973) argues that the main role of the capitalist state 
is to reproduce the conditions of production for capitalism which rest on the 
reproduction of capital, thus the class character of state officials is deemed to be beside 
the point. 
Poulantzas sees the state and social classes as objective structures. Their 
relations form an objective system of regular connections "a structure and a system 
whose agents, men are in the words of Marx, bearers of it... " (Poulantzas, 1973, p. 
295) As in hard 'structuralist' readings of Marx, Poulantzas believes that the 
distinctive criterion for membership of the capitalist class is "the objective place in 
production and the ownership of the means of production" (Poulantzas, 1973, p. 296). 
The differences and relations between fractions of capital should, Poulantzas argues, be 
the central point in a Marxist analysis. 
Regarding the state, Poulantzas views it as "the factor of cohesion of a social 
formation and the factor of reproduction of the conditions of production of a system that 
itself determines the domination of one class over the others (Poulantzas, 1973, p. 
298). He emphasises the idea of the relative autonomy of the state from the ruling class. 
The state "in order to be able to organise the hegemony of the whole of the ruling class" 
(Poulantzas, 1973, p. 300) has to be relatively autonomous from the diverse fractions 
of this class and the class as a whole. Since he views the state "as the instance that 
maintains the cohesion of a social formation and which reproduces the conditions of 
production of a social system by maintaining class domination" (Poulantzas, 1973, p. 
304), he sees it as an objective system with its own logic and isolated from influences of 
the ruling class and its fractions. 
The first point that Poulantzas (1973) stresses about Miliband's work is that 
for Miliband social and political phenomena are reduced to the level of inter-personal 
relations. Social classes are understood in terms of inter-personal relations; the state is 
also reduced to inter-personal relations among the members of the groups which 
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constitute the state apparatus; and the relation between social classes and the state is 
reduced to inter-personal relations between individuals of social groups and individuals 
of the state apparatus (Poulantzas, 1973, p. 295). He argues that Miliband is using the 
epistemological principles of Max Weber and of contemporary elite theory and his use, 
albeit in a radical context, legitimises these concepts (Poulantzas, 1973, p. 295). 
Poulantzas (1973, p. 295) also criticises the concept of managerialism, because 
of his belief in the ownership of the means of production and the position in the 
production process as the only real criteria for defining the members of the capitalist 
class. 
Regarding the question of bureaucracy he argues that "the direct participation of 
members of the capitalist class in the state apparatus and in the government, even where 
it exists, is not the important side of the matter"2 (Poulantzas, 1973, p. 298). For 
him, there is an objective relation between the bourgeois class and the state. Therefore, 
the coincidence between the function of the state and the interests of the dominant class is 
an effect of the system itself. Poulantzas argues that the problem of the state apparatus 
is the problem of bureaucracy. The objective function of bureaucracy is to reproduce the 
role of the state. Therefore, bureaucracy is the servant of the ruling class "by reason of 
the fact that its internal unity derives from its actualisation of the objective role of the 
state. The totality of this role itself coincides with the interests of the ruling class" 
(Poulantzas, 1973, p. 299). 
Regarding the issue of the branches of the state apparatus, Poulantzas proposes 
that "the state apparatus forms an objective system of special 'branches' whose relation 
presents a specific internal unity and obeys, to a large extent, its own 
logic"3(Poulantzas, 1973, p. 301). Therefore, he rejects Miliband's argument that one 
of these branches (government, army, police, judiciary or civil administration) 
predominates over the others because either its members are nearest to the ruling class 
or the branch itself has an immediate economic role. 
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Finally, according to Poulantzas, the fact that Miliband "replies to bourgeois 
ideologies by the immediate examination of concrete fact" (Poulantzas, 1973, p. 239) is 
a revealing weakness in his methodology. 
Miliband's replies to Poulantzas' critique are weak. Miliband (1973, p. 308) 
mainly argues that it is a problem of emphasis. He stresses the question of 
managerialism recalling the idea of the ideology of the managers. Through this concept he 
tries to show the ties between managers and the ruling class. For him, Poulantzas' 
analyses are structural super-determinist "which makes impossible a truly realistic 
consideration of the dialectical relationship between the state and the system" (M iliband, 
1973, p. 311). 
There are two central points, important for this study, in the 
Miliband/Poulantzas debate: the relation between theoretical and empirical study and the 
definition of the state and its relation to civil society. 
Regarding the former, Poulantzas' arguments on the impossibility of using 
concrete fact in order to criticise a theory are misguided. Theory should not be isolated 
from the real world if one views theory as an instrument to explain, to describe and to 
understand the real world. Marx's theory is also the result of his observations of 
empirical reality. As Rubin (1972, p. 91) put it "the power of Marx's theory does not 
reside in its internal logical consistency as much as in the fact that the theory is 
thoroughly saturated with complex, rich socio-economic content taken from reality and 
elucidated by the power of abstract thought". Theoretical and empirical studies exist at 
different levels of abstraction which does not mean that one is more comprehensive than 
the other. There should be a deep connection between both in order to develop integrated 
knowledge. 
Poulantzas defines the state as an objective structure and he argues that "if the 
function of the state in a determinate social formation and the interests of the dominant 
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class in this formation coincide; it is by reason of the system itself" (Poulantzas, 1973, 
p. 298). According to this argument it is irrelevant that the members of the ruling class 
participate in the state apparatus. The state as "the factor of reproduction of the 
conditions of production of a system" (Poulantzas, 1973, p. 298) has the objectively 
acquired role of maintaining the system. Therefore, he sees the state as a rational 
structure with a specific and clear objective. His definition of the state becomes 
deterministic in the sense that, as a structure which is above the society, the state seems 
to be isolated from any kind of demands from society, including those of the capitalist 
class. Moreover, for him the individuals who occupy positions in the state apparatus are 
absolutely irrelevant and have no power at all. Poulantzas sees the state as an objective 
system which means that he adopts, in a sense, a view of the state as a unified and 
rational actor. Clarke (1991a, p. 98) argues that Poulantzas' conception of the social 
structure can be characterised as structural functionalist in the sense that the state is a 
class state because it is the state of a structure in which a class is dominant and so it is a 
state which reproduces that dominance. The state expresses the existing relations of 
power between classes in struggle, and is the arbiter of conflicting interests. This 
position assumes that capital has a priori needs which are achieved by the state. In this 
sense, Clarke argues that Poulantzas reproduces the substantive theoretical positions of 
bourgeois sociology (1991 a, p. 99). 
On the other hand, Miliband's analyses are trying to show how the state works 
within a society. He sees the state as a fundamental part of the life of the society and he 
shows the connections between both. The state itself has no objective role in Miliband's 
arguments. He places more emphasis on the relation between the people who occupy the 
state than the state as an objective structure. Miliband's arguments are more useful for 
understanding the capitalist state and its society since the state must not be understood 
as an objective structure above society. However, his weakness is to imply that the state 
is capitalist because its officials belong to the capitalist class. The class nature of the 
capitalist state does not derive from the class position of its officials, rather it derives 
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from historical struggles which established the 'separation' of the state from civil 
society with the demise of the feudal form of class domination. I expand upon this notion 
of the capitalist state below. 
Regarding the relation between the state and economic policy, Miliband's 
approach implies that the state follows an economic policy decided by state officials, 
who, belonging to the capitalist class will, pursue an economic policy according to its 
interest. Poulantzas' analysis argues that the state has as its main objective the 
reproduction of capital, and thus, its economic policy will be oriented to such a purpose. 
Both approaches seems to be quite simplistic in this regard. The capitalist state, I will 
argue, is a historical form of class domination, and it is therefore class struggle which 
influences the historical form of the state. Thus, the economic policy of the capitalist 
state is neither an outcome of the class character of its officials nor of the 'pure' 
objective of the reproduction of capital. Rather it is primarily an outcome of intense 
political struggle which is an aspect of domestic and international class struggle. 
Both Miliband and Poulantzas, failing to make an historical analysis of the state, 
argue that the state exists in one level and the economy in another level4. Miliband's 
analysis provides a useful framework to understand the origins of the class character of 
state officials, however such a framework does not help to understand the development of 
the form of the capitalist state. From Miliband's point of view, the nature of the 
capitalist state is reducible to the class character of state officials. Therefore, regarding 
the relation between the state and economic policy, the capitalist state pursues capitalist 
objectives due to the class character of its officials. Regarding the Argentinian case 
during the democratisation process the relation seems to be much more complicated, 
with the external debt crisis a major feature of the period. Besides, Miliband's analysis 
is aimed at advanced capitalist societies where state officials play a significant role. This 
is not the case of a country which was jumping, in the last fifty years, from 
authoritarian to democratic governments and back again. Therefore, Miliband's analysis 
could not be applied for the majority of Third World countries. Thus, his study, rather 
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than being a state theory, is an analysis of the class character of state officials in 
advanced capitalist societies. On the other hand, Poulantzas' analysis remains so abstract 
that it does not provide a satisfactory basis to analyse concrete situations such as 
Argentina's. In this sense, as both failed to make an historical analysis of the capitalist 
state, their approaches remain unhelpful in analysing the particular national form of 
the capitalist state and its relation to economic policy. Furthermore, both fail to take 
into account the international state system, therefore, they see the capitalist state in a 
singular, isolated sense. Because of these weaknesses, they are not suitable for the 
purpose of this thesis. 
The statist approach was a non-Marxist reply to the Miliband/Poulantzas debate 
and has since developed into an important school influencing a number of neo-Marxists 
such as Fred Block (1977; 1980; and 1991). 
iii. Statist analyses 
The main attempt of the statist approach is to place the state in the centre of 
political and sociological analysis and to propose a different road to study the state. Their 
method is "through analytical induction and historically grounded comparisons" (Evans 
et al., 1985, p. 347). This method implies that there is a "juxtaposition of Weberian 
understandings of the state with propositions drawn from recent neo-Marxist theories" 
(Evans et al., 1985, p. 348). They explore such ideas through comparative and 
historical research. 
Statism seeks to reconcile the differences in the recent state debates between 
neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian approaches. For statism, neo-Marxist literature has 
centered the analysis of the state on the question of state autonomy; and neo- 
Weberianism has emphasised the study of strong states versus weak states. For the 
Weberian tradition, a strong state should be close to Weber's ideal type of rationalised 
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bureaucracy. Neo-Marxism alternatively considers strong states as those which have a 
"domestically and internationally potent capitalist class, well served by 'its' state 
organisations" (Evans et al., 1985, p. 351). Regarding state autonomy, statism adopts 
the Weberian conclusion that the bureaucracy's success in applying its policy signifies 
an autonomous state, while social groups' control over the implementation of policies 
means less state autonomy. 
Theda Skocpol, one of the main representatives of statism, defines 'state 
autonomy' as the potential capacity of states to formulate and pursue goals that are not 
simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society 
(Skocpol, 1985, p. 9). She emphasises the exploration of the 'capacities' of the state to 
implement such goals over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups 
"or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances" (Skocpol, 1985, p. 9). 
Therefore, she recognises that state elites are free of dominant class' pressure and "such 
autonomous state contributions happen in specific policy areas at given historical 
moments" (Skocpol, 1985, p. 13). As the state is understood as autonomous and its 
capacities to pursue its policies vary, the state is influenced to a variable degree by 
social group pressure. While it is true that the state is influenced, what it is essential 
to understand are the reasons for the 'variable degree' of the influences. It is also 
essential to know how the state is free of alliances during the time of autonomy, but 
Skocpol does not explain this. In her analysis the state appears over society and isolated 
from it. It could be that the state had broken its alliances during the time of 'state 
autonomy' or that the state had won the interest struggles between state elites and the 
ruling class. However Skocpol does not offer an explanation for this, taking state 
autonomy as a given fact. 
The state, she argues, can influence "the meanings and the methods of politics for 
all groups and classes in society" (Skocpol, 1985, p. 28) but, on the other hand, she 
suggests that no one can influence the state's policies. She rejects the idea of an strong 
relationship between state elites and the dominant class and sees the state as autonomous; 
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thus, she does not take into account struggles within the state. In other words, she does 
not pay sufficient attention to the struggles between state elites and the dominant class 
nor that within state elites. Evidently, she does not give any importance to class struggle. 
Through her analysis of the New Deal, Skocpol tries to demonstrate that neo- 
Marxist approaches are insufficient to understand state's policies and its outcomes. She 
uses three different approaches: instrumentalist, political-functionalist and class 
struggle. 
As an instrumentalist analysis she uses Miliband's book The State in Capitalist 
Society (1969). She argues that the primary purpose of this book is to show that 
pluralist analyses underestimate the influence of the capitalist class. She includes 
Miliband in the theorists of corporate liberalism and argues that Miliband believes that 
when a crisis of accumulation takes place "capitalists can be expected to act as a class" 
(Skocpol, 1980, p. 161). Skocpol argues that although the New Deal's measures were 
favourable in the long-term for capitalists, in the short-term they could not see its 
favourable effects and they fought against some of the measures. Thus, she tries to show 
that capitalists did not act as a class in the case of the New Deal. Not because they were 
unable to; but because they did not see the positive side of the New Deal. Therefore, it 
could be argued that if they would have seen the positive side of the New Deal they would 
have acted as a class. On the other hand, she recognises that "these measures were 
accepted by most corporate capitalists in the US" (Skocpol, 1980, p. 168). Therefore, 
Skocpol's arguments are not clear when she tries to demonstrate why the 
instrumentalist view cannot explain the case of the New Deal. 
Political functionalism is the second view that Skocpol criticises, focusing on 
Poulantzas' work. She recalls Poulantzas' definition of the state as "the factor of cohesion 
of a social formation and the factor of reproduction of the conditions of production of a 
system" (Skocpol, 1980, p. 170). She argues that Poulantzas believes that the 
intervention of a relative autonomy of the state ensures that the political system pursues 
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capitalists' interests. Therefore, she affirms that "Poulantzas' capitalist state is 
basically a vehicle of system maintenance" (Skocpol, 1980, p. 171). Furthermore, she 
sees in Poulantzas' functionalist theory the existence of a centralised, bureaucratic 
administrative apparatus which intervenes economically in order to reach capitalist 
class interests. 
Regarding the state's 'relative autonomy', she points out that Poulantzas' theory 
is wrong because the state's capacity depends on historical circumstances. Moreover, for 
her, Poulantzas does not take account of the "potential democratic responsiveness of 
elected politicians in all capitalist democracies" (Skocpol, 1980, p. 180). These are the 
main reasons why political functionalism could not explain the New Deal's measures. 
However, following her argument that the New Deal measures in the long-term were 
favourable for the capitalist class, it could be argued that the state's relative autonomy 
made possible the application of measures which were favourable for the capitalist class 
in the long-term, although they were negative in the short-term. But, if this is her 
point, then the New Deal could be explained through Poulantzas' definition of the state as 
the factor of reproduction of the conditions of production of a system. 
Block's (1977) theory is the last point of view that Skocpol analyses in her 
article. Block's main argument is that there exists a division of labour between 
capitalists and state managers. He states that capitalists are not conscious in the long- 
term about what is necessary to reproduce the accumulation of capital, and state 
managers are "specially sensitive to the overall state of 'business confidence"' (Skocpol, 
1980, p. 183). During exceptional periods such as economic depressions or wars, state 
managers have more autonomy because 'business confidence' normally declines. 
Skocpoi argues that Block's arguments are at a high level of abstraction and he 
"does not investigate existing state structures as constraints upon what state managers 
can do when they attempt to facilitate capital accumulation" (Skocpol, 1980, p. 184). 
She seems to find an important contradiction in Block's arguments. Regarding the 
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capacities of state managers to apply their policies, she quotes two paragraphs of Block's 
work: "they are capable of intervening in the economy on the basis of a more general 
rationality. In short, their structural position gives the state managers both the interest 
and the capacity to aid the investment accumulation process" (Skocpol, 1980, p. 190). 
On the other hand, "state managers can make all kinds of mistakes, including excessive 
concessions to the working class. State managers have no special knowledge of what is 
necessary to make capitalism more rational: they grope toward effective action as best 
they can within existing political constraints and with available economic theories" 
(Skocpol, 1980, p. 190). There is no contradiction between these arguments although 
Block says that state managers are capable of acting this way because of their structural 
position, he does not say that they will necessary do it perfectly. State managers are 
potentially capable but they can make, as Block says, all kinds of mistakes. Moreover, 
Block, contrary to what Skocpol is arguing, takes account of political constraints and 
available economic theories. 
Skocpol concludes by arguing that the state is an organisation of political 
domination, with its own structure, its own history, and its own patterns of conflict and 
impact upon class relations and economic development (1980, p. 199). Finally, she 
states that the New Deal changes "were not fully intended by anyone, were not 
consistently in conformance with the interests of any class, and were not smoothly 
functional for the system as a whole" (Skocpol, 1980, p. 201). The changes were the 
product of political struggles, undertaken within given "structures of political 
representation and domination" (1980, p. 201). The structures are the key to 
understand political response to economic crisis within capitalism. 
The main weakness of Skocpol's argument is her conception of 'state autonomy'. 
The potential capacity of states to formulate and pursue goals that are not reflective of 
the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society implies that the capitalist 
state is an isolated structure which is above society. In this sense, she sees the state as a 
unified and rational actor pursuing policies for the long-term 'national interest'. She 
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fails to conceptualise the nature of the capitalist state. This is so, because Skocpol does 
not make an historical analysis of the development of the capitalist state. Her arguments 
are rather an attempt to build up a framework to understand some policies in a given 
moment. However, her emphasis on 'state autonomy' makes her arguments misguided. 
The capitalist state, as I will argue, is in no sense autonomous. 
Finally, Skocpol's arguments imply that the state is capable of implementing a 
specific economic policy which might not be supported by any social group. The 
empirical account of this thesis rejects this view. Indeed, Argentina's case shows the 
incapacity of the state to implement an economic strategy without either domestic or 
international support. This is so because, as Cammack (1989, p. 263) suggests, state 
and society are not separate polar opposites. Skocpol denies in practice the presence of 
classes and class struggle within the state, for this reason she concludes that the state 
has the capacity to act without support. However, as I will argue, the study of the 
capitalist state cannot ignore class struggle. 
An equally influential statist approach is found in Krasner's Defending the 
National Interest (1978) which tries to demonstrate that, in order to understand and to 
explain state actions, a statist approach is more comprehensive than liberal or Marxist 
approaches. 
Krasner believes that "states (defined as central decision-making institutions 
and roles) can be treated as unified actors pursuing aims understood in terms of the 
national interest" (Krasner, 1978, p. 12). He defines the national interest in an 
inductive way as "the preferences of American central decision-makers" (Krasner, 
1978, p. 13). These are the policy objectives. The implementation of policy 
demonstrates the "ability of the state to carry out its aims" (Krasner, 1978, p. 17). 
International and internal constraints have to be considered as well as the structure of 
the political system. 
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As the national interest is determined by following an empirical-inductive route, 
its definition is based on the behaviour of central decision-makers. Their preferences 
have to be related to general objectives and to persist over time. That being the case, 
Krasner argues their preferences make up the national interest. He rejects the logical- 
deductive route because of its stress on the preservation of territorial and political 
integrity arguing that "many economic questions are only remotely related to a state's 
political and territorial integrity" (Krasner, 1978, p. 41). He emphasises that an 
"inductive statist approach asserts that the national interest consists of a set of 
transitively ordered state preferences concerned to promote the general well-being of 
the society that persists over a long period of time" (Krasner, 1978, p. 45). 
Krasner develops three ideal-typical relationships between the state and society 
in capitalist or market economy countries: 1) the state may be able to resist societal 
pressure, but unable to change the behaviour of private actors; 2) the state may be able 
to resist private pressure and to persuade private groups to follow its policies but be 
unable to impose structural transformation on its domestic environment; and 3) "a state 
may have the power to change the behaviour of existing private actors and also, over a 
period of time, the economic structure itself' (Krasner, 1978, p. 57). Following these 
three ideal-types and their combinations, he defines states as nonexistent, weak, 
moderate, strong and dominant, and recognises that the pattern of strength and weakness 
is different between state's issue areas. These three ideal-typical relationships might be 
useful to study the relationship between state and society in capitalist economies. 
However, there is a confusion here between state and government. Krasner is arguing 
about the government which is part of state apparatus. Therefore, this framework could 
be useful to study the relationship between the government and the society. The state, as 
I shall argue, is conceptually different from the government. 
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It has to be highlighted that Krasner incorporates the international system as a 
variable to take into account, moving his analyses away from those who analyse the 
capitalist state in the singular. 
The main criticism that can be leveled at Krasner is that he sees the state -or 
more precisely, the government- as an unified actor. Further, he argues that state 
officials have clear and persistent objectives in some areas at a given moment. Krasner 
also sees some state's agencies, for instance the White House and the State Department in 
the United States of America, as isolated from society and from other state agencies. 
Therefore, they can define the national interest without taking account of the demands of 
society. The second criticism of this view is thus that an autonomous state could 
degenerate into an authoritarian state in order to promote the well-being of the society. 
This threat to democracy, in Krasner's arguments, arises because the well-being of the 
society is defined by the state's agencies. 
However, Krasner's emphasis on the role of state officials indicates that his study 
is not applicable to the Argentinian case. After so many changes from authoritarian to 
democratic governments, Argentinian state officials do not have a historically significant 
role. This is also the case of most of the Third World countries which almost without 
exception go from military dictatorships to democratic governments. Therefore, 
Krasner's analyses are very related to the United States government and so can not be 
considered as constituting a general capitalist state theory. 
Indeed, statism rather than offering a capitalist state theory, is an approach to 
study certain policies pursued by governments of advanced capitalist states. Finally, for 
the purposes of this thesis, the main weakness of statism is its inability to theorise the 
relationship between national states and global economy. 
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iv. The contemporary state debate: Bob Jessop and Peter Hall 
In this part I will analyse two authors: Bob Jessop and Peter Hall. Their work 
attempts to enrich the state debate, and on many levels it enables us to build up a useful 
framework to study the capitalist state. Their importance lies in the guides they offer to 
understand the development of the contemporary capitalist state. 
For Bob Jessop the state is a social relation which he defines as follows: "the core 
of the state apparatus comprises a distinct ensemble of institutions and organisations 
whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on 
the members of a society in the name of their common interest or general will" (Jessop, 
1990, p. 341). 
The state can also be analysed as the site, the generator and the product of 
strategies. Jessop points out that the state can be viewed as a system of strategic 
selectivity, "as a system whose structure and modus operandi 5 are more open to some 
types of political strategy than others" (Jessop, 1990, p. 260). As the generator of 
strategies, the state is a space where strategies are elaborated, and so the problem that 
he emphasises is how the state acts as a unified political force. In this sense it is useful 
to study the different strategies and tactics through which state managers develop the 
coherence of state actions. Regarding the state as the product of strategies, Jessop refers 
to past political strategies and struggles. 
Jessop also believes that a definition of the state should consider "the complex 
forms of articulation among state institutions and between the state and non-state 
institutions in the overall reproduction of capital accumulation and political domination" 
(Jessop, 1990, p. 340). Moreover, he sees the state as a form-determined social 
relation with its main feature, its particularisation from the immediate production 
process. The state's boundaries are recognised as ambiguous; the nature of the state, its 
institutions and organisations, depend on the nature of social formation and its past 
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history. The main task for state theorists is "to build up an understanding of the state as 
a form-determined social relation through a steady spiral movement from abstract to 
concrete and from simple to complex" (Jessop, 1990, p. 341). 
Jessop points out that the state can never be neutral among all social forces and 
political projects. He also notes that "state power is capitalist to the extent that it 
creates, maintains or restores the conditions required for capital accumulation in a 
given situation" (Jessop, 1990, p. 354). In this respect, he emphasises the fact that 
there is no single logic of capital. Hence, as accumulation is the result of "the strategies 
pursued at different levels and on different sites within a given conjuncture" (Jessop, 
1990, p. 354), it is necessary to add the historical dimension in order to understand 
the development of the state. 
In order to articulate two systems like the capitalist economy and the capitalist 
state Jessop develops two notions: structural coupling and strategic coordination. The 
former "refers to the co-evolution of autonomous structures which share at least in part 
the same social space" (Jessop, 1990, p. 358); it refers to "the formal and substantive 
articulation of different structures treated as autonomous structures" (Jessop, 1990, p. 
359) The structures have neither hierarchy nor subordination; they are dependent on 
inputs from their environment but these influences are mediated through the structure's 
own procedures. These features mean "that the development of a given autonomous 
structure is conditioned by its relation with other structures but follows its own logic" 
(Jessop, 1990, p. 359). The logic of the capitalist economy is the law of value; the logic 
of the capitalist state is state projects. 
Strategic coordination "points towards the strategic dimension of co-evolution 
considered from the viewpoint of specific social forces or agencies" and "can only occur 
in the context of the uncontrolled and anarchic structural coupling of co-evolving 
structure" (Jessop, 1990, p. 359). It refers to "the strategic aspect of relations among 
systems and structures" (Jessop, 1990, p. 359). In other words this notion considers 
34 
the capacities and vulnerabilities in the relation between systems and structures. 
Therefore, the notions of structural coupling and strategic coordination take account of 
the capacities and vulnerabilities of the state and social forces. 
The concepts of accumulation strategy and hegemonic project are also developed 
in the context of Jessop's arguments. Accumulation strategy refers to a specific economic 
growth model which takes account of its extra-economic preconditions. This strategy 
should unify the "different moments in the circuit of capital under the hegemony of one 
fraction" (Jessop, 1991, p. 160). It should also recognise national and international 
constraints as well as the balance of forces between the dominant and subordinate 
classes. It is wrong to think that only one accumulation strategy is followed and also only 
one tactic. Therefore, this plurality -especially of tactics- creates a margin of 
manoeuvre for non-hegemonic fractions. 
He treats capital accumulation as "the contingent outcome of a dialectic of 
structure and strategies" (Jessop, 1991, p. 169). As structures are given, he says that 
"the development and pursuit of accumulation strategies reproduce and transform these 
structures within definite structural limits" (Jessop, 1991, p. 169). The strategies, in 
order to be effective, must be adapted to the margin of manoeuvre inherent in the 
prevailing structures. Here, there is a contradiction that Jessop does not clarify: 
structures seem to constrain accumulation strategies despite his argument that there is 
a plurality of accumulation strategies to be followed. 
The hegemonic project is oriented to non-economic objectives (military success, 
social reform, political stability or moral regeneration) although these issues could be 
economically conditioned. The realisation of a hegemonic project depends on three key 
factors: its structural determination, its strategic orientation, and its relation to 
accumulation. The first one means that there is a structurally privileged class which 
maintains its situation in each accumulation strategy and hegemonic project. The 
structural determination shows the necessity of studying the forms of representation, 
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the internal structure of the state, and forms of intervention. The strategic orientation 
and the relation to political practices points towards the study of the social bases of state 
power. The relation to accumulation also signifies the relation with the prevailing 
accumulation strategy. 
Jessop concludes that "there is no essential unity of substance to the value form 
of the circuit of capital and that the unity that exists depends on the successful 
accumulation strategy oriented to all complex economic, political, and ideological 
conditions necessary to accumulation in a specific conjuncture" (Jessop, 1991, p. 
181). He recognises a dynamic relation between the accumulation strategy and the 
hegemonic project. He takes account of both changes in the state and actions regarding the 
economic, political, social and ideological aspects of state policy. He also emphasises the 
historical aspect of the state because he regards the current accumulation strategy as the 
result of preceding strategies. 
Each accumulation strategy needs a hegemonic project for its realisation. I see a 
hegemonic project as the ideology which supports the application of an accumulation 
strategy. In order to effect a radical change in accumulation strategy the hegemonic 
project has to be changed beforehand. But a radical change in the hegemonic project could 
be applied without a prior change in the accumulation strategy. 
A weak point in Jessop's arguments is the analysis of the state as a unified actor 
after the choice of hegemonic project, ignoring the role of class struggle. Also, the 
contradiction mentioned above -namely, that structures seems to constrain accumulation 
strategies despite Jessop's argument that there is a plurality of accumulation strategies 
to be followed- is not resolved. Finally, Jessop's claim that many possible accumulation 
strategies can be pursued is also misplaced. For Jessop, the determination of which 
accumulation strategy will be adopted by the state requires an analysis of the political 
conflicts through which strategic issues are resolved (Bonefeld, 1992, p. 4). This 
statement is based on an understanding of the state as above class struggle. "The 
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development of capitalism is thus construed in terms of an articulation between different 
social systems which stand above social conflicts" (Bonefeld, 1992, p. 4). Thus, Jessop 
understands conflict as based on the relative autonomy of the economy, polity and 
ideology. For Jessop the state appears isolated from class struggle. 
In addition to this weakness, Jessop does not recognise that in the context of the 
globalisation of capital the choice of accumulation strategy is severely constrained. This 
weakness might originate in Jessop's decision to ignore the international state system. 
Indeed, he barely mentions the role of international constraints. Jessop fails to put the 
capitalist state within its the international context, ignoring the impact of the 
globalisation of capital on the development of the capitalist state. In this sense, Jessop's 
work is unsatisfactory as a framework for an empirical study of a national state. Peter 
Hall's analysis, similar in many ways to Jessop's, is an step further in this direction 
since he incorporates the study of the international system. 
Peter Hall (1986, p. 4) argues that the economic policy making process is 
highly political. For him the major challenge is to discover the political factors which 
most influence the process. His task is to highlight that the direction of policy in Britain 
and France was determined, "not simply by prevailing economic conditions, but also by a 
political dynamic" (Hall, 1986, p. 20). He suggests that the aim of his study is to look at 
the political determinants of economic policy "that links those policies to the structural 
constraints implicit in the socioeconomic organisation of each nation" (Hall, 1986, p. 
231). Hall states that national economic policy is influenced by what a government is 
pressed to do and by what it can do in the economic sphere (1986, p. 232). According 
to him, governments are prevented from adopting a policy by the absence of any means to 
implement it (Hall, 1986, p. 232). 
Hall's institutional approach suggests that economic policy making is affected by 
five factors. The first three "are intrinsic to the socioeconomic structure of a nation" 
(1986, p. 232). They are: the organisation of labour which refers to the organisation of 
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the working class in the labour market; the organisation of capital which refers to the 
organisational relationship between financial and industrial capital; and the organisation 
of the state apparatus which means the roles of, and relationships between, the 
Executive, Legislative and Judicial bodies. In addition, the position of the nation within 
the international economy may also influence economic policy. This refers to the relative 
openness of national markets and the position of national producers in the international 
markets. Finally, the organisation of the political system itself, which refers to the 
electoral practices and network of organised political parties, seems also to affect 
economic policy making. 
Explaining the reasons why organisation is important, Hall (1986, p. 232) first 
argues that policy is the response to pressure from various groups. However, the way 
this pressure is organised depends on the organisation of the structure within which it is 
expressed. Secondly, the interests of the actors are affected by the organisation of the 
economic and political structures within which they operate. Thirdly, Hall states that 
economic policy making is a collective endeavor (1986, p. 233). And finally, "in order 
to implement economic policy, the state relies on access to organisational resources in 
both the public and the private sectors" (Hail, 1986, p. 233). 
Hall concludes his work by arguing that "the institutions that affect the 
performance of the economy and distribute power in society are ultimately artefacts of 
political action. They were constructed out of political struggles, and from time to time, 
we may recast them" (1986, p. 283). 1 suggest that Hall's institutional approach is a 
useful framework to study the relation between the state and economic policy since it 
takes into account both the international and domestic factors which influence the 
economic policy making process. However, it has to be highlighted that Hall's work is not 
an attempt to develop a general state theory. Hall takes for granted the capitalist nature 
of the state. Nevertheless, his approach is a useful framework to discover the 
development of the relation between state and economic policy. His weakness is that he 
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still gives little attention to the international context, even though it is one of his five 
actors. 
Krasner and Hall (and to a lesser extent Jessop) incorporate aspects of the 
international system which is crucial for this study. However, they refer only very 
tentatively to the influence of the international system in the development of the state. 
For the purpose of this study, it is necessary to analyse in greater depth how the 
internationalisation of capital, highlighted by Mandel (1978), modifies the relation 
between national states and economic policy. Hence I will now turn to analyse Mandel's 
(1978) contribution in understanding the internationalisation of capital. 
II. The internationalisation of capital 
The aforementioned approaches, despite their differences, share a significant 
weakness. The capitalist state should be studied in the context of the internationalisation 
of capital. Mandel's (1978) seminal study was an attempt to relate the development of 
the national state to the global accumulation system. Mandel following Marx relates the 
international concentration of capital to a process of international centralisation (1 978, 
p. 316). He makes strict distinctions between the internationalisation of the realisation 
of surplus-value (the sale of commodities), the internationalisation of the production of 
surplus-value (the production of commodities), the internationalisation of the purchase 
of the commodity of labour-power (or the specific market for this commodity), and the 
internationalisation of the power of command over capital, which is "ultimately always 
based in the internationalisation of capital ownership" (Mandel, 1978, p. 323). 
The internationalisation of the production of commodities began after the Second 
World War, being a new late capitalist development, consisting of an international 
framework for the competition of capital. The internationalisation of the purchase of 
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labour was unevenly developed, and the internationalisation of the power of command 
over capital was only developed in communications. Mandel, then, analyses three types of 
state strategy to be connected to the aforementioned developments. First, the 
international centralisation of capital could be followed by the international extension of 
the power of one state (Mandel, 1978, p. 326). Secondly, the international 
centralisation of capital may be followed by the gradual dismantling of the power of 
various nation states with the rise of a federal supranational state power. Thirdly, it 
could be followed by the relative indifference of internationalised capital to the late 
capitalist state (Mandel, 1978, p. 328). He suggests that these three different 
relationships between the international centralisation of capital and the state provide 
three possible models of imperialism for the near future. First, the model of super- 
imperialism which is based on a single imperialist power. Second, the model of ultra- 
imperialism in which the international fusion of capital is so advanced that "all critical 
differences of economic interest between the capital owners of the different nationalities 
disappear" (Mandel, 1978, p. 332). And third, the model of continuing inter- 
imperialist competition where "capital fusion is achieved on a continental level, but 
thereby intercontinental imperialist competition is all more intensified" (Mandel, 
1978, p. 333). Mandel argues that "the main tendency of the intensifying international 
competitive struggle today is not for big capital to merge on a world scale, but for 
several imperialist formations to harden in their mutual antagonism" (1978, p. 338). 
He concludes that the international centralisation of capital must be understood as 
capital's attempt to break the barriers of the nation-state (Mandel, 1978, p. 342). 
Mandel's main contribution was to place the capitalist state in the context of the 
internationalisation of capital. He tries to explain, from a Marxist perspective, the 
causes of the post-war rapid growth in the international capitalist economy, 
emphasising the process of the international centralisation of capital as one of the main 
causes. His perspective highlights the inadequacies of the aforementioned approaches 
since all of them concentrate their attention on the capitalist state as if it were isolated 
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and indifferent to the modifications of its own international context. However, Mandel's 
analyses are riddled with inflexibility since his arguments follow a crude continuity of 
stages. Mandel's predictions concerning the development of the capitalist state make his 
arguments much too mechanical. Despite this, Mandel provides the basis for 
understanding the significance of the internationalisation of capital. 
This thesis, studying the Argentinian state's economic policy in the 
democratisation process of the 1980s, cannot ignore the internationalisation of capital 
and its main consequences for the capitalist state since the external debt, an essential 
feature of the period, is a consequence of this globalisation. Therefore, as most of the 
aforementioned approaches do not fully examine the internationalisation of capital and 
the international state system, l turn now to studies which look at this relationship and 
its impact for state theory. 
III. Global Capital and the National State 
i. Dependency Theory 
Dependency theory was one of the first contributions to take into account the 
international framework of the capitalist state. There are two main currents: the world 
system view and the historical-structuralist perspective. The world system view, 
represented by Gunder Frank, Samir Amin and Immanuel Wallerstein, suggests that the 
underdevelopment of Third World capitalism is a consequence of the main internal 
contradictions that characterise its modes of production as part of the development of 
world production (Carnoy, 1984, p. 184). For Frank "this dependent, and in this sense 
weak, character of the state in the Third World -dependent financially, technologically, 
institutionally, ideologically, militarily, in a word politically, on the international 
bourgeoisies) and their metropolitan states- may be regarded as the fundamental 
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characteristic of the Third World state" (1979, p. 5). In the world system perspective, 
the dependent state is organised to meet the needs of a powerful international 
bourgeoisie. As Picciotto points out (1991a, p. 218) in Wallerstein's approach, the 
world market and the consequent international division of labour allocate a particular 
role to each region. However, he argues with Brenner (Picciotto, 1991a, p. 218) that it 
was not trade "that transformed production relations, but the contradictions of feudal and 
post-feudal production relations that led to transformations both of the world market 
and of the form of the state". In this sense, Wallerstein's approach is misplaced due to its 
emphasis on the world marked/ as the 'allocator' of roles. This approach is also quite 
mechanical and functionalist, and so quite inflexible regarding the role of each region 
(Skocpol, 1977, p. 1088). 
The historical-structural perspective "emphasises not just the structural 
conditioning of social life, but also the historical transformation of structures by 
conflict, social movements, and class struggle" (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979, p. X). The 
main contribution of this perspective is its concentration on the inter- and intra-class 
struggles that mark the development of capitalism into the periphery. The social 
struggles which took place in the periphery were important for the development of 
capitalism in the Third World and for the development of world capitalism. The state is 
viewed as the instrument of imperialist penetration, on the condition that the exporting 
bourgeoisie "can organise hegemonic blocs that overcome resistance to deepening 
dependency" (Carnoy, 1984, p. 195). The dependent state is placed in the context of 
conditioned class struggle -conditioned by crises and developments in the world system 
and by the role of export sectors in the national economy. 
A type of dependent state was widely analysed by O'Donnell. It has been defined by 
O'Donnell (1988) as the Bureaucratic Authoritarian state (BA). The BA is a type of 
capitalist state which has to guarantee capitalist relations of production and the 
maintenance of the social relations which allow the dominance of the bourgeoisie as a 
class. The BA state is a 
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"defensive reaction by the dominant classes and their allies to 
crises involving a popular sector6 that has been politically 
activated and is increasingly autonomous with respect to the 
dominant classes and the state apparatus. This reaction 
includes an agreement among those who implant and support 
the BA that its main tasks should be the subordination and 
strict control of the popular sector, a sharp reversal of the 
tendency toward autonomy of its class organisation, and the 
elimination of its capacity to express itself in the political 
arena" (O'Donnell, 1988, p. 31). 
The principal social base of the BA is the upper bourgeoisie7, in a class structure 
defined by O'Donnell (1988, p. 31) as subordinated to the upper fractions of a highly 
oligopolised and trans nationalised bourgeoisie. O'Donnell (1988, p. 191) points out that 
"the BA is a state for the bourgeoisie: it supports and defends the most basic and long- 
term interests of this class, but it is not an apparatus colonised by the immediate 
interests of its various fractions". The main objective of the BA is the political 
deactivation of the popular sector, the reimposition of 'order', and the stabilisation, or 
'normalisation' in O'Donnell's words, of the economy. The BA state is a system which 
perpetuates the political and economic exclusion of the popular sector. 
O'Donnell's analyses have been extremely useful in studying the Latin American 
authoritarian regimes. Regarding Argentina, the BA can be applied to the military 
dictatorships of 1966 and 1976. Indeed, O'Donnell uses the BA to study the 1966 
military government. E believe that the BA framework is a useful approach to 
characterise the Latin American authoritarian regimes and to highlight their main 
features and objectives. In this thesis, analysing the 1966 military dictatorship, I 
suggest that O'Donnell's framework helps to understand the origins and development of 
the dictatorship. O'Donnell's historical analyses further clarify the causes and 
consequences of the authoritarian governments. 
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However, the concept of the BA has been widely criticised. Stepan (1978) argues 
that the BA is not a type of state but a type of corporatism, while Cardoso (1979) points 
out that the dependent state has coexisted with many different political regimes8 
O'Donnell's analysis must be seen as an attempt to understand capitalist development in 
the periphery through considering the causes and consequences of the rise of Latin 
American authoritarian states. I suggest that O'Donnell's analyses are an attempt to build 
up a framework to study the development of the capitalist state in Latin America. In the 
framework of dependency theory the BA is a type of capitalist state which influences the 
development of the dependent state. 
Dependency theory has also been widely criticised for its simplistic 
perspective9. Holloway (1994, p. 52) correctly states that dependency theory remains 
very state-oriented and over-emphasises the external constraints on state action. This 
critique shows the inability of dependency theory to understand the relation between the 
capitalist state and domestic economic policy in the current context of the 
internationalisation of capital. Thus, dependency theory in general is not suitable for 
this study since I intend to analyse how Alfonsin attempted to restructure the state and 
the working class and the Argentinian state's relationship to the global economy. This 
thesis intends to look at both levels, global capital and national state policies, to analyse 
the development of the Argentinian capitalist state in the 1980s. In this regard, 
dependency theory is an incomplete approach, however useful O'Donnell's insights on 
bureaucratic authoritarianism as one form taken by the capitalist state. 
ii. Contemporary Marxist attempts to analyse the internationalisation of capital 
and the national state 
From the late 1970s a new phase in the state debate began. A seminal 
contribution was that of Holloway and Picciotto (1977, p. 76) who pointed out that 
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"from the 1930s to the 1960s the analysis of the processes of capitalist accumulation 
became separated from that of class struggle and the state". This promoted the idea of the 
state as 'the state in capitalist society' rather than one aspect of the social relations of 
capital. At the same time, due to "the failure to relate developing contradictions of 
accumulation to the changing forms of class struggle within and around the state" 
(Holloway and Picciotto, 1977, p. 76), it has been difficult to develop a sophisticated 
approach to crisis. Holloway and Picciotto's argument is that 
"a theoretical and practical understanding of the present crisis 
and of the role played by the state can be gained only by seeing 
the crisis not as an 'economic crisis' but as a crisis of the 
capital relation, i. e. as a crisis of an historically specific 
form of class domination, a crisis of accumulation which 
involves the totality of capitalist social relations and therefore 
a struggle waged on every front and through every mechanism, 
economic, political, ideological, etc. " (Holloway and Picciotto, 
1977, p. 77). 
Thus, the development of the state must be seen as a particular manifestation of 
the crisis of the capital relation. The capitalist state is usefully conceptualised as a 
particular surface form of the capital relation, "i. e. of an historically specific form of 
class domination" (Holloway and Picciotto, 1977, p. 77). They argue that the state must 
be located in the context of the historical form taken by the relation between dominant 
and dominated classes in capitalist society. Thus, the beginnings of a theory of the state 
must lie in the "historical materialist category of the capital relation" (Holloway and 
Picciotto, 1977, p. 78). The succeeding dominant forms of surplus value production 
should be the basis for understanding the development of the capitalist state (1977, p. 
86). 
Holloway subsequently distinguishes between state form and state apparatus 
(1991a, p. 228). This distinction gives rise to a 'double dimension' of the state as a 
relation of capitalist domination, and as an apparatus. Regarding the state as a relation of 
capitalist domination, Holloway points out that the analysis of the state as a form of the 
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capital relation is an attempt to analyse the place of the state in the relations between 
capital and labour, "conceived of as an historically specific form of class domination 
with its own laws of motion" (Holloway, 1991a, p. 232). The capitalist state is 
"constituted by the particularisation of the political and the economic as distinct forms 
of social relations" (Holloway, 1991a, p. 240). In the transition from feudalism, the 
serf becomes wage-earner and citizen. The separation of 'economics' and 'politics' 
implies the separation of economic and political relations, that is the constitution of the 
proletarian as property-owner and citizen. This separation is a constantly-repeated 
process: "the classless status of citizen comes into constant conflict with the class 
experience of the bearer of that status" (Holloway, 1991a, p. 240). Therefore, the 
constitution of the state is a process of fetishisation "of the fragmentation of class 
relation into non-class form" (Holloway, 1991a, p. 249). 
This analysis of the capitalist state is a useful attempt to explain the main 
historical features of its development, and to provide a basis to go further in analysing 
the national form of the capitalist state. From this level of abstraction, analysis should 
move to the study of the national state. However, Holloway and Picciotto do not pay 
enough attention to the national form of the capitalist state (Clarke, 1991b, p. 54), and 
to the international state system. Despite this weakness, Holloway and Picciotto's 
analysis of the capitalist state is a significant attempt to theorise the relation between 
capital and the state as the "contradictory unity of differentiated forms of capitalist 
power" 1 O(Clarke, 1991b, p. 56). 
Due to the aforementioned weakness, Barker (1991, p. 204) criticises Holloway 
and Picciotto's article since they treat the state as if it existed only in the singular. He 
emphasises that capitalism is a world system of states, "and the form that the capitalist 
state takes is the nation-state form" (1991, p. 204). Barker's article is an attempt to 
place the capitalist state in an international context by arguing that capitalist society 
should be seen as a global 'social formation', a real totality, rather than a set of separate 
capitalist societies (1991, p. 210). Von Bra'unrnühl's (1978) article is also an attempt 
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in this direction. The contradiction between internationalisation and nationalisation of 
the process of accumulation is defined by von Braunmühl as the main feature of the 
imperialist system (1978, p. 260). She correctly argues that an international system 
consists of many nation states (1978, p. 162). Thus, the world market is organised in 
the form of many national economies as its integral components (1978, p. 162). The 
world market is defined as "an international, state-organised and specifically 
structured, all-encompassing effective international context of competition, within 
which statehood arises and consolidates itself and states form their characteristic 
economic, social, and political structure" (1978, p. 167). Thus, the world market must 
be understood as a totality constituted by many national economies. Von Braunmüh1°s 
weakness is her over-emphasis on the world market, and her consequent neglect of the 
historical context of the national state. 
Another significant attempt to incorporate the internationalisation of capital into 
Marxist state debate was made by Radice (1984), arguing that since the capitalist world 
economy has become so integrated, it is impossible to maintain a national capitalist 
strategy. He firmly assesses that there are no longer significant nationally-limited 
capitals (1984, p. 127). 
Indeed, in the seventies, the power of multinational companies seemed to 
undermine the political power of national states and their capacities to develop 'national 
economic strategies'. However, this notion is based on a specific concept of the capitalist 
state and its relation to the economy. This concept either idealises the role of nation 
states or reduces them to "mere spatial zones, or territorial areas, housing the 
economy" (de Brunhoff, 1976, p. 138). As de Brunhoff (1976, p. 139) argues the 
point is not to analyse the relationship between multinational companies and the 
integrity of national states, rather it is to define the "new forms of state practices in 
relation to changes within capitalism". Indeed, the multinational companies "are not 
economic subjects able to replace national political subjects" (de Brunhoff, 1976, p. 
138). 
47 
To clarify this 'antagonism' between internationalisation of the economy and the 
national state, Picciotto (1991 b, p. 46) suggests that the internationalisation of state 
and capital are interrelated processes. He argues that 
"the internationalisation of capital has not been apurely 
economic process: an important role in shaping it was played 
by the internationalisation of a framework of state structures 
which have generally guaranteed the internationalised 
ownership of capital and its reproduction primarily through 
the corporation. The modern capitalist state was born within 
an international framework. Although it was primarily 
national socio-economic forces that defined its socio- 
geographic boundaries, its form and functions developed 
internationally" (1991b, p. 47). 
In this sense, the international system is defined as a network of "loose and 
overlapping jurisdictions" 11 (Picciotto, 1991b, p. 47). Picciotto emphasises that 
during the twentieth century there occurred two processes: the consolidation of the 
national state and the development of international organisations. These internationally 
organised networks played a crucial role in ensuring "the minimum degree of 
coordination of state regulation necessary to permit the international reproduction of 
capital" (Picciotto, 1991 b, p. 53). Picciotto highlights the significance of the 
internationalisation of capital for the development of the capitalist state, concluding that 
despite the process of internationalisation, the national form remains important since it 
provides the basis for the international reproduction of capital. 
In the context of this problematic, Pooley (1991, p. 67) also emphasises that, 
despite the internationalisation of capital, "nation-states remain focal points for 
political activity over a wide range of economic and social circumstances". He points out 
a basic contradiction of the globalisation process: international capital utilises the 
capitalist state while trying to avoid its regulatory functions (1991, p. 67). 
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Following these approaches, Burnham develops Marxist state theory at the level 
of the interstate system. He (1992a, p. 3) points out that the appropriate level for 
analysing the state is the world market. This is due to the constitution of the national 
state: vertically with regard to its population, government and sovereign territory; and 
laterally, regarding its relations with other states as 'equals'. Burnham (1992b, p. 4; 
and 1994) states that the most important contradiction of capitalism is still 
undertheorised, that is the tension "between the national form of the capitalist state and 
the global character of accumulation". Currently, national states struggle to mediate the 
consequences of this contradiction. Burnham explains the different analytical levels to be 
followed to analyse this contradiction, concluding that to analyse the contemporary 
international system it is fundamental to go from the level of abstraction of the capitalist 
state form to particular national states (1992b, p. 12). His arguments lead him to 
conclude that global crisis is experienced by capitalist states in a national form. This 
was notably the case of the international debt crisis. 
Most recently, Holloway (1994) states that national state development can be 
understood only in relation to the development of global capital. The unity between states 
is that "all are rigidified, apparently autonomous forms of social relations" (Holloway, 
1994, p. 27). This fetishised form exists as a multiplicity of national states. Due to the 
multiplicity there are differences in the relation between global capital and national 
states. Each state has a different relation to the global relations of capitalism (Holloway, 
1994, p. 33). Therefore, there is competition between national states, defined by 
Holloway as extremely unequal, to attract and maintain into their territories a share of 
global surplus value (1994, p. 35). Holloway argues that this process is not an 
internationalisation or globalisation of the economy, rather it is a change in the form of 
the global existence of capital (1994, p. 41). This leads him to argue that political 
decisions taken by the national state are integrated into the global movement of capital 
(Holloway, 1994, p. 42). 
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In this context the capitalist form of the national state can no longer be studied in 
isolation. Assuming the relevance of global capital, the inadequacy of pluralism, statism 
and other leading contemporary approaches in defining the development of the capitalist 
state and its relation with economic policy becomes clear. Global capital has radically 
transformed this relationship. The contemporary capitalist state, although still 
assuming the national form, has to be analysed in the context of global capital, above all 
when the study is focused on economic policy. 
iii. The notion of crisis and the 'monetarist' restructuring of the state 
As indicated above, this thesis is predicated upon the assumption that crisis is 
neither 'economic' nor 'political'. The concepts of 'economic' and 'political' are specific to 
capitalism since "the relations between slave and master or serf and lord were 
indistinguishably economic-and-political relations" (Holloway, 1992, p. 160; and 
Anderson, 1979). Thus, the concepts of 'economic' and 'political' are fetishised 
categories which reflect the superficial fragmentation of capitalist society. 
The notion of crisis, applied to social and historical developments, refers to 'hard 
times' as well as to turning points (Holloway, 1992, p. 146). Although crisis presents 
itself as economic, it expresses the structural instability of capitalist social relations, 
"the instability of the basic relation between capital and labour on which the society is 
based" (Holloway, 1992, p. 159). 
As Holloway and Picciotto (1977, p. 77) suggest, the development of the state 
must be seen as a particular manifestation of the crisis of the capital relation. Crisis of 
the capital relation inevitably involves a restructuring of social relations which takes 
economic and political forms (Holloway and Picciotto, 1977, p. 92). Crisis involves a 
process of struggle. The restoration of accumulation and a new pattern of accumulation 
depends on the outcome of the process of struggle. Thus, crisis is a crisis of the capital 
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relation. A crisis of an historically specific form of class domination; a crisis of 
accumulation which involves the totality of capitalist social relations. 
Moreover, crisis is composed of both breakdown and restructuring, and "between 
crisis-as-rupture and crisis-as restructuring there is a whole world-history of 
struggle" (Holloway, 1992, p. 164). Indeed, this thesis demonstrates that the crisis of 
the Argentinian state, that is the breakdown in the established pattern of social 
relations, could not be resolved by the 1976 military dictatorship. Thus, crisis-as- 
rupture and crisis-as-restructuring were not identical. Moreover, the 1983-1989 
democratic government was also unable to restructure the state and social relations. 
Thus, rupture may or may not contain the possibility of a restructuring. 
As noted earlier, the state appears as the primary barrier for the resolution of 
the crisis and the realisation of the particular interests of both capitalists and the 
working class. However, as Clarke (1990, p. 27) suggests, and as this thesis 
demonstrates, the ultimate barrier is the strength of the working class. In addition to 
this, in the context of global capital, the restructuring of the state takes into account the 
relationship between the national state and the global economy. 
During the seventies, Keynesian policies were abandoned and replaced by 
'monetarism'. While the former emphasises full employment, the latter emphasises 
price stability. Economically, 'monetarism's' common theme is "the need to maintain 
monetary stability to ensure the smooth operation of the market and the achievement of a 
full employment equilibrium" (Clarke, 1988, p. 323). In general terms, 'monetarism' 
prioritised monetary regulation as a means to achieve price stability. The economic role 
of the state is "to confine accumulation within the limits of the market by restructuring 
the growth of the money supply" (Clarke, 1988, p. 328). This economic aspect was 
complemented by the eradication of the institutional forms of Keynesianism and the 
restructuring of the state as the means of imposing the rule of money and law. Thus, the 
political institutions' of Keynesian class collaboration were destroyed. 'Monetarism' 
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attempted to exploit and intensify the divisions within the working class for the 
reimposition of the rule of money (Clarke, 1988, p. 355). Money replaces the state as 
the agent of restructuring, the rule of money is imposed on capitals and on the state by 
the banks and the financial institutions. The 'monetarist' restructuring of the state and 
its class relations is an attempt to "resolve the political crisis of the state by trying to 
disengage the state politically from the economy so as to depoliticise economic policy 
formation" (Clarke, 1990, p. 27). 
As Clarke (1988, p. 355) suggests the internationalisation of capital had 
undermined the possibility of social democratic governments pursuing alternative 
economic strategies to 'monetarism'. This thesis demonstrates that the 1983 democratic 
government did not initially intend to resolve the crisis of the Argentinian state by the 
imposition of a 'monetarist' restructuring. However, as its Keynesian policies failed, the 
government was unable to avoid a gradual 'monetarist' restructuring of the state and its 
class relation. 
IV. Conclusion 
One of the purposes of this chapter has been to analyse the relation between the 
state and economic policy in the current context of global capital. In this sense, 
pluralism, the Miliband/Poulantzas debate, statism, Jessop and Hall's analyses do not 
provide a satisfactory framework. 
As noted earlier, pluralism is more concerned with the analysis of liberal 
democratic governments than with the state. Miliband's analysis is focused on the class 
character of advanced capitalist societies. Poulantzas' work remains too abstract to 
provide a useful framework for this thesis. Statism deals with specific state policies in a 
given moment, the concept of 'state autonomy' reflecting its failure to recognise class 
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struggle. Jessop's analysis is influenced by his separation between 'economics' and 
'politics' -in Jessop's words, accumulation strategy and hegemonic project. This thesis 
denies such a separation. Jessop also ignores class struggle, isolating the state from 
society. Finally, Hall's work, although a useful framework to study the relation between 
the state and economic policy, does not provide a satisfactory framework since he does 
not conceptualise the capitalist state. 
In addition to these weaknesses, these approaches do not theorise the relationship 
between the state and economic policy in the current context of global capital. 
Dependency theory, which does analyse the international context of the capitalist 
state, emphasises the external constraint as an structural obstacle for the development 
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of the 'dependent state'. Thus, it cannot be used as a theoretical framework of this thesis 
since the main objective here is to analyse the restructuring of the Argentinian state, its 
class relations, and its relation to global economy. 
Finally the contemporary Marxist accounts attempt to provide a satisfactory 
framework, although they need to be enriched by empirical studies to be able to 
conceptualise the capitalist state, its relation to economic policy and to the global 
economy. 
Thus, the theoretical framework of this thesis rests upon a view of the capitalist 
state as an historically specific form of class domination. The analysis of the 
development of the capitalist state must be located in its historical context. The 
development of the state must be seen as a particular form of manifestation of the crisis 
of the capital relation, thus class struggle cannot be ignored. Class struggle influences 
the historical form of the state. In this sense, the economic policy of the capitalist state 
is primarily an outcome of both domestic and international class struggle. An analysis 
such as this overcomes the superficial separation between 'economics' and 'politics'. This 
fetishised separation is caused by the constitution of the proletarian as property-owner 
and citizen, a specific feature of the capitalist society. The coexistence of the classless 
53 
status of citizen and the class character of capitalist society is the origin of the 
separation between 'politics' and 'economics'. The historical analysis of the capitalist 
state helps to overcome this superficial separation, and conceptualises the capitalist 
state as a historically specific form of class domination. 
To locate the analysis of the state in its historical context also enables us to 
conceptualise its relation with economic policy. And, as noted earlier, the globalisation 
of capital is a feature which modifies this relation. National state development must be 
understood in relation to the development of global capital. The capitalist state can no 
longer be studied in isolation. 
The analysis of the capitalist state and its historical development provides a basis 
to go further in analysing the national form of the capitalist state. However it must be 
enriched by empirical studies which help to conceptualise the relation between the 
capitalist state and global economy. In this way we are able to analyse how global crisis 
is experienced by capitalist states in a national form. This thesis is an attempt to enrich 
the theory with empirical study. It intends to analyse the resolution of the crisis of the 
Argentinian state by the 1976 military dictatorship and the 1983 democratic 
government. It is mainly focused on the attempt of the democratic government to resolve 
the crisis of the Argentinian state in the context of the debt crisis. 
Although crisis is often experienced in an economic form, it inevitably involves a 
restructuring of social relations. Crisis is not the transition from one phase of 
accumulation to another, rather it expresses the instability of the labour-capital 
relation which is the basis of capitalist society. 
Thus, this thesis is guided by the assumption that the crisis of the capitalist state 
means a breakdown and a restructuring of the capital relation. In the context of 
globalisation of capital, the restructuring of the capital relation means a restructuring 
of the state, the working class, and the state's relationship to the global economy. With 
the 'triumph of monetarism' over Keynesian policies this restructuring means, 
54 
ideologically and politically, the imposition of the rule of money and the law. These 
theoretical assumptions provide a framework from which the attempt of restructuring 
the Argentinian state by the 1976 military dictatorship and the 1983 democratic 
government can be analysed avoiding the fetishised separation between 'economics' and 
'politics'. 
According to the significance given to the historical context, it is now necessary 
to present the development of the crisis of the Argentinian state from the 1950s to the 
early 1970s in order to explain the causes of the 1976 military dictatorship. 
1 Although there are a number of pluralist schools they all tend to share common 
assumptions. Thus the analysis, I will present, is focused on these common assumptions. 
See, for instance, Dahl (1956), (1958), (1961), and (1978), and Bachrach and 
Baratz (1962) and (1970). 
2 4talics in text 
31talics in text 
4 For a good critique of this debate see Clarke (1991b), and Holloway and Picciotto 
(1977). 
5ltalics in text 
6 O'Donnell (1988, p. 23) defines 'popular sector' as the ensemble formed by the 
working class and the unionised segments of the middle sectors. 
7 The upper bourgeoisie is composed of the larger and more powerful (monopolistic or 
oligopolistic) fractions of urban private capital, both national and transnational 
(O'Donnell, 1988, p. 33). 
8 For other critiques see Collier (1979). 
9 For more details on dependency theory see Cardoso and Faletto (1979), Frank 
(1978), Palma (1978), Caporaso (1978), Sunkel (1972) and Carnoy (1984). 
10 Italics in text. 
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Chapter 2 
A brief historical background of the crisis of the Argentinian state 
Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to set the scene for the analysis of the 1976 
military dictatorship, explaining the historical origins of the crisis of the 
Argentinian state. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first deals with the 
recent political background explaining the causes and consequences of the crisis of 
the Argentinian state. It analyses the emergence of Peronism, sindicalismo peronista, 
and examines the political role of the Armed Forces. It highlights the reasons why, 
historically, in Argentinian politics, the Armed Forces and the trades union 
movement played an influential role. The second section explains Argentina's recent 
economic development, preparing the ground for the study of the 1976 economic 
structural reform. The last section concludes by analysing the development of the 
crisis of the Argentinian state and outlining its main features in 1976. 
1. The Political Background 
i. The emergence of Peronism and 'sindicalismo peronista' 
In 1930 the first military coup ended fourteen years of democracy in 
Argentina. The 1916 Radical government signalled the incorporation of the middle 
sectors of Argentinian society into the political spheres. The coup was the first 
manifestation of the crisis of the Argentinian state since it once again excluded the 
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middle sectors from political involvement. The re-incorporation of both the middle 
sectors and the working class had to await the arrival of Peronism. 
In 1943, after many conservative governments which were the result of 
electoral frauds2, a nationalist sector of the Armed Forces took over the government. 
The GOU (Grupo de Oficiales Unidos -United Officials Group), a secret military 
society, organised the coup. The main aim of the coup was to overthrow President 
Ramön Castillo and the presidential candidate Robustiano Patrön Costas who would 
have been elected by another electoral fraud (Potash, 1969). The objective of the 
coup was, thus, to end the 'electoral fraud era' (decada infame), and to begin a return 
to democracy. One of the main participants of the 1943 military coup was Colonel 
Juan Domingo Perön. By 1944 Perön was, simultaneously, Vice-President, Minister 
of War and Secretary of Labour (Potash, 1969, p. 248). 
Perön, from his position as Secretary of Labour, encouraged the unionisation 
of the working class. The labour movement which existed at the time of the 1943 
military coup was divided and weak. There existed four labour organisations: the 
anarchist Federaciön Obrera Regional Argentina (Argentinian Regional Workers' 
Federation), the syndicalist Uniön Sindical Argentina (Argentinian Syndical Union), 
and the Contederaciön General del Trabajo -CGT- (General Confederation of Labour) 
n1, controlled by socialists, and CGT n° 2, controlled by communists. In 1943 
only 20 per cent of the urban labour force was organised, the majority of them from 
the tertiary sector. The great majority of the industrial labour force was, thus, 
outside effective union organisation (James, 1988, p. 9). Construction, food 
processing and wood working had been organised by the Communist Party, while 
textiles and metal working, which had been the vital areas of industrial expansion in 
the 1930s and the 1940s, were not unionised. "Of 447.212 union members in 1941 
the transport sector and services accounted for well over 50 per cent of 
membership, while industry had 144.922 affiliates" (James, 1988, p. 9). In this 
context of weak unionism, there were wide wage differentials, seasonal 
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unemployment, and general low pay. Per©n encouraged unionisation. He released 
union leaders from prison, opened government posts to union men, provided many 
short-run benefits to the workers and added a large welfare dimension to the 
activities of the state (Corradi, 1985, p. 58). He established a forty-hour week, the 
minimum wage, medical insurance, rights for dismissed employees, and annual paid 
holidays (Lewis, 1992, p. 140). He also integrated the trade unions into a single 
massive national confederation. In November 1944, Perön dissolved the communist 
CGT n° 2 and ordered all trade unions to join the CGT n° 1 (Lewis, 1992, p. 141). 
Perön also enacted the Law of Professional Associations which established that: 
"No union could claim legal status unless first granted 
recognition by the Secretariat of Labour. Without such 
recognition, it could not sign a legally binding contract, 
represent its members in labour courts, or own 
property. Only one union was allowed in each economic 
field. In theory, the government was supposed to 
recognise the largest unions as the most 
representative" (Lewis, 1992, p. 141). 
Perön was also concerned with rural labour. He promulgated the Estatuto del 
Peßn (Statute of the Rural worker) which regulated minimum wages for rural 
workers. The Statute required farmers to provide decent housing, medical services, 
warm clothing, and wholesome food for the rural workers (Lewis, 1992, p. 142). 
Through these measures Perön integrated the working class into the political 
and economic scenario and recognised its civic and political rights within society. A 
plot within the Armed Forces against Perin resulted in his arrest on the 13th 
October 19453. There are few events in Argentinian history that can be compared 
with the 17th October 1945. Even now it is unclear who was behind the organisation 
(Luna, 1982) but from very early in the morning, thousands of workers came to 
Buenos Aires to demand Perön's release. Felix Luna captures the atmosphere of the 
1 7th of October: 
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"Well, there they were. As if they wanted to show all 
their power, so that nobody could doubt that they really 
existed. There they were all over the city, shouting in 
groups which seemed to be the same group multiplied 
by hundreds. We looked at them from the side walk, 
with a feeling akin to compassion. Where had they come 
from? So they really existed? So many of them? So 
different from us? Had they really come on foot from 
those suburbs whose names made up a vague unknown 
geography, a terra incognita through which we had 
never wandered ... 
During all those days we had made 
the rounds of the places were they spoke of worries 
like ours. We had moved through a known map, 
familiar: the faculty, Recoleta for the burial of Salmün 
Feijöo, the Plaza San Martin, the Casa Radical. 
Everything up till then was coherent and logical, 
everything seemed to support our own beliefs. But that 
day when the voices began to ring out and the columns 
of anonymous earth-coloured faces began to pass by we 
felt something tremble which until that day had seemed 
unmovable" (Luna, 1982, p. 320). 
After the 17th of October 1945 Argentina was never the same, the working 
class had appeared as a political actor. Because of the social demonstration in the 
Plaza de Mayo, Perön was released. He went to the balcony of the House of 
Government and made his first speech to the thousands of people waiting for him. 
This would become a tradition during Peronist governments. After the 17th October 
1945 it was not a surprise that Perön won the 1946 and 1952 general elections. A 
military coup in 1955 overthrew Perön's government and obliged him to flee from 
Argentina. His return was prohibited for eighteen years. 
Peronism was characterised by the incorporation of the workers into the 
political scenario and their organisation as a labour force. Perön extended political 
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and social rights to the workers. Perän and his wife, Eva, were seen as the protectors 
of the workers. 
One of Perön's main objectives was to create a comunidad organizada 
(organised community), and to organise the working class (Smith, 1980, p. 81). He 
argued that unorganised workers "present a dangerous panorama because the most 
dangerous mass ... is an inorganic one. Modern experience shows that the best 
organised working masses ... are those which can best be directed and led in all 
spheres" (Smith, 1980, p. 81). Perön emphasised the role of the unions as the 
representatives of the working class. The trade unions were incorporated into a 
Peronist movement and "were called upon to act as the state's agent vis-'a-vis the 
working class, organising political support and serving as conduits of government 
policy among the workers" (James, 1988, p. 11). Between 1946 and 1951 total 
union membership increased from 520.00' members to 2.334.000 (James, 1988, 
p. 9). In addition to the organisation of the trade unions, real wages for industrial 
workers increased by 53 per cent between 1946 and 1949, and the share of wages 
on the national income increased from 40.1 per cent to 49 percent in the same 
period (James, 1988, p. 11). 
The Peronist years saw the emergence of sindicalismo peronista4(Peronist 
trades union movement). As indicated, Perön, from the Secretary of Labour, 
promoted the unionisation of the workers. In July 1943, the government established 
that labour organisations could not be involved in politics or spread ideas 'contrary 
to Argentinian nationality' (Lewis, 1992, p. 141). This gave Perön the power to 
intervene directly in union affairs. He removed and arrested trade unionists who 
opposed him and replaced them with his followers. He was able to do so due to the 
weakness of the trades union movement. Thus, by 1945, the leaders of the textile 
workers, meat packers, railway, metallurgical, bank, telephone, printing, sugar, 
and construction workers were loyal to Perön (Lewis, 1992, p. 141). This was the 
origin of sindicalismo peronista; after the Peronist era most trade unionists were 
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still loyal to Perön. Indeed, the peronizaciön of the trades union movement had 
significant compensations for workers and trade unionists. Perön gave them a voice 
in Argentinian politics. Peron greatly improved the political, social, and economic 
situation of the working class. 
Although after Per®n's fall, the social situation changed, Argentina was never 
the same. Despite Perön's exit, in reality, the working class could not henceforth be 
ignored by Argentina's governments. In addition, the Armed Forces, through the 
1955 military coup became the representatives of the upper bourgeoisie since it had 
lost its traditional and broader influence based on the 'electoral fraud system'. 
Therefore, after Perön's fall, the Argentinian political scenario had dramatically 
changed, the Armed Forces and the working class its new most influential actors. 
While the working class remained loyal to Perön, the Armed Forces were deeply 
anti-Peronist. Thus, from 1955 the Armed Forces tried to desperonizar Argentina. 
ii. The political role of the Armed Forces 
Desperonizar Argentina was the main objective of the Revoiuciön Libertadora 
(Liberating Revolution) of 1955, namely, to free the private sector from state 
controls created under Peronism and to purge all Peronist influences from national 
politics prior to returning to civilian rule (Smith, 1980, p. 99). President Lt. 
General Eduardo Lonardi and his successor Lt. General Pedro Aramburu aimed at 
depoliticising the labour movement by breaking Peronist union bosses' hold on 
power. Lonardi began the process by removing the Peronist General Secretary of the 
CGT, Hugo Di Pietro, and replacing him with two younger Peronists who were willing 
to negotiate with the new regime in order to defend labour's gains (Lewis, 1992, p. 
227). Under Lonardi's presidency there was a general strike called by the CGT due to 
Lonardi's removal of all union officials in order to call for trade unions elections. 
After the strike, Lonardi restored all union officials (Lewis, 1992, p. 228). 
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However, Lt. General Pedro Aramburu, who replaced Lonardi, made no attempt to 
negotiate with the trade unions. Armed raids of Peronist unions increased, and when 
the CGT responded with a general strike, Aramburu sent in troops to seize its offices 
(Lewis, 1992, p. 229). 
General elections were scheduled for February 1958. Peronism was 
proscribed and the Radical Party was divided into two factions: the Uniön Civica 
Radical Intransigente which nominated Arturo Frondizi as its presidential candidate, 
and the Uniön Cfvica Radical del Pueblo 
candidate. 
with Ricardo Balbin as presidential 
Perön was then in Caracas. Frondizi reached an agreement with him. Peron 
agreed to instruct his followers to vote for Frondizi who would, if elected, restore 
the Peronist Party, the Law of Professional Associations to its original form, lift the 
control over CGT activities, release all Peronist labour leaders from jail, drop all 
criminal charges against Perön, and re-nationalise the banking system (Lewis, 
1992, p. 238). Frondizi was elected President with 45 per cent of the total vote 
cast, while Ricardo Balbin from the Uniön Civica Radical del Pueblo received only 29 
per cent (Wynia, 1992, p. 32). Juan D. Perön, from his exile, was still dominating 
Argentinian politics. However, Frondizi did not fulfill his agreement with Perön, 
especially in the economic spheres. in addition, Frondizi's strategy to cooperate with 
organised labour was not very successful mainly due to the decline in real wages and 
periodic action by the police and military to repress strikes (Smith, 1980, p. 10 3). 
Thus, Frondizi could not retain the workers support. Indeed, Frondizi's decision to 
allow Peronist candidates to run for the March 1962 mid-term elections resulted in 
an important victory for Peronism which obtained the governorship of Buenos Aires 
province and 31.5 per cent of the total vote cast (Smith, 1980, p. 103). The result 
of the elections was not accepted by the Armed Forces which overthrew Frondizi from 
the Presidency and replaced him with the President of the Supreme Justice Court, 
Jose Maria Guido. 
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The Guido administration was marked by internal conflicts in the Armed 
Forces. Two factions emerged: the colorados (red ones) which combined "extreme 
economic orthodoxy and internationalism with near-fanatical anti-P eronism" 
(Smith, 1980, p. 104). They favoured a doctrine of total vigilance over national 
politics, the postponement of elections and the complete purge of Peronism from all 
aspects of national life. The azules (blue ones) favoured a quick r eturn to 
constitutional rule. They were led by Lt. General Juan Carlos Ongania who stood for 
the "military's 'spirit of self-preservation', defined as the defense of its corporate 
interests, internal cohesion, and autonomy from the political struggles raging in 
civil society and in the rest of the state apparatus" (Smith, 1980, p. 104). The 
dispute between the azules and colorados led to unprecedented armed conflicts in 
September 1962 and April 1963 when the azules obtained a definitive victory 
(Smith, 1980, p. 104). 
With the azules` victory the demand for general elections was realised. For 
the 1963 general elections, Peronism was proscribed and Frondizi was in prison, 
thus, the Uniön Civica Radical del Pueblo won the general elections with 25 per cent 
of the total vote cast (Wynia, 1992, p. 32). Blank ballots, mainly cast by Peronists, 
accounted 17.5 per cent of the total vote cast and Frondizi`s Party, 16.2 per cent 
(Smith, 1980, p. 101). 
The elected Radical President, Dr. Arturo lllia, was opposed, from the very 
beginning of his term, by the CGT. The CGT argued that lüia had been elected 
by 
fraudulent and illegitimate means, namely, the proscription of Peronism. 
Labour 
opposition was manifested through a prolonged series of general strikes, occupations 
and demonstrations against the government. During 1963, there were 143 national 
strikes; in 1964,265; and in 1965,291 (Smith, 1980, p. 100). Illia's main goal 
was the restablishment of full political rights. Therefore, for the 
1965 mid-term 
elections, Peronism was allowed to present candidates. It won 34.5 per cent of 
the 
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total vote cast while Illia's Radical party obtained 28.6 per cent (Smith, 1980, p. 
101). 
The Armed Forces were sure that the 1967 elections would result in a 
Peronist victory. In order to prevent the return of Peronism, the Armed Forces, 
once again, overthrew a 'democratic' government. However, the 1966 military coup 
was different: 
"This would not be merely another repetition of the 
familiar coups of the intervene-and-exit variety, 
turning power to the most 'reliable' civilian 
politicians. The army's internal memoranda reveal that 
something quite different was being planned. According 
to the leading theorists of the doctrina azul (blue 
doctrine), since 1955 all the major non-Peronist 
political parties had been given their chance to create a 
stable democratic government, overcome the social 
stalemate, and modernise the economy; all had failed. 
Consequently the next military intervention had to be a 
'revolution' to sweep aside the entire 'corrupt' system 
of political parties and competitive politics, and not 
merely a coup to replace an individual president or a 
particular political party" (Smith, 1980, p. 109). 
The Armed Forces did not understand that to create a 'stable democratic 
government and to overcome the social stalemate' Peronism could not be ignored. The 
working class was the ultimate barrier to any attempt to govern Argentina. Any 
solution which excluded the workers and/or their leader, Juan D. Peron, would fail. 
As indicated earlier, before the emergence of Peronism, the middle sectors and the 
workers were excluded from Argentinian politics. Peronism meant a restructuring 
of the state and its social relations. It mainly meant the full inclusion of the workers 
as a political and social force. The 1955 military coup was an attempt, by the Armed 
Forces and the upper bourgeoisie, to restructure the state and its social relations by 
depoliticising and demobilising the workers. Thus, in 1966 the Armed Forces 
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imposed a new kind of military coup, with different objectives, in order to 
breakdown the institutionalised power of the working class. However, the latter 
proved too powerful and the Armed Forces' strategy failed. 
As explained in chapter one, the 1966 military dictatorship has been defined 
by O'Donnell (1988, p. 31) as a Bureaucratic Authoritarian state (BA), that is a 
"defensive reaction by the dominant classes and their allies to crises involving a 
popular sector that has been politically activated and is increasingly autonomous 
with respect to the dominant classes and the state apparatus". The principal social 
base of the BA is the upper bourgeoisie, in a class structure defined by O'Donnell 
(1988, p. 31) as subordinated to the upper fractions of a highly oligopolised and 
transnationalised bourgeoisie. The main objective of the BA is the political 
deactivation of the popular sector, the reimposition of 'order', and the stabilisation, 
'normalisation' in O'Donnell's words, of the economy. The BA state is a system of 
political and economic exclusion of the working class. In O'Donnell's point of view, 
the political activation of the popular sector was seen by the bourgeoisie and the 
Armed Forces as a threat to the capitalist system in Argentina. 
From 1966 to 1973, the Armed Forces tried to achieve two main objectives: 
the imposition of what they understand as political and social 'order' and the 
stabilisation of the economy. The first President of the 'Argentinian Revolution' (as 
the new military government was called) Commander in Chief Lt. General Juan 
Carlos Ongania tried to achieve the second objective appointing as Minister of 
Economy a man from the upper bourgeoisie, Adalbert Krieger Vasena6 
Regarding the trades union movement, the military dictatorship did not have a 
specific strategy to desperonizar it. The government chose to 'divide and conquer' 
"meeting labour protests head-on and ruthlessly suppressing them, at the same time 
inviting selected unions to ally themselves with the government as long as they 
refrained from protesting its policies" (Wynia, 1992, p. 83). As a result of this 
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strategy the CGT was divided into two bodies: CGT de los Argentinos (Argentinians' 
CGT) and CGT-Calle Azopardo (CGT-Azopardo Street); the former was much tougher 
in negotiating with the military government (O'Donnell, 1988, p. 149). The 
existence of the CGT was becoming a real problem for Ongania and his economic 
policy due to the increase of trade unions' demands through strikes7. But the 
beginning of the end of Ongania's presidency was signalled by the so-called Cordobazo. 
The antecedents of the Cordobazo were confrontations between university students 
and the police. On May 15th, 1969, during a protest against increases in cafeteria 
prices in the Corrientes province a student was killed; another student died in a 
demonstration in Rosario (Wynia, 1992, p. 83). On May 28 and 29, in Cordoba (one 
of the largest and richest cities in Argentina with one of the oldest Universities), 
students, workers and other middle sectors "launched a mass uprising. Assailed by 
rocks, Molotov cocktails, and an inflamed multitude, the police retreated, and the 
insurrection took over most of the city, focusing its attacks on targets whose 
symbolic implications escaped nobody: property of the government and of 
transnational corporations" (O'Donnell, 1988, p. 159). After the Cordobazo, the 
idea of order and the government's authority lacked credibility. Likewise, guerrilla 
activity soon emerged. On May 29,1970, former-President, Lt. General Juan C. 
Aramburu, was kidnapped and later killed by Montoneros8 (the revolutionary-wing 
of the Peronist Party). This buried completely the idea of order and the authority of 
the 'Argentinian Revolution'9 
All these events indicate that the military dictatorship was unable to control 
the institutionalised power of the working class and to prevent the emergence of 
armed urban guerrillas. The seizure of state power by the Armed Forces, as a 
response to the political crisis, failed to tackle the real barrier to the resolution of 
the crisis, the institutionalised power of the working class. 
After Ongania's resignation, Lt. General Roberto Levingston took over as the 
second President who intended to 'nationalise' the 1966 military dictatorship. Under 
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his presidency, the Radical Party, the Peronist Party and some other political 
parties agreed, in a document called La Hora del Pueblo (The Hour of the People) for 
an urgent return to democracy (ODonnell, 1988, p. 207). In addition to the 
emergence of political party activity a second Cordobazo marked the end of 
Levingston's term. Moreover, economic problems and lack of support from the upper 
bourgeoisie -which had never agreed with Levingston's return to 'economic 
nationalism`- unleashed a coup by Commander in Chief Lt. General Alejandro Lanusse 
(Lewis, 1992, p. 286). Lt. General Lanusse tried to organise -particularly by 
negotiating with Peronism- a return to democracy. In 1973, after seven years the 
Armed Forces left the government without achieving any of its objectives; order, 
social peace and economic stabilisation were all absent from Argentina in the early 
seventies. 
As the 1966 military dictatorship was unable to demobilise the working 
class, it was not a surprise that a Peronist candidate won the 1973 general elections. 
In March 1973, the Peronist candidate for President, Hector Cämpora, won the 
general elections with 50 per cent of the total vote cast. After eighteen years of exile, 
Juan D. Perön returned to Argentina on June 20,1973. On July 13, Cämpora and the 
vice-President, Vicente Solano Lima, resigned and new general elections were held 
on September 23. Juan D. Perön and his new wife, Maria Estela Martinez de Perön, 
won the elections with 62 per cent of the total vote cast (Wynia, 1992, p. 60). 
Perbn's presidency unsuccessfully attempted to reach a social pact between the 
government, the trade unions and the business organisations1 0. it seemed that, after 
eighteen years of exile, Perön no longer understood Argentinian politics. In his 
absence, there had been important changes. A harsh internal struggle had broken out 
within the trade unions, different factions each claiming to be the successor of 
Perdn's leadership. The left-wing Peronist youth section had obtained an important 
role under Cämpora's presidency. Now they came into conflict with Perön in an effort 
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to maintain their influence. Perön could no longer control the internal struggles in 
either the Peronist Party or the trades union movement> 1 
After Perön's death in July 1974, his widow's government had to deal with 
these continuing power struggles. In addition, Jose Löpez Rega, the Minister of Social 
Welfare, had now formed a neo-fascist paramilitary group, the Alianza Argentina 
Anti-Comunista -Triple A- (Argentinian Anti-Communist Alliance) which had the 
objective of "'ideological cleansing' (depuraciön ideolögica) to eliminate zurdos 
(literally left-handed persons) and Marxist 'infiltrators' who had entered the 
Peronist Movement" (Smith, 1989, p. 228). The struggle of 'the triple A' against 
the Montoneros and the Marxist Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo (People's 
Revolutionary Army) led Argentina to violence on a scale previously unknown. 
O'Donnell (1988, p. 142) defines the pre-1976 situation as "a crisis of 
social domination with serious challenges to the coercive supremacy of the state 
apparatus". A crisis of social domination is a crisis of the state as an apparatus, but 
also, "in its primary aspect as a guarantor and organiser of social domination" 
(O'Donnell, 1988, p. 26). This type of crisis is defined as the 'supreme political 
crisis', it is a crisis of the state as a form of social domination (O'Donnell, 1988, p. 
26). There was, indeed, a crisis of the state. However, the emergence of this crisis 
was not in the seventies or the sixties. The emergence of the crisis of the Argentinian 
state began in the thirties when the Armed Forces, for the first time, overthrew a 
democratic government. The emergence of Peronism in the forties deepened the crisis 
and made the restructuring of the state and the social relations more difficult due to 
the emergence of the institutional power of the working class. 
Once again, although just three years before the Armed Forces had failed in 
their attempt to impose 'order and stabilise' the economy, in March 24,1976, they 
took office through a coup d'etat. Essentially, the main objective of the 1976 
military dictatorship was the imposition of disciplinamiento social (social 
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discipline) (Canitrot, 1981, p. 132) -the attempt to discipline society through 
subordinating the working class in both the political and the economic sphere. This 
disciplinamiento social was imposed through an economic structural reform and 
State Terrorism. 
In contrast to the failure of the 1966 military dictatorship, the 1976 
dictatorship did achieve some of its objectives. The political demobilisation of the 
working class, albeit on a temporary basis, and the defeat of the armed urban 
guerrillas was achieved through the implementation of State Terrorism, the 
establishment of concentration camps, and the 'disappearance' of 30.000 peoples 2 
Fear was one of the best political allies of the Armed Forces. In addition an economic 
structural reform achieved the economic subordination of the working class, and 
transformed Argentina's economic structure to make it impossible for any future 
government to embark on a 'return to the past' (Smith, 1985, p. 74). Thus, the 
objective of the military dictatorship was the imposition of a disciplinamiento social 
which was to last longer than the dictatorship itself. Before analysing the 1976 
military dictatorship's efforts to achieve this disciplinamiento social, let me briefly 
explain Argentina's economic development from the 1950s to the early 1970s. 
II. The Economic Background 
i. The Peronist economy 
Peronism did not only change Argentina's social and political scenario but also 
its economic structure. Helped by the accumulation of reserves during the Second 
World War, the Peronist government stimulated activity in non-saleable goods and 
services, the production of marketable goods expanding as a result of the opening up 
of international trade immediately after the war (Gerchunoff, 1989, p. 63). 
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One of the main priorities of the Peronist government was a redistribution of 
income in favour of workers. In manufacturing industry, the real wage per worker 
increased by 72 per cent between 1950 and 1954; 80 per cent of this increase took 
place during the first three years of Peronist administration (Gerchunoff, 1989, p. 
64). In 1954 a basket of basic food items cost an Argentinian industrial worker 14 
hours of labour as compared with 25 hours for an Uruguayan industrial worker, 
40.5 hours for a Brazilian, and 74 hours for a Peruvian (Lewis, 1992, p. 208). 
The second notable aspect of Peronism was the expansion of the economic role 
of the state. Total state expenditure jumped 87 per cent between 1939-1944 and 
1945-49; by 1955 the increase was only 16 per cent (Smith, 1980, p. 76). State 
investment increased by 248 per cent between 1946 and 1950 (Smith, 1980, p. 
76). This increases were the result of the new presence of the state in public 
services (railroads, shipping, energy, communication) and in areas that 
traditionally were developed by foreign capital (foreign trade, insurance, banking), 
as well as the opening up of new public-sector activities such as airlines (Smith, 
1980, p. 76). In addition, the state, through loans from the Banco de Credito 
Industrial (Industrial Credit Bank), promoted specific industries such as housing 
construction, regional meat packing plant, agricultural machinery producers, 
regional electricity cooperatives, frozen-food factories, and the purchase of diesel 
vehicles (Lewis, 1992, p. 185). 
Finally, the third most notable feature of Peronism was the nationalisation of 
foreign trade. The newly-created Instituto Argentino de Promociön de Intercambio- 
IAP1- (Argentinian Institute for the Promotion of Trade) "received international 
market prices for Argentina's exports in hard currencies and then turned around and 
paid rural producers in pesos at well below the world market price" (Smith, 1980, 
p. 77). The generated surplus was to finance industrial investment and urban 
consumption. This state-managed transfer from the rural sector to urban labour 
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served to finance industrialisation with income redistribution. However, after 
1949, the decline of the terms of trade together with bad droughts in 1951 and 
1952 reduced the volume and purchasing power of exports. Thus, the transfer 
system was, in fact, put into reverse. In order to increase incentives for rural 
producers, the state began to transfer surplus generated in urban areas to the 
agricultural sector (Smith, 1980, p. 78). 
During this period, there was a double process of industrial fragmentation 
and centralisation of production. This resulted in a increase in the number of 
manufacturing firms from 86400 to 151800 between 1946 and 1954 (Smith, 
1980, p. 78). The fragmentation occurred in the light industrial sector while the 
centralisation was in the more dynamic intermediate and heavy industrial sectors 
(basic metals, vehicles and petrochemicals) "which increased both their proportion 
of industrial GDP and their share of industrial employment" (Smith, 1980, p. 78). 
Thus, the industrial bourgeoisie became divided between a large number of small and 
medium size companies and a small group of firms, organised as corporations, which 
had considerable capacity to achieve monopoly or oligopoly rents due to their 
capacity to fix prices. The latter group did not feel protected by Peronism, and thus 
it formed a temporary alliance with the Pampeana bourgeoisie (Smith, 1980, p. 
78). The basis of this alliance was, mainly, support for the liberalisation of state 
controls. This alliance was the social basis of the 1955 military coup. 
ii. The 1955-1966 economic strategies 
The politically unstable period of 1955-1966 witnessed the increase of 
foreign capital inflows. In the 1950s foreign investment started to control the most 
dynamic branches of industry and consolidate the strategy of import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) which had started in the 1930s. From 1958 to 1966, 
US$630 million in new foreign investments arrived. The share of US capital was 
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55.2 per cent of the total foreign investment. More than 90 per cent of all US 
investment went into chemical, petrochemical, transportation, metallurgy, 
machinery, electrical equipment and petroleum industries (Smith, 1980, p. 90). 
This resulted in a further concentration and centralisation of capital. 
Looking at data from the Industrial Census of 1963 (by 
which time the biggest spurt of foreign investment was 
largely completed), one finds that while transnational 
firms comprised only 0.5 per cent of all industrial 
firms (666 out of 143057), they accounted for 25.1 
per cent of total industrial production and 75.1 per 
cent of production in the ten most important industrial 
branches, measured in terms of value added. The 
transnational firms, together with a somewhat larger 
number of big locally-owned firms (many of whom 
also had significant linkages with transnational capital 
through portfolio investment, technology, management 
interlocks, etc. ), formed the more advanced elements of 
a process of diversification of entrepreneurial 
leadership, and thereby comprised the dynamic core of 
the modern internationalised bourgeoisie expanding its 
dominance over the entire urban economy" (Smith, 
1980, p. 91)1 3. 
This internationalisation of the economy was made possible through the 
dismantling of state control over foreign exchange, prices, and wages, favouring the 
imposition of 'market rules'. As a result, wages declined from 48 per cent of the GDP 
between 1950-1955 to 38 per cent in the early 1960s (Smith, 1980, p. 93). 
Economically, the most significant period between 1955 and 1966 is that of 
Arturo Frondizi's presidency. The main objectives of Frondizi's Desarrollismo 
(developmental ism) was that Argentina had to "1) pursue a strategy of 'deepening' 
its economy in order to construct an integrated industrial complex centred on basic 
industries (steel, chemicals, paper, machinery, etc. ); 2) free itself from the 
international division of labour under US domination; and 3) develop large-scale, 
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highly capitalised agro-industrial enterprises" (Smith, 1980, p. 102). A list of 
investment priorities was drawn up which included the extraction of petroleum and 
natural gas; development of chemicals and petrochemicals; steel production; the 
extraction of coal and iron; and the automobile industry (Petrecolla, 1989, p. 110). 
These priorities were to be financed by foreign investment. The sanction of the law 
14780 gave foreign capital rights equal to those of national capital. Almost no sector 
of activity was excluded from the entry of foreign capital. The latter could 
participate in import substitution industries, in the promotion of exports, or in the 
promotion of development activity to 'increase the growth of the country' 
(Petrecolla, 1989, p. 110). 
At the very beginning of Frondizi's presidency there were significant wage 
increases; however, in 1960 a restrictive wage policy was put into effect. Collective 
bargaining agreements were signed for two years, during which a wage increase of 
20-30 per cent was authorised, less than the price increases which went up over 30 
per cent from 1959 to 1961 (Petrecolla, 1989, p. 113). This, together with 
attempts to reduce the number of state employees, caused a confrontation with the 
trade unions. In August 1961, the Minister of Economy, Roberto Alemann, announced 
that 75000 railway employees were to be laid off, "several lines would be closed 
down, and the working day would be increased from three and a half to six hours" 
(Lewis, 1992, p. 262). The railroad workers struck, and remained out until 
December when the reorganisation plan was abandoned. Thus, Frondizi, despite being 
elected through Peronist votes, could neither control nor demobilise the workers. 
They were the ultimate barrier to any non-Peronist restructuring of the state. 
As noted earlier, Frondizi was expelled from the government because he 
allowed Peronism to run in the 1962 mid-term elections. Since Jose Maria Guido's 
administration was in office only 562 days it could not implement any significant 
economic changes. The economic strategy was characterised by the liberalisation of 
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the exchange market, the reduction in government spending, and greater monetary 
control (De Pablo, 1989, p. 135). 
The 1963-1966 Radical administration was marked by recession, a large 
foreign debt and fiscal deterioration. The foreign financing of 1960-1961 added to 
the foreign debt which had been growing since 1955. "The resources gap, equivalent 
to the total of all current account deficits, reached US$ 2000 million, which meant 
that between 1955 and 1962 the foreign debt annually financed 16 per cent of all 
imports or 1.7 per cent of demand" (Guadagni, 1989, p. 150). By 1963 the foreign 
debt was US$ 3000 million with an annual service of US$ 800 million (Guadagni, 
1989, p. 150). Due to this situation, Illia's administration attempted to keep a 
positive balance on the current account. The key to the solution of the foreign debt 
problem is to be found in the favourable behaviour of the balance of trade, which as a 
result of a constant growth in exports, went from a deficit of US$ 813 million in 
1960-1962 to a surplus of US$ 1480 million in 1963-1966 (Guadagni, 1989, p. 
152). 
At the beginning of Illia's administration, real wages increased. The 
government announced that in 1965 wages for the public sector would rise by 15 
per cent. However, a harsh campaign from the trade unions, mainly through general 
strikes and occupations of work places, obliged the government to grant an increase 
of between 25 and 30 per cent for the first months of the year. Thus, by the end of 
the 1965, the wages of state employees rose by 50 per cent while the inflation rate 
was 20 per cent (Guadagni, 1989, p. 159). 
Illia, like Frondizi, allowed Peronism to run in the 1965 mid-term elections 
This, together with the growing opposition of the trades union movement, provoked 
the 1966 military coup. lllia's administration was, economically, successful, 
mainly due its management of the external debt problem. However, the 1955-1966 
period was characterised by the incapacity of governments to control the trades 
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union movement and to demobilise the workers. Thus, the crisis of the Argentinian 
state was, from 1955 to 1966, expressed in a political form rather than an 
economic form. 
iii. The economic strategy of the 'Argentinian Revolution' 
As noted earlier, the objectives of the 1966 military coup were different 
from the objectives of other military coups. As already quoted, the military 
government intended to be "a 'revolution' to sweep aside the entire 'corrupt' system 
of political parties and competitive politics, and not merely a coup to replace an 
individual president or a particular political party" (Smith, 1980, p. 109). 
Economically, the 1966 'Argentinian Revolution' attempted to stabilise the economy 
by reducing the role of the state. 
Adalbert Krieger Vasena, Ongania's Minister of Economy, emphasised the 
control of inflation by the reduction of government expenditures, trimming state 
employees, raising taxes, and increasing public service rates. He decreed a total wage 
freeze until 1968 and price guidelines (Lewis, 1992, p. 282). Krieger Vasena 
attempted to launch a strategy of dependent industrialisation based on the expansion 
of foreign monopoly capital. The objective was first to stabilise the economy and, 
within this framework, eliminate distortions and increase productive efficiency, and 
then, generate industrial expansion with the aid of foreign capital (Corradi, 19 8 5, 
p. 89). 
Foreign capital did go to Argentina. By 1968 US investment in Argentina 
totalled US$ 1148 million (Corradi, 1985, p. 90). This process, added to the one 
begun in the 1950s meant the denationalisation of capital and the liquidation of small 
and middle size industries. In addition, 
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"The new investments were characterised by a high 
organic composition of capital. The logic of their drive 
was to increase the weight of constant capital made up 
by machines and raw materials, but not in wages, 
tended to increase with the new advances in 
mechanisation. The upshot was a decline in the capacity 
of the industrial sector to absorb labour: the 
marginalisation of the working class that had been 
integrated into the system during a phase of labour- 
intensive exploitation" (Corradi, 1985, p. 90). 
In this sense, the 1966 military dictatorship differed from other Armed 
Forces attempts to politically stabilise Argentina. This time the Armed Forces 
attempted to demobilise the workers by subordinating them in the economic sphere. 
In this sense the 1966 military dictatorship and Krieger Vasena's economic strategy 
were antecedents of the 1976 military dictatorship and its economic structural 
reform. However, the 1966 experiment was destroyed by the Cordobazo, suggesting 
that the military dictatorship could neither control nor politically demobilise the 
workers. On the contrary, the 1966 military dictatorship witnessed two Cordobazos 
and the emergence of the armed urban guerrillas. 
Finally, the military dictatorship called elections which were won by the 
Peronist candidate. From 1955 to 1973 the Armed Forces attempted to destroy 
Peronism and to control the workers. The Cordobazo and the electoral victory of the 
Peronist candidate in 1973 highlight that not only had the military lost power but, 
worse, they had lost to the political movement they had set out to banish. 
rv. The last Peronist attempt 
In October 1973 when Juan Doming Perön took office, he attempted to reach a 
Pacto Social (Social Pact) between the trade unions and the business sector under the 
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aegis of the state. The Pacto Social was based on a price freeze and one wage increase 
of 13 percent. This resulted in an increase of the share of wages to 46 per cent of 
GNP, which represented more than four percentage points, reaching one of the 
highest levels of the previous ten years (Di Tella, 1989, p. 218). The Social Pact 
aimed to expand the domestic market, redistribute income in favour of the workers, 
achieve full employment, open new foreign markets (especially among the socialist 
countries), and promote manufactured exports (Smith, 1980, p. 537). The state 
would regulate foreign investments and international transfers of technology, 
promote small and medium size companies, and consolidate the public sector through 
limited nationalisation of foreign trade and some banking activities (Smith, 1980, p. 
538). 
In December 1973 there was an attempt to introduce some price flexibility 
which met with opposition from the trade unions which argued that price flexibility 
was a violation of the Social Pact. Wages were then increased by 20 per cent from 
Mach 1974. After this increase, prices began to rise (Di Tella, 1989, p. 220). To 
make things worse, the European Community closed its market to meat imports. "The 
surplus of the previous year's current account was reduced to about US$ 200 
million and, if the second part of the year is compared with the first, the change is 
even more dramatic, as it went from US$ 400 million surplus to a deficit of nearly 
300 million" (Di Tella, 1989, p. 220). 
As indicated earlier, Perön's third presidency was marked by the 
confrontation of different sectors within Peronism, mainly, the trade unions and the 
revolutionary youth wing. Perön himself could no longer control them. During 
Peron's exile, the trades union movement had reached a high degree of autonomy from 
its former leader. Even Perön was opposed by the trade unions when he attempted to 
implement price flexibility. Perön, like Frondizi, Illia and, to a lesser extent the 
1966 military dictatorship, granted wage increases in order to placate the trade 
unions opposition. The trades union movement proved, then, to be the strongest 
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barrier to any restructuring of the state. Even Perön, who was supposedly the only 
man capable of governing Argentina, was defeated by the opposition of the unions and 
the activity of armed urban guerrillas which were part of the Peronist movement, 
namely, the Montoneros. 
After the death of Perön in July 1974, the Social Pact was abandoned. Perbn's 
widow, Maria Estela Martinez de Perön, and her powerful Welfare Minister, Jose 
LOpez Rega, dramatically changed the orientation of the government. They looked for 
the support of the business sector and the Armed Forces. The government's 
programme was to eliminate the armed urban guerrilla by means of paramilitary 
groups -the so-called Triple A-, to eradicate left-wing groups in the universities 
and schools, and to reduce wages in order to favour the business sector (Di Teffa, 
1989, p. 221). 
In June 1975 the Economy Minister, Celestino Rodrigo, "announced an IMF- 
style shock treatment (i. e. a 50-per cent devaluation of the peso coupled with 
equivalent increases in public-sector prices, etc. ) in a desperate attempt to stabilise 
the economy" (Smith, 1989, p. 229). The so-called Rodrigazo was an attempt to 
produce a real devaluation and to increase public tariffs through a shock, in order to 
correct the disequilibrium of the balance of payments and the fiscal unbalance 
(Damill and Frenkel, 1990, p. 7). Fanelli and Frenkel (1989, p. 9) point out that 
"the main features of the 1975 crisis were a fiscal deficit that averaged 15 per cent 
of GDP, a spurt of inflation which led the economy to the brink of hyperinflation and 
a marked disequilibrium in the current account accompanied by massive capital 
fIight "1 4. As a consequence of the pressure of the CGT, through negotiations with the 
government and afterwards the organisation of strikes, the government authorised a 
140 per cent adjustment in nominal wages. "From June to August consumer prices 
jumped 102 per cent. Production fell off sharply, and financial speculation reached 
astronomic levels. The state itself was one of the principal losers, facing an 
unprecedented fiscal crisis: the fiscal deficit for 1975 reached 17 per cent of the 
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country's gross domestic product" (Smith, 1989, p. 230). In the first three months 
of 1976, the Peronist government tried to implement a stabilisation plan, but it 
failed again. A 100-per cent devaluation of the peso, an increase of 90 per cent in 
publicly controlled prices, and an increase of 20 per cent in nominal wages were the 
main measures of the plan. The results were "in March, consumer prices shot up 38 
per cent, while wholesale prices rose 58 per cent" (Smith, 1989, p. 230). 
This economic crisis soon became a political crisis. The state was under 
pressure to restructure economic and social relations but it was unable to do so. The 
unions were, by this time, a barrier to any restructuring. As Clarke (1990, p. 27) 
points out the response to this crisis is the restructuring of the state and of broader 
class relations. This response in Argentina took the form, politically, of an 
authoritarian government. 
III. Conclusion 
Peronism and its full incorporation of the working class into the political 
scenario put the class domination of the Argentinian capitalist state in ý danger. The 
Armed Forces, seizing power, attempted to restructure the state and its class 
relations. However, from 1955 to 1976, all their attempts failed. The 
institutionalised power of the working class was the ultimate barrier to such a 
restructuring. 
This political instability unleashed an economic crisis since neither the 
Armed Forces nor the democratic governments of the period could stabilise 
Argentina's economy or achieve long-run economic growth. By 1976 the crisis of the 
Argentinian state was evident in both political and economic terms. Thus, the seizure 
of state power by the Armed Forces attempted to restructure the state and its class 
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relations politically by demobilising the workers, militarily by defeating the armed 
urban guerrillas, and economically by implementing a structural reform to make 
impossible any attempt to 'return to the past'. 
The crisis of the Argentinian state was caused by the institutionalised power 
of the working class which put in danger the class domination. This is not to say that 
Argentina was in the brink of a 'social revolution', rather it is to say that the 
working class could not be controlled by the state. Argentina's working class did not 
attempt to make a 'social revolution', its only objective was to maintain the 
achievements of 1946-1955. Peronism, while bringing the working class into 
Argentina's political scenario, made any 'revolutionary' attempt impossible, since it 
established the pprcepiion that the state can benefit the working class, making the 
notion of class struggle unnecessary. 
The 1976 military dictatorship attempted to resolve the crisis of the 
Argentinian state by implementing a 'monetarist' restructuring of the state. I turn 
now to analyse this attempt and its consequences for the 1983-1989 democratic 
government. 
1 For a detailed account of the 1916-1930 period see Luna (1958), del Mazo 
(1959), Ciria (1964) and Galletti (1961). 
2 For an analysis of this period see Potash (1969), Luna (1958), Ciria (1964), 
and Puiggrös (1968). 
3 For a detailed account on this plot see Luna (1982) and Potash (1969). 
4 For an historical account of the emergence of sindicalismo peronista see 
Matsushita (1983), James (1988), Godio (1989) and Godio et al (1988), 
Cavarozzi (1984), Torre (1988), (1989), and (1990b). 
deal with Frondizi's economic strategy below. 
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6 Adalbert Krieger Vasena "had served as an adviser to and a member of the boards of 
directors of several large corporations, including TNC(transnational corporations) 
subsidiaries, and was well connected with international organisations and banks" 
(O'Donnell, 1988, p. 72). 1 deal with his economic policy below. 
7 There were 68 national strikes in 1967; 50 in 1968; and 93 in 1969 (O'Donnell, 
1988, p. 291). 
8 An excellent historical account of Montoneros is Gillespie (1982). 
9 Basic references for this period are Potash (1971), Rouquie (1983a), Perina 
(1983), and Cavarozzi (1983). 
10 For more details on the attempt to reach a social agreement see De Riz (1981) 
and James (1988). 
11 For more details on this period see De Rz (1981), James (1988), Di Tella 
(1983), and Landi (1978). 
12 This is the number commonly given by the organisations of human rights. The 
Comisiön Nacional de Desapariciön de Personas (CONADEP) - National Commission on 
Disappeared People- had heard evidence of 8960 cases (Argentina's National 
Commission on Disappeared People, 1986, p. XVI). 
13 For a detailed account of the role of foreign investment and the process of 
centralisation and concentration of capital see Azpiazu et al (1986) and 
Sourrouille 
et al (1985). The above mentioned 'big locally-owned firms' are the so-called 
Grupos Econörnicos Nacionales -GEN- (National Economic 
Groups) which, as I 
analyse below, played a crucial role in Argentina's economy during the 1970s and 
1980s. 
14 For more details on this period see Diaz Alejandro (1969), (1970), 
Malion and 
Sourrouille (1975), and Fanelli and Frenkel (1989). 
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Chapter 3 
The 1976-1983 military dictatorship and its economic legacy 
Introduction 
In 1976 the co-existence of urban guerrillas, an organised working class and 
a weak government with neither political nor economic goals, was viewed by the 
Armed Forces and the upper bourgeoisie as sufficient reason to, once again, install 
their form of 'order' in Argentina. The aim of the alliance was to subordinate and 
control the working class, to undermine its capacity to organise itself as a class and 
to express itself politically. This disciplinamiento social was achieved by both State 
Terrorism and a structural economic reform. The objective of this chapter is to state 
the political and economic legacy of the military dictatorship, and to assess to what 
extent the economic reform produced an overwhelming increase of the external debt, 
a profound concentration of capital in the hands of a small group of national 
corporations (GEN), and the impoverishment of the working class. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section analyses the early 
years of the military dictatorship (1976-1981) when the strongest repression as 
well as the structural economic reform were applied. The main measures of the 
economic plans are examined, as well as their consequences for the agricultural 
sector, the industrial sector, and the labour market. The section also traces the 
origins of the external debt. The second section covers the last years of the 
dictatorship (1981-1983), examining the government's attempt to retain power. 
The third section describes the transition to democracy and the results of the 1983 
general election. Finally, the conclusions turn to the legacy of the so-called Proceso 
de Reorganizaci6n Nacional (National Reorganisation Process). It analyses the 
consequences of the debt-led growth strategy, the concentration of capital and the 
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impoverishment of the working class, as they constitute one of the main constraints 
upon Alfonsin's government. 
!. 1976-1981: the apogee of the dictatorship 
In 1976 a new military government was established in Argentina. The 
'official' objective of the Proceso de Reorganizaciön Nacional was the establishment 
of a new order in Argentinian society through Christian values, national security and 
justice. In reality, its main objectives were the removal of the guerrilla, the 
disciplinamiento social through the subordination of the working class in both the 
political and the economic sphere, and the recovery of the state as "the guarantor not 
of the immediate interests of the bourgeoisie, but of the ensemble of social relations 
that establish the bourgeoisie as the dominant class°'1 (O'Donnell, 1988, p. 2). Its 
objective was the restructuring of the state and of class relations. 
As a consequence of the failure of the 1966 experience, this new dictatorship 
tried to correct the old mistakes in order to achieve its main objectives: the 
disciplinamiento social and economic 'normalisation'2. Therefore, the Armed Forces 
undertook a plan of structural reform of the Argentinian economy. Before describing 
this reform, let me briefly explain the juridical and social context upon which such 
an economic reform was applied. 
i. The 'juridical' framework of the dictatorship 
The suspension of constitutional rights and guarantees, and a new basis of 
rule given by acts and statutes made up the 'juridical' framework of the dictatorship. 
Two acts, one statute and one law were the main legal tools of the new government: 
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Acta para ei Proceso de Reorganizaciön Nacional (National Reorganisation Process' 
Act); Acta fijando ei propösito y los objetivos bäsicos para e/ Proceso (Act fixing the 
outline and basic objectives of the National Reorganisation Process); Estatuto para el 
Proceso de Reorganizaciön Nacional (Statute for the National Reorganisation 
Process); and law 21256 concerning the functioning of the Junta Militar, the 
Executive Power and the Cornisiön para e! Asesoramiento Legislativo -CAL- 
(Commission for Legal Advice) which replaced the Parliament (Ciarin, 25,26,27- 
3-1976). The Junta Militar was the supreme body, its duties were to secure the 
main objectives of the government and other bodies of the State, and to appoint and to 
remove the President. The Junta was formed by the three Commanders-in-Chief 
who would choose the President from the highest officials from the Armed Forces. 
The first Junta Militar was formed by Lt. General Jorge R. Videla, Brigadier Orlando 
E. Agosti and Admiral Emilio E. Massera (Clarin, 25-3-1976, p. 2-3). 
The Junta determined that the activity of political parties and trade unions 
was forbidden, including the ability to strike (Abös, 1984, p. 7). The peak 
organisation Confederaci©n General del Trabajo -CGT- was declared illegal (Abös, 
1984, p. 7). 
Lt. General Videla was appointed President of Argentina until March 19 7 83 
and he named Jose A. Martinez de Hoz4 as Economics Minister. While Martinez de Hoz 
was trying to achieve the social discipline through an economic structural reform, 
the Junta implemented State Terrorism as another tool of achieving the 
disciplin a mien to. 
ii. State Terrorism 
The Junta Militar continued and deepened the 'dirty war' which had already 
begun with `the triple A' 5. State Terrorism was imposed by kidnapping, tortures and 
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the assassination of thousands of people. Politicians, journalists, workers, trade 
unionists, intellectuals, students, nuns, priests and members of the Montoneros (the 
revolutionary-wing of the Peronist Party) and the Marxist Ejercito Revolucionario 
del Pueblo (People's Revolutionary Army) were tortured and killed. Smith quotes 
General Luciano Menendez, the head of the Third Army in Cördoba during the first 
years of the Proceso, and says that Menendez "observed that there existed a division 
of labour within the regime: 'While Videla governs, I kill". Menendez also 
acknowledged that: "We are going to kill 50000 people: 25000 subversives, 20000 
sympathizers, and we will make 5000 mistakes" (Smith, 1989, p. 232). 
On the 30th of April 1977, a group of mothers of the desaparecidos went to 
the Plaza de Mayo to demand from the government information about the fate of their 
lost relatives. They formed a group called Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of Plaza 
de Mayo). One of the founders, Azucena Villaflor de Vicenti, declared that every 
Thursday they would repeat the march around the square until the disappeared were 
accounted for (apariciön con vida). Later, she disappeared (Fontana and 
Llenderrozas, 1992, p. 158). The Mothers of Plaza de Mayo became a pillar of the 
struggle for human rights. They demonstrated that, while large sectors of the 
Argentinian population seemed apathetic in the face of State Terrorism, a number of 
groups were reacting against it. 
State Terrorism was seen as the principal political way of achieving social 
discipline. The Armed Forces established an organised net of terror. In the knowledge 
that they would not be punished, Army officials kidnapped people from their work, 
home or the street. After being tortured, some were killed and some were used to 
lure others for kidnapping. Most of them have never appeared again. The Armed 
Forces argued that the situation was akin to a war and that, due to the nature of the 
enemy, it was a very special kind of war (Andersen, 1993). However, when the 
Armed Forces took control the guerrilla movement was already almost defeated by the 
'Triple A'. The guerrilla threat was essentially ajexcuse to justify the use of violence 
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as a means of achieving social discipline6. Thus, State Terrorism was another way to 
demobilise the working class; indeed, thirty per cent of the desaparecidos (the 
largest single group) were workers (Argentina's National Commission on 
Disappeared People, 1986, p. 448). 
iii. The economic policy of the dictatorship 
The economic policy proposed by the Martinez de Hoz's teaM7 implied the 
"opening and reinsertion of Argentina's domestic economy into the world economy 
according to strict criteria of efficiency and the law of comparative advantages" 
(Smith, 1989, p. 234). It favoured a short-term capital market with high 
liquidity, increased the public and private external debt, and redistributed income 
through salary reductions. 
Retrospectively, Martinez de Hoz, explained that the objective of his 
administration was to "implement a structural reform of the economy and not only to 
overcome a crisis" (Di Tella and Rodriguez Braun, 1990, p. 151). Through the 
liberalisation and modernisation of the economy, the government wanted 
"to encourage individual effort and initiative, to 
reintroduce competitiveness into the Argentine economy, to 
encourage saving and investment as the launching-pad for 
capitalisation, to attain a more efficient resource 
allocation with a focus on activities with a higher 
productivity rate in relative terms, and thus to attain a 
rise in the average productivity rate and subsequently in 
the standard of living" (Di Tella and Rodriguez Braun, 
1990, p. 153). 
Martinez de Hoz describes his plan as consisting of four programmes: 
stabilisation, liberalisation, modernisation of the economy, and streamlining of the 
state (Di Telia and Rodriguez Braun, 1990). The first measures were the 
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liberalisation of prices, the opening up of domestic markets to foreign capitals, the 
liberalisation of exports and imports through the elimination of tariffs, the 
elimination of subsidised fuel prices, the freezing of wages, and a taxation reform 
consisting of the generalisation of Value Added Tax (VAT). 
At the very beginning Martinez de Hoz introduced two exchange rates: a 
financial rate, applied to financial transactions and stabilised until the end of 1976, 
and a commercial rate, applied to foreign trade and increased gradually until the end 
of 1976. The latter increased to achieve equality between both exchange rates by the 
end of the year. The monthly inflation rate in April 1976 was over 50 per cent; 
after the application of the new exchange rates it was 7 per cent, and by the end of 
1976 this rate was stable between 5 per cent and 9 per cent (Schvarzer, 1986a, p. 
47). 
With regard to real wages, the share of the wage earners fell dramatically, as 
table n2 1 shows, as a result of the Proceso. 
Table n2 1 
Wage bill as a share of national income 
1974-1981 
(percentages) 
1 974 50.5 
1 975 48.9 
1976 33.6 
1977 31.8 
1978 33.6 
1979 31.9 
1978 36.9 
1980 33.9 
1981 32.5 
Source: Orsatti, A. (1983) La nueva distribuciön funcional del ingreso en la 
Argentina, Desarrollo Econ©mico, n2 91 (Buenos Aires: IDES). 
88 
A comparison of inflation rates and changes in real wages shows the damage 
done to wage earners. 
Table n2 2 
Inflation rate 
1974-1981 
(percentages) 
1974 40.0 
1 975 335.1 
1976 349.0 
1977 160.0 
1978 169.0 
1979 140.1 
1980 87.5 
1981 1 31 .2 
Source: Frenkel et al. (1992) Argentina. Evoluciön macroecondmica, financiaciön 
externa y cambio politico en la decada de los 80 (Madrid: CEDEAL). 
Table n2 3 
Real wages per sector 
1974-1981 
(1976=100) 
Industrial workers 
1974 159.0 
1975 149.0 
1976 100.0 
1977 1 01 .0 
1978 98.2 
1979 112.1 
1980 124.1 
1981 114.2 
Public administration Services 
159.6 173.4 
166.9 139.3 
100.0 100.0 
92.9 98.5 
108.0 111.0 
113.4 125.2 
139.9 135.5 
115.5 1 21 .2 
Source: Gerchunoff, P. and Dieguez, H. (1984) La dinämica del mercado laboral 
urbano en la Argentina 1976-1981, Desarrollo Econömico, n° 93 (Buenos Aires: 
IDES). 
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At the very beginning of the dictatorship there was a substantial 
redistribution of income. In the first year of the dictatorship, the wage bill as a 
share of the national income decreased 31 per cent. A comparison between inflation 
rates and real wages between 1974 and 1976 highlights the damage done to wage 
earners. If in 1974 the real wage of an industrial worker was 159, in 1976 it 
equalled 1009. During this two year period the inflation rate went from 40.0 per 
cent in 1974 to 394.0 per cent in 1976. This means that as the inflation rate 
increased 772.5 per cent from 1974 to 1976 the real wage of an industrial worker 
decreased 37 per cent in the same period. 
Despite the prohibition of trade union activities, the labour movement 
organised strikes, go-slows and lightning stoppages as a response to the reduction of 
wages policy. The most persistent form of labour protest was the so-called trabajo a 
desgano (work to rule). In September 1976, there were conflicts in General 
Motors, Ford, Fiat, Peugeot and Chrysler. The government decided to establish the 
law 21400 which determined that everyone who participated in strikes would have a 
punishment of six years in prison, with ten years for those instigating strike action 
(New York Times, 9-9-1976, p. 8). Nevertheless, on the 5th October, a series of 
strikes by the electricity workers began. The cause of the strike was the sacking of 
108 workers from the state electricity company of Buenos Aires, as part of the plan 
to rationalise state expenditure by cutting down the number of workers. The sacked 
workers included the entire executive committee of the unions, and a considerable 
number of shop floor representatives. By the 11th October, in Buenos Aires city, 
most of the workers had returned to work; however, in Buenos Aires province the 
workers began a work-to-rule campaign. The day after, three union members were 
kidnapped from their homes by armed civilians (Latin America Political Report, 
15-10-1976, vol X, n2 40). The stoppages began again with power cuts in 
industrial areas. The light and power workers went on working 'with sadness' 
(trabajo a tristeza)l 0. The confrontation ended on 29th October following 
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government threats to draft union members into the army (Latin America Political 
Report, 5-11-1976, vol X, n° 43). In March 1977, the power workers started a 
work-to-rule campaign as a response of the kidnapping of their union leader Oscar 
Smith (Latin America Political Report, 1-4-1977, vol XI, n2 13). In October 1977 
there was a national rail strike (Abös, 1984, p. 11). The railway strike began on 
26th. The stoppages and go-slows among the railway and underground workers of 
Buenos Aires latterly spread to the dockers of Buenos Aires and Rosario, who also 
began a work-to-rule campaign. The power workers of Rosario and Santa Fe, and 
state oil company workers (Yacimientos Petroiiteros Fiscales -YPF) also began a 
work-to-rule campaign. At the same time, 25000 workers at the Alpargatas textile 
industry stopped work in support of a wage claim and were joined later by the 
25000 workers of Peugeot plant. By 11th November all the workers went back to 
work after wage increases of 40 per cent (Latin America Political Report, 11-11- 
1977, vol XI, n° 44). These strikes show that, despite the efforts of the dictatorship 
to demobilise the unions -mainly through the prohibition of strikes, the 'illegality' 
of the CGT as the peak organisation, and State Terrorism-, the workers could still 
organise themselves and demonstrate against the military dictatorship. In this sense, 
they developed new forms of social demonstration such as the trabajo a tristeza, 
which were not forbidden by the dictatorship. Thus, State Terrorism and the 
economic reform, could not completely demobilise the unions. 
In March 1977, Martinez de Hoz applied a price freeze which was the first 
step of the financial reform of June 1977. The reform liberalised capital flows and 
deregulated the financial system. This reform, through the liberalisation of interest 
rates, enabled banks to recover their central position within the financial system, 
instead of being mere intermediaries of the Central Bank (Canitrot, 1981, p. 
143 )1 1. The financial reform linked the banking system to short-term capital 
markets which made state companies look for new capital markets to satisfy their 
financial needs. According to Canitrot (1981, p. 123) the financial reform was a 
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political decision connected with the long-term project of the dictatorship. As the 
military government sought the liberalisation of the economy, the plan required this 
kind of financial reform since its purpose was to make the market an instrument 
through which social discipline would be achieved. 
The wage-price spiral of the economy (indexaciön) was the main obstacle to 
stabilising the economy. Therefore, in May 1978 a desindexaciön 12 plan was applied 
through the exchange rate and public tariffs. Damill and Frenkel (1990, p. 12) 
point out that while the accumulated devaluation in 1978 was 68 per cent, the retail 
price index increased 178 per cent. Therefore, it was clear that the plan could not 
stop inflation. 
In December 1978 a new plan was announced which signified that "future 
exchange-rate devaluations and changes in public-sector prices would 
systematically be adjusted below the rate of private-sector price increases. In 
theory, at least, this was to force inflation downward" (Smith, 1989, p. 239). The 
desindexaciön was made through a tab! ita (little table) which indicated the future 
rate of devaluation. This plan was applied with the liberalisation of the capital 
market which was to regulate the interest rate and allow the convergence of internal 
and international prices. 
This Plan had been framed in the 'monetarist' approach to the balance-of- 
payments. As it is well-known 'monetarism' "is a policy which expresses a deep 
confidence in the free market system" (Cole et al, 1991, p. 90). The stabilisation 
policies must limit money and credit growth, reduce the fiscal deficit, and implement 
a real devaluation. They also promote privatisation, limit government expenditure, 
and attempt to avoid price distortions by reducing state economic intervention. Thus, 
this 'monetarist' approach to the balance-of-payments is a tool to achieve external 
balance and to stabilise domestic prices (Cole et al, 1991,261). This 'monetarist' 
strategy is, indeed, the basis to economically discipline the working class. In this 
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approach, the money and market take the role of regulator of the economy. In this 
sense, the approach represents a radical restructuring of the working class since it 
has to accept the discipline of the market forces. As explained earlier, during the 
sixties and early seventies, the resistance of the working class was the ultimate 
barrier to the resolution of the crisis of the Argentinian state. Through the 
implementation of 'monetarism' -which came to dominate the world economy in the 
1980s and 1990s- the resistance of the working class could be broken down "by 
exploiting and intensifying divisions within the working class as the basis on which 
to secure its political demobilisation" (Clarke, 1990, p. 27). This was the objective 
of the dictatorship, the so-called disciplinamiento social -which meant to eliminate 
any vestige of Peronism and working class power- was to be achieved by the 
implementation of 'monetarism' to give to the market and money the role of regulator 
of the economy. 
The social response to the plan of December 1978 was the first national 
strike during the military government on the 27th of April 1979 (Abös, 1984, p. 
48). Although all the leaders of the trade-unions who organised the strike were 
imprisoned, the strike occurred and enjoyed total support in the industrial sector 
(Abos, 1984, p. 49). 
In March 1980 the winding-up of one of the biggest national banks (Banco de 
Intercambio Regional- BIR ) caused a deep financial crisis (Schvarzer, 1986a, p. 
98). The Central Bank, reversing an initial policy commitment, had to guarantee the 
deposits. In September 1980, the Central Bank decided to devalue the peso further. 
Therefore, devaluation during the last three months of 1980 was 1 per cent per 
month. In February 1981 the devaluation-rate was 10 per cent; and 3 per cent per 
month until August 1981 (Schvarzer, 1986a, p. 106). 
The monthly inflation rate could not be stopped, and after five years of 
different plans and programmes, Lt. General Videla and his Minister of Economy left 
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the government in March 1981. At the beginning of 1981 "massive capital flight had 
reduced foreign-exchange reserves by more than $2 billion; interest rates had risen 
to annual rates more than 200 per cent; and the public sector deficit had soared out 
of control" (Smith, 1989, p. 242). The fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP went 
from 7.5 in 1980 to 13.5 in 19811 3 
Before outlining the position of Lt. General Roberto Viola's administration, let 
me explain the consequences of the Martinez de Hoz's economic policy for the 
agricultural sector; the industrial sector; the conditions in the industrial labour 
market; and the origin of the external debt. 
a. The agricultural sector 
Argentina's main agricultural products are maize, sunflower, soya, sorghum, 
wheat and meat. The agricultural sector represented about 12 per cent of the GDP 
throughout the period 1976-1981; and, according to the National Census of 1980, 
12 per cent of total employment was accounted for by the agricultural sector (Di 
Tella and Rodriguez Braun, 1990, p. 213). 
The rural sector production represents only 15 per cent of GDP (Fanelli and 
Frenkel, 1989, p. 30), however it plays a fundamental role with regard to both 
short run stability and growth: land-and-cattle production is the main source of 
foreign exchange (60 per cent of total exports originate in this sector); the goods 
produced by the sector represent 15 per cent of the consumer's purchases; and it 
contributes significantly to government revenues (Fanelli and Frenkel, 1989, p. 
30). 
The unification of exchange rates and the fall in export taxes were favourable 
to the agricultural sector. In 1976 the sown field surface of wheat increased by 40 
per cent -over the average of the last five years- as a consequence of the positive 
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measures of the Martinez de Hoz's plan and of technological development 1 4. Due to 
this increase the crop reached 11 million tons, a record quantity (Schvarzer, 
1986a, p. 151). Therefore, the agricultural GDP and traditional exports rose 
significantly in 1976 and 1977. The growth of the production of grains for the whole 
period (1976-1981) was about 6.8 per cent annually (Cavallo and Cottani, 1991, 
p. 140). Another aspect of the period was the "increase on yields for a number of 
crops, especially oil seeds. This was due to technological improvements (for 
instance, more intensive use of chemical fertilizers and adoption of new crop 
varieties) which were fostered by trade liberalisation" (Cavallo and Cottani, 1991, 
p. 140). After 1977, because of the financial reform and the fiscal and monetary 
policies implemented, the situation for the agricultural sector was modified and in 
1980 production and exports fell (Cavallo and Cottani, 1991, p. 142). The 
agricultural sector suffered due to the extreme overvaluation of the peso, and so by 
1981 the situation of the farmers had deteriorated. 
The main feature of the period is the technological improvements which were 
obtained through trade liberalisation. Due to this benefit, the agricultural sector 
mainly supported the economic strategy of the military dictatorship (Schvarzer, 
1986a, p. 151). Indeed, despite the overvaluation of the peso in 1981, in general 
terms the economic strategy was beneficial for the sector; most notably, the 
unification of the exchange rate and the fall in export taxes. 
b. The industrial sector 
The main branches of the Argentinian industrial sector are foodstuffs, 
textiles, chemicals, steel and other basic metal industries, capital goods and the 
automobile industry. For each of these branches the consequences of the Martinez de 
Hoz's administration were quite different. However, from a general point of view, 
Scholarsl 5 agree that the industrial sector was the most severely affected by this 
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economic policy. The first blow to the industrial sector was given by the financial 
reform of 1977 because of high interest rates which stimulated short-run 
transactions. Therefore, all the benefits gained by the reduction of wages -by almost 
40 per cent- were lost in extra financial costs (Schvarzer, 1986a, p. 179). 
Smith (1989, p. 241) argues that "protective tariffs were further reduced, 
thus forcing traditionally high-cost firms to face the effects of stiff competition 
from cheap imported goods. The magnitude of this foreign competition can be gauged 
by the dramatic jump in total imports: 73 per cent in 1979 and 56 per cent in 
1980". He also argues that the Martinez de Hoz team knew that this policy would 
severely affect the industrial sector, but they believed it was necessary to 
restructure the Argentinian industry (Smith, 1989, p. 241). 
According to Kosacoff's analyses (Azpiazu and Kosacoff, 1989, p. 20) 
industrial production fell 20 per cent between 1975 and 1982; the share of the 
industrial sector in the GDP fell from 28 per cent to 22 per cent in the same period; 
20 per cent of the biggest companies closed; and the share of industrial workers in 
national income fell from 49 per cent in 1975 to 32.5 per cent in 1982. The sectors 
most severely affected were textiles and metallurgical industries, while foodstuffs 
and chemicals were less affected than the average of the whole industrial sector 
(Dorfman, 1983, p. 112). 
In terms of industrial branches, the paper producing branch expanded. 
Cavallo and Cottani (1991, p. 148) point out that "between 1976 and 1978 
officially promoted investment plans were approved for a total of over a billion 
dollars. Tariffs on imports were increased from 10 per cent to 15 per cent in 1976 
and 20 per cent in 1977, a remarkable exception to the trade policies pursued at the 
same time in other branches". Regarding the chemical branch, "exports were 
promoted and increased steadily during the 1970s and both production and 
employment performed better than the manufacturing average" (Cavallo and Cottani, 
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1991, p. 148). As "steel and aluminum were the only exceptions to the elimination 
of quota restrictions started in 1976" (Cavallo and Cottani, 1991, p. 149) steel 
production increased between 1978 and 1981, and imports fell. 
The capital goods branch was discriminated against by the trade policies in 
two different ways: by an unscheduled acceleration in the rate of tariff reductions and 
by the maintenance of high levels of protection in the industries supplying basic 
metal inputs. The big change in the policy applied to this branch was because "the 
authorities wanted to foster the incorporation of technologically advanced imported 
equipment to improve industrial efficiency in capital intensive branches. Thus, in 
order to favour some activities, the domestic production of capital goods was hurt" 
(Cavallo and Cottani, 1991, p. 149). The automobile industry was also severely 
affected. By 1978 three plants closed (General Motors, Citroen and IME) and two 
others merged (Safrar-Peugeot and Fiat). Employment decreased significantly in 
this sector, but its productivity was less affected. 
The promotion of different sectors shows a restructuring process occurring 
in industrial production. During the sixties and early seventies the promoted 
branches were automobiles, capital goods and metallurgy; while in the mid-seventies 
paper producing, chemical, steel and aluminium branches were promoted. This 
process was also a response to changing international trade: as a consequence of the 
protectionist measures applied by the European Community and the United States 
Argentina could no longer be solely an agricultural producer (Chudnovsky, 1991, p. 
3j. 
Most importantly, the process shows that the financial sector was 
strengthened during this period at the expense of industrialists. Crystal (1994, p. 
1 37) points out that "as a reaction to 'economic chaos', the regime followed a course 
whose essential meaning was ... in the nature of a determined drive to 
force all 
producing groups to accept the discipline of market forces". This strategy was 
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another way of breaking the power of the organised working class. Indeed, the 
promoted branches -paper producing, chemical and steel and aluminium- did not 
have historically powerful unions, while automobile, capital goods and metallurgical 
branches, which were discriminated against, did have historically powerful unions. 
The SMATA (Sindicato de Mecänicos del Transporte Automotor) and UOM (Uniön 
Obrera Metaldrgica), which represented the workers from the automobile and 
metallurgical industries, respectively, are among the most historically powerful 
unions in Argentina1 6 
Table n2 4 shows the industrial activity by branches. 
Table n° 4 
Industrial activity. Main Branches. 
1970=100 
Foodstuffs Capital Goods Textiles Paper Prod. Chemicals Basic 
Metals 
1975 111.1 124.0 112.1 120.2 119.0 123.4 
1976 114.4 121.7 106.0 105.2 121.0 115.5 
1977 107.2 148.7 110.0 105.3 122.8 128.1 
1978 101.5 118.5 94.4 108.7 113.1 121.1 
1979 103.1 134.6 104.6 110.6 127.0 141.7 
1980 102.1 130.8 92.3 101.9 128.0 128.0 
Growth 
rate 
75/80 -7.7 5.5 -17.7 -15.2 
7.6 3.7 
Source: Canitrot, A (1981) Teoria y präctica del Iiberalismo. Politica 
antiinflacionaria y apertura econbmica en la Argentina, 1976-1981, Desarrollo 
Econßmico, n2 82 (Buenos Aires: IDES). 
According to Canitrot (1981, p. 185), between 1975 and 1980, industrial 
output contracted 2.6 per cent. The growth of the capital goods branch 
is quite 
significant because as pointed out above, this branch was discriminated against. 
Canitrot (1981, p. 185) suggests that the growth of this branch shows that the 
imports of capital goods were complementary to national production. Another point of 
98 
interest is the fall in paper production, despite this sector being promoted by 
government policies: the results of these policies would not be seen until the early 
eighties. 
Regarding industrial employment, Canitrot (1981, p. 185) argues that its 
fall was one of the most significant modifications of the period. 
Table n° 5 
Industrial employment 
1970=100 
Foodstuffs Capital Goods Textiles 
1 975 1 21 
.9 1 23.4 111 .7 
1976 122.7 116.5 107.2 
1977 117.5 108.9 98.4 
1978 105.6 96.9 87.4 
1979 105.8 96.7 79.9 
1980 108.0 88.8 64.1 
Growth 
rate 
75/80-11.4 -28.0 -42.6 
Paper Prod. Chemicals Basic Metals 
1 03.7 1 24.1 136.2 
94.3 125.7 130.8 
84.8 119.0 127.2 
82.8 108.9 119.0 
81.2 105.6 119.0 
81.4 73.9 114.7 
-21.5 -40.5 -15.8 
Source: Canitrot, A (1981) Teoria y präctica del liberalismo. Politica 
antiinflacionaria y apertura econömica en la Argentina, 1976-1981, Desarrollo 
Econdmico, n2 82 (Buenos Aires: IDES). 
Industrial employment declined 26 per cent from 1975 to 1980. It is 
remarkable that in all industries -whether or not their activities have increased- 
employment fell. For instance, chemicals, which shows the highest growth rate of 
activity in the period, shows a fall in employment of 40.5 per cent. Therefore, this 
shows that the economic reform was, indeed, a tool for the restructuring of class 
relations. 
99 
c. State and industry 
Under Lt. General Videla's administration, the role of the State was 
fundamental through the restructuring of the industrial sectorl7, its purchases in 
the private sector, the privatisation of some public companies, and public 
investmentl 8 
Daniel Azpiazu (Azpiazu and Kosacoff, 1989, p. 93), in his anafysos of the 
promotion of the industrial sector, concludes that the beneficiaries of this policy 
were the national corporations, or GEN. He states that 50 projects -which 
represented 7.2 per cent of total projects presented in the period studied- 
represented 70 per cent of total investment, and were directed to highly concentrated 
industries. Therefore, industrial policy served, through the pattern of subsidies, to 
further concentrate production. 
Manufacturing exports were also promoted in various ways 19. From the 
manufacturing branch, the chemical industry, steel and other basic metal industries 
have the main share of industrial exports. These industries increased their 
participation in total exports as a consequence of the low demand in the internal 
market and also because of state promotion of these industries. On the other hand, 
capital goods and the automobile industry's share fell as a consequence of industrial 
policy. While the purchasing power of industrial exports decreased 6.4 per cent 
from 1973 to 1986, the volume of industrial exports increased more than 80 per 
cent in the same period (Azpiazu and Kosacoff, 1989, p. 120). 
Regarding the privatisation process, Schvarzer (1986a, p. 266) emphasises 
that the State in many cases decided to close the company instead of selling it. This 
was the case with Industrias Mecänicas de/ Estado, a state-owned steel company 
(Schvarzer, 1986a, p. 266). There was also a process of 'peripheral privatisation', 
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that is a subcontract between a public company and a private one through which the 
former delegated some of its activities. 
The restructuring of the industrial sector meant increasing the concentration 
of capital in the biggest national corporations, destroying the small and medium size 
companies. As said, the latter had constituted the so-caiied 'domestic bourgeoisie' 
which, allied with the working class, had been Peronism's support base. The GEN 
were strengthened at the expense of the 'domestic bourgeoisie'. Second, privatisation 
weakened the working class organisation, whose strength was institutionalised in 
public companies. Moreover, as said, the government decided in some cases to close 
down companies instead of selling them. Thus, a prime objective of the economic 
reform was to restructure the role of the state as economic regulator and the 
organisation of the working class. 
d. The industrial sector after Martinez de Hoz 
After Lt. General Videla's government the problems of the industrial sector 
were deindustrialisation, the limited internal market, high costs, and the 
'denationalisation' of important sectors of the industry (Dorfman, 1983, p. 583). 
This policy led to the closure of a large number of small and medium size companies, 
most of them related to the metallurgical industries, producing significant 'idle 
capacity' of productive equipment (50 per cent) and considerable dependency on 
industrial exports (Dorfman, 1983, p. 583). In addition, there was a process of 
external desinvestment and capital repatriation. In 1973 the share of the 
transnational corporations in the value of the industrial production was 30.8 per 
cent, in 1981 their share fell to 28.6 per cent, rising slightly to 29.4 per cent in 
1983 (Azpiaza and Kosacoff, 1989, p. 194). Most of the transnational corporations 
were automobile and capital goods industries; these industries slumped during the 
early 1980s, and some transnational corporations left Argentina2 0. 
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A comparison between the National Economic Census of 1974 and 1985 shows 
that in 1974 there were 129.678 companies in the manufacturing industry with 
1.555.538 employees; in 1985 there were 111.767 companies with 1.359.489 
employees, which means that in eleven years 17.911 companies were closed 
(Minsburg, 1987, p. 99). 
An analysis of the situation of the 100 biggest companies (according to their 
sales) in 1975 and 1981 concludes that from the group of 1975,33 do not appear 
in the group of 1981. From this 33,20 go down in the ranking and 13 disappear. 
The number of companies with a negative balance in their sales increased from 14 in 
1975 to 39 in 1981. The analysis of the changes shows that 6 companies were 
absorbed by others and 15 companies changed ownership (Schvarzer, 1986a, p. 
202). Therefore one of the consequences of the Martinez de Hoz's plan was the trend 
towards the concentration of big 'economic groups' who diversified their activities to 
minimise risk. Most of them were organised around one holding company whose 
success was a consequence of the protectionist activities of the State. These groups 
grew up during a period of economic stagnation. 
Another indicator of crisis in the industrial sector is the increasing level of 
unemployment. From a base index of 100 in 1975, the level of employment in the 
second six months of 1980 fell to 84.5; in the same period of 1981, to 74.4 ; and in 
the same period of 1982, to 72 points (Dorfman, 1983, p. 113). According to the 
Unidn Industrial Argentina in 1980 the number of unemployed and underemployed 
was 1.500.000 which represented 14 per cent of the population of working age 
(Caputo, 1982, p. 124). 
Martinez de Hoz himself explains that 
"our policy was not meant to wipe out our industry but, on 
the contrary, to strengthen it through competitiveness. A 
slogan proclaims that we are to blame for the 'destruction' 
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of the productive apparatus, but the word 'modernisation' 
would be more to the point. While it is true that many 
industries disappeared -due perhaps to their own 
obsolescence- they were replaced by more modern 
newcomers" (Di Tella and Rodriguez Braun, 1990, p. 
1 59) . 
The national corporations or Grupos Econömicos Nacionales are these 'modern 
newcomers'. However, Martinez de Hoz does not explain that their development was 
not directly connected to the economic development of the country. On the contrary, 
while these 'modern newcomers' appeared, Argentina was undergoing a profound 
economic crisis. Their economic growth was based on the closure of companies and 
the absorption of some activities which were previously assumed by the state. The 
success of these groups was a consequence of the redistribution of ownership and of a 
new distribution of activities between the public and the private sector. Most of the 
GEN owed their success to state sponsorship. The GEN control big industrial 
companies which are connected to the agricultural, financial and construction sectors 
(Basualdo and Azpiazu 1990, p. 15). Another significant result of Martinez de Hoz's 
economic strategy was the diversification of the transnational companies, which 
adopted the same characteristics of the GEN (Basualdo and Azpiazu, 1990, p. 15). 
Generally, both, the GEN and the transnational companies, are oligopolies. For 
instance, Celulosa Argentina and Massuh control paper production. Garovagiio y 
Zorraquin and Perez Companc control the most important national banks. The latter 
also controls petrochemical and metallurgical production. Bunge y Born controls the 
biggest companies in the foodstuff sector, an important textile company and a paint 
company (Basualdo and Azpiazu, 1990, p. 156). The industrial promotion applied by 
the military dictatorship further accelerated this centralisation and concentration of 
capital in the GEN and transnational companies21 
The development of the GEN and the transnational companies can be analysed 
through the evolution of the number of subsidiaries they held. There were 30 GEN in 
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1973 which had 277 companies, 33 in 1983 with 586 companies and 31 in 1986 
with 665 companies. For the same years, there were 31 transnational companies 
with 327 companies, 31 with 434 companies and 29 with 426 companies, 
respectively (Acevedo et al, 1990, p. 52). Therefore, although the years of the 
military dictatorship can be characterised as a period of economic stagnation, the 
GEN as well as the diversified transnational companies achieved a quite significant 
expansion. Another factor which helped the development of the GEN was their 
international connections which allowed them to obtain foreign credits2 2. The 
private external debt, 68 per cent of which was accounted for by the GEN and the 
transnational companies (Basualdo, 1987, p. 74), was transferred to the state in 
1982, a decision of the President of the Central Bank, Domingo CavaIIo2 3 
The emergence of the GEN was, therefore, a consequence of the absorption by 
the biggest companies of small and medium size companies which went bankrupt, and 
of the creation of new companies through state financing 24. In this sense, Martinez 
de Hoz's modernisation produced significant changes in the industrial structure. 
Others beneficiaries of Martinez de Hoz's policy were the financial mediators 
and the most concentrated sector of the Pampeana bourgeoisie. The latter began to 
transfer its profit to the financial market, instead of investing it in the agricultural 
sector, without losing productivity (Jozami, 1985, p. 179). The biggest companies 
gained benefits from the transfer of both their funds and activities to the financial 
arena. Thus, the state was losing control of the system, which started to depend on the 
decisions of a growing private financial sector '(Schvarzer, 1986a, p. 35). 
Therefore, as a consequence of Martinez de Hoz's 'modernisation', there was a crucial 
transformation in social relations and in the role of the state. 
Martinez de Hoz's economy policy promoted the modernisation of a small 
group of large firms which achieved considerable economic growth in a context of 
stagnation. What the former Minister does not explain is the other side of the coin, 
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that is, the impoverishment of the working class. An analysis of the industrial labour 
market shows this to be the other side of Martinez de Hoz's 'modernisation'. 
e. The conditions of the industrial labour market 
After the dictatorship, the two main results for the industrial labour market 
were its desasalarizaciön and its terciarizaciön. The former derives from the 
reduction of the number of wage-earners because of the transfer of workers from 
the industrial sector to the 'black market'. The latter refers to the transfer of 
workers from the industrial sector to the service sector. A brief description of the 
conditions of the labour market will help to understand these two processes. 
There were two moments which severely affected the labour market. The fir st 
was in 1975 with the so-called Rodrigazo and its redistribution of income; the 
second one was at the beginning of the dictatorship with another redistribution of 
income through the freezing of wages (Gerchunoff and Dieguez, 1984, p. 4). 
Workers real wages decreased between 1974 and 1978 by 49 per cent 25 
The wages in the manufacturing sector, in 1977, were 66.3 per cent of the wage of 
1975 (Azpiazu and Kosacoff, 1989, p. 176). As table n° 1 has shown, the 
percentages of income going to wage earners has decreased 31 per cent from 1975 to 
1976. During the military government this percentage was around 33 per cent of 
national income while in the early seventies it was 45 per cent. Turning to tables n° 
2 and n2 3 the comparison between inflation rates and real wages shows that in fl at ion 
increased 772.5 per cent from 1974 to 1976 while the real wages of an industrial 
worker decreased 37 per cent in the same period. The decline in the purchasing 
power as well as the saving power of an industrial worker can be shown through the 
increase of poverty in Greater Buenos Aires (the most industrialised area of 
Argentina). 
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Table n° 6 
Percentage of poor population of Greater Buenos Aires26 
Poor population 
1 974 34.30 
1 980 31-30 
1 982 51 .10 
Poverty groups 
Structurally poor* 
31.10 
21.20 
23.10 
Pauperizados* 
3.20 
10.10 
28.00 
'Structurally poor' are those with severe problems of housing, social 
infrastructure, and incomes inadequate to cover basic needs. 
* *Pauperizados means working class families that had, in the past, a reasonable 
standard of living but had been pushed into poverty conditions not different from that 
of the 'structurally poor', as Minujin (1991) points out, "they did not inherit 
poverty; they acquired it" as a consequence of economic crisis. 
Source: Boron, A. (1992) La pobreza de las naciones. La economia politica del 
neoliberalismo en is Argentina, mimeograph (Buenos Aires: EURAL). 
In eight years the pauperizados group increased 775 per cent while the 
structurally poor group decreased 25 per cent and the total poor population rose by 
49 per cent. The pauperizados are the most relevant group since their position is a 
clear consequence of the Martinez de Hoz's political economy and 'modernisation'. The 
pauperizados are the consequence of the dismantling of the industrial sector, the 
closure of small and medium size companies, and the fall of the real wages. The 
number of 'structurally poor' remained unchanged. After Martinez de Hoz's 
Imodernisation', the 'structurally poor' were still living in villas miserias (shanty 
towns) without sanitary services, between four or more people sharing a single 
room. Although their situation followed the general economic recession, it did not 
change dramatically. However, as it is defined, the pauperizados were working class 
families pushed into, and beyond, the conditions of the 'structurally poor'. 
The increase in poverty was a cause of the decrease of the number of 
industrial workers; it went from 1.165.000 in 1975 to 740.000 in 1982, which 
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represents a fall of 36 per cent in seven years. During 1975 and 1980 employment 
decreased annually by 1.3 per cent and public employment by 6 per cent (CEPAL, 
1990, p. 23). 
On the other hand, from the employer's point of view, labour costs decreased 
from 43 per cent in 1974 to 35.7 per cent in 1976 (Azpiazu et al, 1986, p. 113). 
In addition, productivity was increasing 37.6 per cent from 1974 to 1983. These 
two factors meant that the absolute profit level and profit rate increased. As wages 
decreased, it was calculated that the funds appropriated by the industrial employers 
increased 69 per cent from 1974 to 1983 (Azpiazu et a1,1986, p. 115). 
Therefore, the conditions of the industrial labour market were severely 
affected by the Martinez de Hoz's political economy. Moreover, these new conditions 
also affected the power of the trade unions and the power of the working class, 
because the fall in the number of the wage-earners implied that the trade unions 
were losing members as well as power. For instance, in 1978 the Uniön Obrera 
Mletaldrgica (Metallurgical Union) had 287000 members, in 1988 it had 267000. 
The SMATA (Sindicato de Mecänicos de/ Transporte Automotor) had 87000 members 
in 1976, and in 1986,54000. The union of textile workers decreased from 87000 
in 1976 to 73500 members in 1986. Conversely, the union of food processing 
workers increased from 41000 members in 1976 to 148000 in 1986. The 
Confederacidn de Empleados de Comercio (Commerce Employees Confederation) also 
increased its membership from 279000 in 1978 to 407000 members in 1988. 
(Morales SoIä, 1990, p. 290). it is important to highlight that the two unions in 
which membership increased belong to the tertiary sector. 
The main conclusion is that the changing structure of the Argentinian 
economy created new conditions for the industrial labour market which were its 
desasalarizaciän, terciarizacibn and the pauperizaciön (impoverishment) of the 
workers. These processes modified the social structure of the country by deepening 
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its inequalities. The industrial working class became both economically worse off, 
and politically weaker. Those who could, moved into the tertiary or the 'black 
market', but this was not sufficient to absorb all the movement away from the 
industrial sector. 
f. The external debt 
The international context in the mid seventies contributed to the accumulation 
of external debt. The quadrupling of the oil price in 1973 weakened the situation of 
non-oil producing developing countries. Together with an increase in their import 
expenditure, there was a decrease in their export earnings as a consequence of the 
recession in developed countries. By contrast, the OPEC countries (Oil Producing and 
Exporting Countries) experienced a massive increase in their current account 
surplus. They placed much of the so-called 'petrodollars' in US and British banks 
(Pilbeam, 1992, p. 407). The rise in inflation resulting from the oil shocks meant 
that real interest rates were very low or negative in the developed countries. The 
governments of developing countries were "keen to avoid having to adopt deflationary 
measures to control their current account deficits. Instead they sought to borrow 
funds to finance the deficits" (Pilbeam, 1992, p. 408). This led to a 'recycling' of 
the 'petrodollars' in the form of massive lending to the developing countries. Most of 
the loans were made with floating rates of interest based upon a margin over LIBOR 
(the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate). While the banks were protecting themselves, 
this left the developing countries such as Argentina exposed to the risk of a rise in 
world interest rates. 
The external debt was one of the most serious consequences of the dictatorship 
in the sense that it will continue to severely constraint the future of the Argentinian 
economy. The accumulation of external debt can be divided in three periods of time: 
a) that of the initial expansion, 1976-1978 (16.6 per cent per year); b) a period 
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of explosive growth, 1979-1981 (41.9 per cent per year); and c) that of the 
compulsory accumulation of debt, 1982-1989 (7.6 per cent per year) (Bouzas and 
Keitman, 1990, p. 3). 
The main feature of the Argentinian external debt is that in the first two 
periods the accumulation of debt was a result of commercial deficits caused by the 
overvaluation of the peso, commercial openness and capital flight (Bouzas and 
Keifman, 1990, p. 5). The mismanagement of the exchange rate combined with an 
opening of the capital account are key explanations for the massive debt accumulation 
(Dornbusch and De Pablo, 1988, p. 20). These were the consequences of the 
Martinez de Hoz's political economy, especially his financial reform and the opening 
up of commercial and capital markets. 
From 1976 to 1982, the public debt increased 407.5 per cent, the private 
debt by 364.5 per cent, and the net debt by 479.5 per cent (Frenkel et al, 1988). 
However, as it was shown above, the time of the dictatorship was a period of 
economic stagnation, and the increase in the external debt does not mean an increase 
of investment funds for developing the Argentinian economy. 
Table n° 7 
External debt 
(million current dollars) 
Public debt Private debt Gross debt Net Debt* 
1976 5189 3090 8279 6467 
1977 6044 3634 9678 5639 
1978 8357 4139 12496 6459 
1979 9960 9074 19034 8554 
1980 14459 12703 27162 19478 
1981 20024 15647 35671 31794 
1982 26341 14362 40703 37477 
*Net debt= gross debt - foreign currency reserves 
Source: Frenkel et al (1988) El proceso de endeudamiento externo argentino, 
Documento CEDES/2 (Buenos Aires CEDES). 
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Despite the fact that in 1978 the balance of trade surplus was over 2.500 
million dollars and the foreign currency reserves were over 6.000 million dollars, 
one year later an explosive growth of the debt commenced, mainly as a result of the 
anti-inflationary policy of December 1978. The so-called tablita was the prior 
announcement of a series of gradually declining mini-devaluations. By decreasing the 
rate of depreciation, the government tried to decrease inflation "by exposing 
domestic producers to international competition and thus reducing the peso price of 
tradeable" (Crystal, 1994, p. 137). The policy failed -partly due to the large budget 
deficit- and the result was an increasingly overvalued real exchange rate. The result 
was substantial capital flight "estimated at around US$25 billion between 1978 and 
1982" (Crystal, 1994, p. 137). This explained the overwhelming increase of the 
private debt. 
From 1978 to 1979, the public debt increased 19 per cent while the private 
debt increased 119 per cent; from 1979 to 1980, the public debt rose by 45 per 
cent and the private debt by 40 per cent; and from 1980 to 1981, the public debt 
rose by 38 per cent and the private by 23 per cent. In 1978-1979, the private 
sector was the origin of the accumulation of debt while, afterwards, both private and 
public sector increases were around 30 and 40 per cent. On the other hand, the 
foreign currency reserves decreased 26 per cent from 1979 to 1980, and 49.5 per 
cent from 1980 to 1981 (Frenkel et al., 1988, figure n° 5). 
As said, the growth of private debt between 1978 and 1979 was not the 
result of new external credits, but rather the product of transactions made by 
Argentinians who had deposits abroad (Basualdo, 1987, p. 65). They brought their 
money back to Argentina and this transaction appears as a new credit. Capital flight 
during 1979-1981 -which amounted US$ 16.2 billion- was around 23 per cent of 
Argentina's GDP (Fanelli and Frenkel, 1989, p. 11). 
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it is also important to look at the composition of the private sector which got 
into debt with foreign banks. Thirty GEN got into debt with foreign banks for a total 
of 7349 million dollars -34.5 per cent of total private debt-, and 106 transnational 
corporations amassed debt of 7238 million dollars -34 per cent of the total 
(Basualdo, 1987, p. 74). Therefore, the share of the economic corporations and the 
transnational corporations represented 68 per cent of total private debt, the rest 
belong to public and medium size companies and public companies. 
The government promoted, until 1980, the accumulation of private external 
debt through the maintenance of a domestic interest rate higher than the 
international one. Due to the financial crisis of 1980, the private sector started to 
substitute domestic assets for foreign assets, and in order to maintain the devaluation 
rate fixed by the tablita, the government compensated the capital flight with a 
expansion of public debt. According to Frenkel et al (1988, p. 12) this mechanism 
was the first step towards the nationalisation of the private debt: the government ran 
up debt acquiring foreign currency to sell it to the private sector at an undervalued 
dollar rate. Therefore, the private sector could cancel its external liabilities with a 
subsidised price. 
The second step towards the nationalisation of the private debt was the 
guarantee of seguros de cambio (swaps) through which the government guaranteed a 
future exchange rate below the market value2 7. By November 1982, the Central 
Bank decided to take charge of the private debt due to the inability of the private 
sector to repay it. The Central Bank would replace the private debtor after the 
cancellation of the debt in pesos. In other words, the private debtor paid the Central 
Banks in pesos and the Bank had to pay it to the external creditor in dollars 
(Graziano, 1986, p. 46). The main official objective in nationalising the debt was to 
prevent a crisis not only in some national companies but also in the domestic 
financial system. 
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In 1980 the public debt grew significantly because the government had 
started to increase the foreign currency reserves which were required by the 
private sector. The increase in the international interest rate as a cause of the 
growth of public debt must also be taken into account (Schvarzer, 1986a, p. 419). 
It also seems probable -although difficult to confirm- that the expansion of public 
debt was linked to the purchase of arms. The military dictatorship was on the verge 
of a war against Chile in 1978, and finally was at war against the United Kingdom in 
1982. Scholars2 8 agree that a large amount of the public debt was created by the 
purchase of arms. 
The consequences of the external debt became a crucial issue for Argentina's 
future. First of all, the 'owners' of the private debt transferred to society, by the 
nationalisation of the debt, their losses but not their profits. Due to this, as the debt 
became mainly public, the external crisis produced a fiscal one. Fanelli and Frenkel 
(1989, p. 19) explain that 
"the core of this issue is that while the government has to 
pay the interest of the foreign debt, the private sector 
'owns' the surplus of the trade account which provides the 
foreign exchange necessary for the payment on the interest 
due. In other words, the public sector must buy the 
external surplus from the private sector and the 
government must obtain the funds to do so by either 
reducing its expenditure or raising taxes. Both of these 
measures tend to depress the activity level and to restraint 
growth". 
Therefore, the government is dependent upon the activity of the private 
sector to repay external credits. Secondly, the private external debt and its 
nationalisation implied a redistribution of income, in the sense of the 'socialisation' 
of losses while profits remained private. Finally, the external debt, combining 
redistribution of income with concentration of capital, rendered national 
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governments unable to control the domestic economy (Basualdo, 1987, p. 117). The 
international creditors -commercial banks, international organisations of credit and 
foreign governments- played, henceforth, a crucial role in the decision making 
process of the Argentinian economy. 
The external debt was another tool for the restructuring of the state. Through 
the debt the international creditors increased their leverage over the debtor 
countries. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) became the 'international 
regulator of debt' (Cole et al, 1991, p. 259) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) became more concerned with 
long-term structural adjustment (Cole et al, 1991, p. 260). Both promoted 
'monetarism' as the means to achieve internal price stability and a balance on the 
external account. Debt repayment was the 'cost' paid to tie Argentina's economy into 
the international system. Its consequence was that the restructuring of the state and 
of class relations begun by the 1976 military dictatorship could not be reversed by 
the incoming democratic government without undermining democracy. 
Ii. The collapse of the dictatorship: from Viola to Malvinas 
The results of the Martinez de Hoz's economic policy were that between 1980 
and 1981 the rate of the GDP went from 0.7 to -6.2, per capita GDP from -0.9 to 
-7.7, and gross national income from 1.8 to -7.0. The external debt increased from 
US$ 27.162 million in 1980 to US$ 35.671 in 1981 (United Nations, 1985, p. 
76). All these modifications were concentrated in one year as a result of the 
economic policy applied in the previous four years. The implementation of Martinez 
de Hoz's economic policy weakened the already vulnerable Argentinian economy. 
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As had been planned, Lt. General Videla and his Ministers left the government 
in March 1981 when Lt. General Roberto Viola, Commander-in -Chief of the Army, 
took office. The new military administration abandoned the trade liberalisation 
programme. The new programme consisted of stabilising the peso, achieving a 
surplus in foreign trade, promoting a larger market for national products, changing 
internal relative prices in favour of producers of tradeable goods, favouring 
employment over real wages, keeping the financial system open with state, foreign 
and private national banks appropriately balanced, encouraging private participation 
in the public investment programmes, and making both fiscal expenditure and the 
public deficit, as well as Central Bank credit, consistent with monetary policy, in 
order to effectively fight inflation (Di Tella and Rodriguez Braun, 1990, p. 188). 
As soon as the new Minister of Economy, Lorenzo Sigaut, took office, the 
demand for dollars increased. In just one day the Central Bank lost US$ 300 million 
(Schvarzer, 1986a, p. 120). On the 2nd of June the economic team devaluated the 
peso by 30 per cent. On the 22nd of June a double exchange market was created: the 
financial or free market and the commercial one (Di Tella and Dornbusch, 1989, p. 
298). The former exchange rate was 30 per cent higher than the latter representing 
another 30 per cent devaluation. The "discrepancy between the commercial and 
financial rate widened over time from 30 per cent to 60 per cent, reflecting a 
growing imbalance between the attempt to avoid the inflationary impact of 
depreciation and the need to check capital flight by a rapid depreciation of the 
financial rate" (Di Tella and Dornbusch, 1989, p. 298). 
Another measure was a new export tax of 12 per cent in agricultural 
products. On the other hand, the industrial sector could maintain its benefit which 
was a subsidy for manufactured goods of 25 per cent. Dornbusch (Di Telia and 
Dornbusch, 1989, p. 298) describes this short period as follows: "inflation had 
been artificially lowered by the exchange rate policy, but this had been achieved at 
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the cost of building up an external lack of competitiveness as well as a large external 
debt. Sigaut therefore had to restore competitiveness and could not avoid some 
increase in inflation". 
Under Viola's government, in July of 1981, there was a second national 
strike called by the banned CGT -once again the leaders were imprisoned- against the 
military dictatorship. This enjoyed total adherence in both the industrial and 
tertiary sectors. In November 1981, there was a protest march against the 
dictatorship with the slogan 'Bread, Peace and Jobs' (Smith, 1989, p. 240). 
In December 1981 a palace coup against Lt. General Roberto Viola showed the 
internal problems of the Armed Forces and "represented a regrouping of various 
right-wing military sectors in a new complex realignment with the economic and 
financial interests associated with the Martinez de Hoz group" (Smith, 1989, p. 
244). Many reasons have been provided to explain this coup d'etat within the 
military dictatorship. On the one hand, Lt. General Viola radically changed the 
economic policy. While Martinez de Hoz's team had represented the objectives of the 
economic establishment, Lt. General Viola's Minister of Economy did not. On the 
contrary, as explained above, his economic plan changed radically the rules of the 
economy. Although there were some groups against Martinez de Hoz's economic 
policies29, the liberals, supporters of Martinez de Hoz, became more powerful 
within the Army through the promotion, by the end of 1981, of old Generals. 
Therefore, when Lt. General Viola was removed, the new President choose as his 
Minister of Economy a man of the economic `establishment", Roberto Aiemann. 
Another cause of Lt. General Viola's forced retirement was that he started a 
political dialogue with the main political parties and appointed seven civilian 
ministers in a Cabinet of thirteen ministers (Smith, 1989, p. 242). Moreover, 
during his short presidential period the Multipartidaria (an organisation joined by 
the main political parties) was created by the Peronist Party, the Radical Party, the 
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Movimiento para la Integraciön y Desarrollo (Movement for the Integration and 
Development), the Christian Democrats, and the Partido Intransigente (intransigent 
Party) (Fontana and Llenderrozas, 1992, p. 167). By this time, the Junta publicly 
warned Lt. General Viola that political dialogue was premature (Fontana and 
Llenderrozas, 1992, p. 167). While, Lt. General Viola believed that the democratic 
transition had to be started this was not an opinion shared by the Armed Forces. 
The change of men in the House of Government was not just a change of names. 
After the coup against Lt. General Viola, Lt. General Galtieri -Commander in Chief of 
the Army- as the new President attempted to return to the origins of the Proceso, 
both economically and politically. By the end of 1981 GNP fell a record of 11.4 per 
cent; "industrial production declined by nearly 23 per cent and real wages declined 
almost 20 per cent" (Smith, 1989, p. 244). Therefore, Lt. General Galtieri's 
Minister of Economy, Roberto Alemann, had to cope with a profound crisis. He 
emphasised deflation, deregulation and denationalisation. Alemann's plan was based on 
"freezing state employees' wages (responsible for approximately 50 per cent of 
government expenditure), raising taxes, and hiking public sector prices" (Smith, 
1989, p. 245). The objectives of the plan were a "drastic compression of domestic 
demand and radical cuts in public spending to reduce inflation and further open the 
economy to the international market" (Smith, 1989, p. 245). Another wage 
freezing, this time only for state employees, suggested that the new military 
government wanted to deepen the restructuring of the state started by Videla and 
Martinez de Hoz. 
A second protest march was held at the 30th of March 1982, again under the 
slogan 'Peace, Bread and Jobs'. Three days later the Malvinas adventure started as the 
last attempt of the dictatorship to maintain control of the government. The defeat in 
the Malvinas signalled the beginning of the end of the dictatorship. Because of the war 
the economic situation radically changed. For instance, Smith (1989, p. 246) points 
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out that "in April 1982 alone, the equivalent of more than $500 million was 
withdrawn, generally to buy dollars in neighbouring Montevideo". 
The defeat in the Malvinas was also a defeat for the Armed Forces as a 
government. Lt. General Galtieri resigned and Lt. General Reynaldo Bignone was the 
president of the last period of the dictatorship. The transition to democracy began as 
a result of the Malvinas defeat. 
Iii. The transition to democracy: a consequence of the Malvinas 
defeat 
The defeat in the Malvinas3 0 was the beginning of the end for the military 
dictatorship. The transition to democracy was, in Argentina, the result of the 
collapse of the Proceso. Unable to overcome the economic crisis, to quash the 
guerrilla through the power of the state apparatus or to win an external war, the 
government of the Armed Forces collapsed. The breakdown of the authoritarian 
regime was a consequence of its own contradictions and failures. 
The Malvinas defeat represented the final blow to the authoritarian regime 
and marked the beginning of the transition to democracy. However, the disintegration 
of the Proceso began with the failure of Martinez de Hoz' plan to bring down 
inflation, reduce the fiscal deficit and overcome economic stagnation. Viola's attempt 
to change the economic strategy and start a process of political 'liberalisation' 
revealed the absence of consensus within the regime. Viola's effort was in turn 
interrupted by the Armed Forces' 'coup within a coup'. Galtieri's presidency tried to 
reimpose a freezing of political activity and to ally the government once again with 
the 'economic establishment', appointing Roberto Alemann as Minister of Economy. It 
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was in the midst of these efforts that Lt. General Galtieri began the Malvinas 
campaign. 
During the Proceso, the Armed Forces' alliance with the upper bourgeoisie 
was undermined. It was weakened initially during Viola's presidency because of the 
shifts in economic policy and the evident failure of the Martinez de Hoz plan. The 
Malvinas campaign served to undermine the alliance even further. Rouquie (1983b, 
p. 582) argues that the foreign policy of the military dictatorship became 
incoherent and that "one can understand that the Argentine conservatives should be 
disoriented, even alarmed, by the statements of Sr. Costa Mendez at the non-aligned 
meeting of 9th June 1982 according to which 'the struggle for the Falklands is 
similar to the liberation struggles of Algeria, India, Cuba, Vietnam and the 
Palestinian people'. The Malvinas war provoked the economic and political isolation 
of Argentina which was not welcomed by the upper bourgeoisie. It also highlighted 
that a military dictatorship is much more unpredictable than any democratic 
government. The same government which was helping the United States' struggle 
against 'communism' in Central America, sought support for its Malvinas campaign 
from the non-aligned movement. Therefore, another cause of the Proceso' s collapse 
was the breakdown of the social alliance which had supported it. 
In conclusion, a combination of four factors provoked the collapse of the 
authoritarian regime: first, the failure of the efforts to overcome the economic 
crisis; second, the contradictions within the Armed Forces; third, these two factors 
provoked the weakening of the alliance with the upper bourgeoisie; fourthly, the 
defeat in the Malvinas war. By the time the transition to democracy had begun, the 
Armed Forces were in danger of internal fragmentation31. The collapse of the 
authoritarian regime and the internal crisis of the Armed Forces made the transition 
to democracy quite distinctive. Let me now turn to the process of transition itself. 
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i. The transition process 
After the military defeat Lt. General Gaitieri resigned (Ciarin, 18-6-1982, 
p. 3) and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Lt. General Nicolaides appointed Lt. 
General Bignone as President (Clarin, 23-6-1982, p. 3). This provoked the Navy 
and Air Force to leave the Junta Militar since Nicolaides had not respected the de 
facto provision of the Proceso referring to the Junta 's responsibility to appoint the 
President. Therefore, the Army assumed total responsibility for government. On the 
1st July 1982, Lt. General Bignone took office and lifted the ban on political activity 
(Clarin, 1-7-1982, p. 2). Bignone's main objective was to conduct the transition to 
democracy. 
Despite the lift of the ban on political activity, at the very beginning of the 
transition process the Multipartidaria was quite cautious and did not seek to provoke 
social mobilisation. In fact the role of the Multipartidaria as the opposition against 
the military dictatorship was undermined by its support for the Malvinas war. 
Indeed, the war had provoked a split within the Multipartidaria, some politicians 
enthusiastically supporting the campaign, others -most notably, Raül Alfonsin- 
withholding such support. 
Nevertheless, the last months of 1982 can be considered as a turning-point 
in the transition process. Firstly, human rights organisations32 organised a public 
demonstration, to exert pressure for investigations into human rights violations 
committed under the military government (Clarin, 6-10-1982, p. 2). Secondly, 
the Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy and the Air Forces decided to reconstitute the 
Junta Militar (Clarin, 11-9-1982, p. 3). 
In October the Junta and the President tried to negotiate some conditions to 
achieve an 'agreed transition' (transicion concertada ). A list of issues, from human 
rights violations to the role of the Armed Forces in the democratic government, was 
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published before being discussed with the political parties. As a consequence of this, 
the Multipartidaria rejected the possibility of a concertaciön or agreement (Clarin, 
6-12-1982, p. 2). The breakdown of the concertaci©n unleashed a general strike 
and a popular demonstration for a quick return to democracy, called for, by the 
Multipartidaria (Clarin, 16-12-1982, p. 2). 
It was, by then, clear that the military government could no longer control 
the transition process. In February 1983, President Lt. General Bignone announced 
that elections would be held on 30th October and a civilian government would take 
office on January 1984 (Clarin, 10-2-1983, p. 2). The political parties started to 
be preoccupied with establishing their leadership teams. The Armed Forces became 
worried about the past. 
Indeed, in April 1983, the Armed Forces published a 'final' document on the 
struggle against the guerrillas. The document emphasised that the struggle against 
guerrillas had been ordered by the constitutional government of Maria Estela 
Martinez de Perön. The document was followed by an 'Institutional Act' (Acta 
Institucional ) "declaring that all military actions during the campaign were carried 
out 'in the line of duty' on orders from the military high command" (Latin American 
Weekly Report, 6-5-1983, p. 10). The document and the act were rejected by all 
the political parties. Nevertheless, the Armed Forces attempted a final defensive 
move: a legal framework to avoid the investigation of the human rights violations. On 
the 23rd of September a law was passed establishing an amnesty for the perpetrators 
of subversive activities and 'excesses' of repression from the 25th May 1973 to the 
17th June 1982 (Clarin, 24-9-1983, p. 2). The law was rejected by all the 
political parties, although Italo Luder, leader of the Peronist Party, was somewhat 
ambiguous regarding whether or not he would reverse the law (Clarin, 24-9 -1 983, 
p. 2-3). 
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From July 1982 to December 1983, the most important decision, in the 
economic sphere, was, as explained above, Cavallo's policy. As the President of the 
Central Bank, he applied "a drastic financial reform that in only six months resulted 
in the liquidation of about 40 per cent of the private sector's debt" (Smith, 1989, p. 
257). In July 1982 for the first time Argentina had difficulties with its 
international obligations and the economic authorities admitted the need to 
renegotiate the external debt with the international Monetary Fund. 
The last years of the dictatorship can be summarised as follows: 1981 was 
the year of the devaluation and seguros de cambio (swaps) -as the first step of the 
nationalisation of the private debt- to cope with the commercial and current account 
deficits as well as with capital flight. 1982 was the year of the liquidation of private 
liabilities. Finally, 1983 was the year of wage increases due to pressures from trade 
unions which took advantage of the weakness of the dictatorship (Frenkel et a), 
1988, p. 7). Stagnation, high inflation, impoverishment and external debt were the 
legacy of the Proceso. 
The transition to democracy was an unstable period. Neither the Armed Forces 
nor the political parties could control or lead the process of transition. For eighteen 
months the transition to democracy was precarious. A new military coup could not be 
discounted. The competitive electoral campaign revealed an absence of a consensual 
approach amongst the political parties towards democracy. And, lastly, an increasing 
number of accusations, both from inside and outside the country, of human rights 
violations against the government of the Armed Forces also increased tensions. 
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IV. The 1983 elections 
The 1983 elections were held on the 30th of October. The Radical Party won 
51.75 per cent of the total vote cast and the Peronist Party, 40.16 per cent. The 
remainder of the vote was divided between an assortment of small parties (Clarin, 
1-11-1983, p. 2-3)33. In the provinces, Peronism won 12 of the 22 
governorships representing 21 of the 56 senators' seats at the National Congress. 
The Radical Party obtained a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, 129 compared 
with 111 for Peronism (ClarIn, 1-11-1983, p. 2-10). 
Since 1946 the Peronist Party -whenever there were genuinely free 
elections- had obtained a majority while the Radicals had obtained between 25 and 
30 per cent of the total vote. In 1983 there were many factors which militated 
against a Peronist victory. First, the absence of a leader able to replace Perön. 
Second, the degree of influence and power of the trade unionists in the decisions of the 
Peronist Party brought memories of Perön's widow's government, which ended in a 
military coup. Thirdly, the aggressive electoral campaign which ended in the burning 
of an effigy of Rail Alfonsin. Finally, the ambiguity of Dr. Italo Luder's34 attitude 
towards the human rights violations. 
Thus, the strong presence of the trade unions brought memories of Isabel's 
presidency and its chaos and violence3 5. The aggressive electoral campaign terrified 
a society which wanted to end a violent period in its history. Dr. Luder was unable to 
convince the electorate that he would be able to control either the factions within the 
Party or the trade unions. Nor could he convince the electorate that he genuinely 
sought to bring human rights violators to trial. 
Alfonsin's3 6 campaign emphasised democratic and pacifist values. He stated 
categorically that a Radical Party government would convict the perpetrators of 
human rights violations. Eight months before the elections Alfonsin denounced a pact 
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between some officials from the Armed Forces and a number of trade unionists. The 
denounced pact apparently stated that a Peronist government would not investigate 
the violations of human rights under State Terrorism, would maintain the hierarchy 
of the Armed Forces, would not impose a reorganisation of the Armed Forces or 
reduce their budget, and would not pursue charges of corruption which had occurred 
under the military government. In return, control of the trade unions and Obras 
Sociales (Health Service Funds) would pass directly to their existing leaders 
without need for either a new law or internal elections (Gaudio et a!., 1990, p. 17). 
Although the existence of the pact was never substantiated, Alfonsin's announcement 
was nevertheless a key factor in his electoral victory. Indeed, although Alfonsin was 
accused of 'socialist' tendencies by some politicians from the Peronist Party, the 
moderate-right electorate voted overwhelmingly for Alfonsin. In the last days of the 
electoral campaign individuals supporting centre-right parties shifted their vote to 
Alfonsin (Mora y Araujo, 1986). Alfonsin's denouncement of the pact, together with 
the high profile of trade unionists in the Peronist camp and the violent campaign 
tactics of some Peronist politicians, contributed to Alfonsin's victory. The Radical 
leader emphasised the democratic values of the Radical Party and showed himself as 
Argentina's most democratic politician. In contrast, Peronism was presented as 
promoting exactly the things Argentinian society had had enough of: violence and 
disorganisation. 
At the 10th of December 1983, Alfonsin took office and a new democratic 
process began. Before turning to analyse the democratic period, let me conclude by 
outlining the main consequences of the 1976 military dictatorship which, I suggest, 
constrained the democratic government. 
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V. Conclusion 
As the main threat to the maintenance of the capitalist order came from the 
armed urban guerrillas, the primary objective of the Armed Forces was to banish 
the guerrilla activity. Through the implementation of State Terrorism the armed 
urban guerrillas literally 'disappeared'. 
The subordination of the working class in both the economic and the political 
sphere was achieved through the applied structural reform. Due to the dismantling of 
the industrial sector and the transfer of workers to the tertiary sector and the 'black 
market', the trade unions lost members and power. Historically, the tertiary sector 
has not had strong trade unions. Likewise, the redistribution of income meant a defeat 
for the working class in the conflict over wealth distribution. From tables n2 2 and 
n2 3 can be deduced that while the price of a good was 100 pesos in 1976 and by 
1981 was 7276 pesos, the real wage of an industrial workers was 100 in 1976 and 
114.2 in 1981. The process of impoverishment was overwhelming. 
The dictatorship succeeded in its long-term objective of disciplinamiento 
social, but failed to stabilise the economy. Despite the stagnation of the economy, the 
national agro-industrial corporations connected to the international financial circles 
increased their profit. They found the path to growth through the financial market 
and speculation, the purchase of small and medium size companies which had gone 
bankrupt, the increase of their external debt, the diversification of their activity - 
from industry to finance, and even within the industrial sector from petrol to 
fisheries-, and peripheral privatisation. They grew under the protection of the state. 
The analysis of the policy of industrial promotion shows that the GEN were the 
beneficiaries of this process (Azpiazu and Kosacoff, 1989). The nationalisation of 
the private debt was also an important assistance from the state to the GEN. Most 
directly the state was the main purchaser of the production of some of the GE'N3 7 
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The dictatorship could not, however, prevent rising inflation, instability and 
stagnation, and was unable to successfully stabilise the economy. The growth of the 
GEN was the result of the promotion of some factions of the industrial bourgeoisie at 
the expense of others factions -mainly the small and medium size companies. The 
high concentration of capital in these GEN was a new feature of Argentinian social 
relations. Another feature was the desasalarizaciön, terciarizaciön and the 
pauperizaciön of the workers. 
Argentina's 'new economy' could not easily be changed after the dictatorship 
because, despite the process of democratisation, in practice Argentina's international 
creditors and the transnationalised faction of the national bourgeoisie remained 
influential. In this sense, the military dictatorship had achieved a limited objective. 
To what extent the military dictatorship achieved its substantive objectives will be 
analysed in the next chapters because the achievement of these aims meant that the 
disciplinamiento social would last longer than the dictatorship itself. Nevertheless, 
some arguments can be considered here based on constraints created by the military 
government. 
The first factor which would restrict the action of the next government was 
the external debt. As explained above, the external debt became a fiscal problem 
since the government had to service an increasing interest payments. As Fanelli and 
Frenkel (1989, p. 19) point out the essential part of this issue is that the private 
sector socialised its losses but still "'owned' the surplus of trade account which 
provides the foreign exchange necessary for the payments on the interest due". 
Therefore, the public sector had to buy the external surplus from the private sector 
and the government had to obtain the funds to do so either by reducing its 
expenditures or raising taxes. Both of these measure tended to depress the activity 
level and to restrain growth (Fanelli and Frenkel, 1989, p. 19). 
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The second factor which would limit the room for manoeuvre of the 
democratic government was the concentration of capital. The GEN expanded in a 
regime of high inflation and a context of economic stagnation. The growth of the GEN 
was connected with relative prices because they operate in oligopolistic markets 
with high inflation which gives them the capacity to set prices above the average for 
the economy (Basualdo, 1987, p. 50). Likewise, due to the financial overvaluation of 
the surplus and their insertion in international and national financial markets, the 
GEN obtained more benefits than other companies. Therefore, they were both 
influential, through the determination of prices, and independent, through their 
powerful place in financial markets. Likewise, their power of speculation 
constrained the decision making power of the incoming government. 
An impoverished working class would also be a constraint on the margin of 
manoeuvre of the democratic government. After seven years of dictatorship with 
social and political repression, the working class expected social, economic and 
political compensation. Nevertheless, due to the mentioned constraints and the 
economic legacy of the dictatorship, the democratic government had to heed the 
requirements of the IMF adjustment plan, and balance them with the demands of the 
working class. 
Alfonsin's new government found itself severely constrained, then, by the 
legacy of the Proceso. Juan Alemann, a member of the Martinez de Hoz's team, said 
that the changes in the economic situation would restrain the action of the new 
democratic government and that the latter would therefore fail (Schvarzer, 1986a, 
p. 227). As Smith (1985. p. 74) points out "the project's architects hoped to make 
it impossible for any future civilian or military regime to embark on dangerous 
'retorno a! pasado ' (return to the past) in terms of social and economic policies". 
The method to achieve that objective was the redistribution of social power in 
Argentine society "particularly the destruction of the economic bases which in the 
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past had made possible the cyclical re-emergence of defensive alliances between 
organised labour and the subordinate factions of capital" (Smith, 1985, p. 74)38 
The democratic government found itself trapped between the conflicting 
pressures of its international creditors, demanding re-payment of the debt, of the 
bourgeoisie, demanding the protection of its interests, and of the working class, 
demanding economic compensation after seven years of impotence. Likewise, the 
democratic government had to deal with the social demand that human rights 
violators be brought to trial -which obliged it to confront the Armed Forces. 
The military dictatorship did not resolve the crisis of the Argentinian state. It 
did, however, lay the foundations of the restructuring of the state and of class 
relations. The incoming democratic government had work on these 'foundations. Let 
me now turn to analyse the democratic government's policies towards this legacy. 
1 My emphasis. 
2 As O'Donnell (1988, p. 90) points out economic normalisation has two dimensions: 
"the first involves the restitution of the economic supremacy of the oligopolised and 
trans nationalised units in such a way that they regain heavy influence over the 
performance of the economy's main variables. The second dimension of normalisation 
consists of the restoration of close links between the local economy and the world 
capitalist system, in ways that involve, in contrast to the pre-Bureaucratic 
Authoritarian period, capital movements away from as well as toward the capitalist 
centres". 
3 Later the Junta renewed his designation until March 1981. 
4 Martinez de Hoz is a man from the 'economic establishment' who had occupied 
crucial places such as the Presidency of the Consejo Empresario Argentino 
(Argentinian Business Board) and of Acindar, a steel-company. 
5 As explained above, the Argentinian Anti-Communist Alliance -Triple A- was a 
paramilitary group formed by Jose Löpez Rega, Isabel Perön's Minister of Social 
Welfare. 
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6 For a detailed account of the dirty war and its consequences see Bonasso (1 98 4), 
Argentina's National Commission on Disappeared People (1986), and Andersen 
(1993). 
7 Regarding the international economic support to the new military government and 
to its economic policy, after one week of the coup d'etat , the IMF approved a credit of 
US$ 110 millions of Special Drawing Rights (SDR). In August 1976, the IMF 
approved another credit of US$ 260 millions of SDR (Schvarzer, 1986a, p. 46). 
8 Law 21382 of August 1976 concerning foreign investment stated that all areas of 
economic activity were open to foreign investment, and guaranteed the settlement of 
profits and the repatriation of capital even in case of the implementation of an 
exchange-rate control (Minsburg, 1987, p. 85). This law also established equality 
between foreign and national investment and accepted the juridical independence of 
the transnational companies with respect to their head offices. Between 1976 and 
1983 foreign investment was guided to petrol and financial sectors. Basic references 
are Minsburg (1987), Azpiazu and Kosacoff (1989), and Sourrouille et al. (1985). 
9 Calculated from tables 2 and 3. 
10 This was a variety of work-to-rule developed to circumvent the anti-strike 
legislation (Abös, 1984, p. 10). 
11 Canitrot (1981, p. 143) explains that, as a consequence of the financial reform, 
the nationalised deposits system ended; therefore, the banks recovered a main role in 
the financial system. For more details see also Frenkel (1980). 
12 Desindexaciön means a restriction to the mechanism of increasing prices due to 
the past inflation rate. 
13 Argentinian Central Bank (Banco Central de la Republica Argentina), unpublished 
data. 
14 See Obschatko (1988). 
15 See Azpiazu and Kosacoff (1989), Schvarzer (1986a) and (1983), Canitrot 
(1981) and Katz and Kosacoff (1989). 
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16 See Torre (1988) (1989) and Godio (1989). 
17 Law 21608 concerning promotion of the industrial sector gave the right of the 
promotion to national as well as international companies (Schvarzer, 1986a, p. 
189). 
18 The public investment during the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s was 
between 7.5 per cent and 8.5 per cent of the GDP; between 1976 and 1980 was 11 .7 
per cent of the GDP. The energy sector was the most relevant with a share of 50 per 
cent of the total of the public investment between 1976 and 1980 (Comisiön 
Econömica para America Latina y el Caribe -CEPAL-, 1990, p. 29). 
19 This promotion started in the 1960s with the proposal of increasing industrial 
exports. This policy tried to take advantage of the development that the industry had 
achieved through the Import Substitution Industrialisation -ISI-. Due to this 
promotion, while in the beginning of the 1960s the manufacturing sector did not 
export, in the 1970s its exports were over US$1000 millions which represented 
25 per cent of total exports (Azpiazu and Kosacoff, 1989, p. 101). 
20 Most notably General Motors, Citröen and Chrysler which was bought out by 
Volkswagenwerk A. K (Sourrouille et a!., 1985, p. 159). 
21 Basualdo and Azpiazu (1990) made an excellent analysis of the impact of the 
industrial promotion applied by the military dictatorship in the process of 
concentration and centralisation of capital. 
22 For more details in the development of the GEN and the 'diversified' transnational 
companies under the military dictatorship see Basualdo (1987), Azpiazu et of 
(1986), Acevedo et at (1990) and Basualdo and Azpiazu (1990). 
231 return to this policy below. 
24 For more details see Ostiguy (1990). 
25 Measured at 1976 levels, 1974 average wages were US$ 217, falling to 
US$ 
109 in 1978 (Villareal, 1985, p. 249). 
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26 Although the author does not explain how poverty is defined, through his 
comments could be assume that poverty is defined as the impossibility of satisfying 
basic needs such as house, drinking water, electricity, education and health service. 
27 For more details in the mechanism of the nationalisation of the private external 
debt see Graziano (1986) and Basualdo (1987). 
28 See Basualdo (1987), Frenkel et al (1988), and Bouzas and Keifman (1 99 0). 
29 Particularly the Navy whose Commander-in-Chief, Admiral E. Massera was 
publicly against it. 
30 Basic references on the Malvinas conflict are Boron and Faündez (1989), Cardoso 
et al (1987), Gamba (1987), and Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse (1990). 
31 Fontana (1984), (1986) points out that the crisis of the Armed Forces was 
within themselves as weil as within each of the Forces, specially within and with the 
Army which was viewed as the most compromised in the implementation of State 
Terrorism and the most responsible for the defeat in Malvinas. 
32 These were specially: Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of May's Square), 
Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos (Permanent Assembly for Human 
Rights), and Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (Centre of Legal and Social 
Studies). 
33 These were mainly: Intransigent Party (left-wing) (Partido Intransigente) 
Movement of Integration and Development (moderate-right) (Movimiento de 
lntegraciön y Desarrollo), Federal Alliance (right-wing) (Alianza Federal) , 
Democratic Centre Union (right-wing) (Uni®n del Centro Democrdtico), Christian 
Democrats (moderate-right) (Demöcratas Cristianos), Democratic Socialism 
Alliance (moderate-'left) (Afianza Demöcrata Socialista) and Movement towards 
Socialism (left-wing) (Movimiento al Socialismo) . 
34 Dr. Luder had been stand-in President (Presidente Provisional) when Maria 
Estela Martinez de Perön was ill. 
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35 An excellent study of the role of trade unionists in the last Peronist government 
is Torre (1989). 
36 Dr. Raül Alfonsin was the leader of the Renovation and Change Movement 
(Movimiento de Renovaciön y Cambio ) within the Radical Party. This fraction was 
formed in 1972 and in 1983 won the internal elections against National Line (Linea 
Nacional ). For more details see Wynia (1992). 
37 Fanelli and Frenkel (1989, p. 27) state that "the state is the most important 
client of 20 of the 100 leading firms of the economy (ranked by sales)". 
38 For more detailed on this alliance see O'Donnell (1978). 
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Chapter 4 
1983-1985, a failed attempt to resolve the crisis 
Introduction 
The main political objective of Alfonsin's government was the consolidation of 
democracy (Alfonsin, 1992, p. 49). In this sense, the Radical government was, at 
the very beginning, much more aware of the political aspects of the Argentinian 
crisis than of the economic ones. Alfonsin believed that, in order to consolidate 
democracy, his government had to 'democratise' the unions and the Armed Forces. By 
'democratise' Alfonsin meant the incorporation of both these actors into the 
democratic system (Alfonsin, 1992, p. 19). He believed that both the unions and the 
Armed Forces were deeply authoritarian. While, in the case of the Armed Forces, this 
assumption was correct, in respect of the unions it was very simplistic. As said, 
during the military dictatorships, the unions were divided into a combative faction 
and a more conciliatory one. Behind Alfonsin's objective of 'democratising' the 
unions, there was the objective to 'desperonizar' the unions, that is to breakdown the 
traditionally powerful role of Peronist trade unionists within the union movement. 
There was, also, the objective of controlling the disruptive power of the unions. The 
unions were viewed as a vehicle of social unrest which could provoke a military 
coup. The Radical government, by 'democratising' the unions, wanted to restrain and 
ultimately defuse their political power. 
Alfonsin tried also to restrain the political influence of the Armed Forces. 
Throughout his period in office, he tried to prevent an alliance between the Armed 
Forces and the unions which might threaten democracy. The assumption that such an 
alliance could threaten social stability was based on the history of military coups in 
Argentina. Most notably, Alfonsin tried to avoid a new breakdown of democracy like 
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that which occurred in Illia's presidency, which was perceived to have been provoked 
by the social unrest unleashed by the unions (Alfonsin, 1992, p. 16). The analysis I 
will present of the first two years of Alfonsin's mandate shows a failed attempt to 
control the unions and to implement Alfonsin's human rights violations policies. 
Economically, the 1983-1985 period is important for the negotiations 
regarding the external debt. During this period the government initially resisted, 
but then agreed to sign, the first letter of intent' with the IMF. In February 1984, 
the Economics Minister, Bernardo Grinspun, declared that "we are not negotiating a 
stand-by (with the IMF) and we will not accept any recessive formula" (Latin 
America Weekly Report, 17-2-1984, p. 8). Seven months later Grinspun affirmed 
that an agreement with the IMF would be necessary (Clarin, 3-9-1984, p. 1). This 
chapter seeks to explain this u-turn. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section analyses Alfonsin's 
policies towards human rights violations. It highlights the reasons why Alfonsin's 
objectives failed, and the consequences of this failure for the rest of his Presidency. 
The second section analyses Alfonsin's first attempts to control and to politically 
demobilise the trade unions. It shows the power of the trade unions in blocking and 
modifying state policies. This indicates that the political demobilisation achieved by 
the military dictatorship was only temporary. The third section analyses the 
domestic economic strategy and the negotiations surrounding the external debt. It 
begins by analysing the consequences of the external debt crisis for Latin American 
countries and, specifically, for Argentina. As one of its main economic problems was 
the existence of high inflation, I briefly analyse the political side of the inflation 
phenomenon. The section also studies the gradual change of Alfonsin's policies due to 
the failure of the first economic strategy to prevent high inflation, and of the 
negotiations for the payment of the external debt to avoid an IMF plan. Due to these 
failures the Radical government was unable to resolve the crisis of the Argentinian 
133 
state. The last section concludes by suggesting reasons why the government's 
strategies failed to resolve the crisis. 
I. Coping with the consequences of State Terrorism 
i. The Radical government's objectives 
One of the worst consequences of the military dictatorship was the 
desaparecidos. Human rights organisations calculated that 30000 people disappeared 
due to the implementation of State Terrorism. These organisations, most notably the 
Madres de Plaza de Mayo, demanded Apariciön con Vida y Castigo a los Culpables 
(literally, Appearance Alive and Punishment of the Guilty). While the first demand 
was, obviously, impossible to satisfy; the second was almost unavoidable. Indeed, 
nationally, the pressure for the punishment for human rights violators was very 
great (Fontana and Llenderrozas, 1992). 
During the first two years of his government Alfonsin attempted to undermine 
the political power of the Armed Forces, to democratise their internal structures, 
and to set in motion the process of bringing the military to trial for human rights 
violations. 
To weaken the political power of the Armed Forces, the government applied 
budget cuts, reduced the number of conscriptsi , proposed the transfer of some 
institutes and corps from Buenos Aires to the provinces, and modified the role of the 
Armed Forces in the internal matters of the State. Military spending was cut back 
from 5.98 per cent of GDP in 1983 to 3.71 per cent in 1984 (Latin America 
Weekly Report, 17-8-1984, p. 10). "Defence expenditures plummeted by 40 per 
cent between 1983 and 1986 (... ) Although the deepest cuts were made in operations 
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(42 per cent) and equipment (50 per cent) army salaries fell 25 per cent between 
December 1983 and October 1984 alone" (Pion-Berlin, 1991, p. 552). Alfonsin's 
Minister of Defence, Raül Borras, announced that no funds would be made available 
for development projects in the military sphere with the exception of those linked to 
the production of arms for export (Latin America Weekly Report, 17-8-1984, 
p. 10). The Prefectura Naval Argentina (Coast Guard Agency) and the Gendarmeria 
Nacional (Frontier Police Corps), which were dependent on the Navy and the Army 
respectively, were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence. 
Finally, around 100 military officials were released from the Intelligence Service 
(Latin American Regional Reports Southern Cone, 16-11-1984, p. 5). For his 
second objective, the democratisation of the Armed Forces, Alfonsin tried to apply a 
different syllabus of studies at their main institutes introducing courses taught by 
civilians on the role of the Armed Forces in a democracy (Fontana, 1989, p. 17, and 
Huntington, 1993, p. 245). 
Alfonsin's policies to set in motion the process of bringing the military to 
trial for human rights violations was the focus of his relationship with the Armed 
Forces. 
During the electoral campaign, Alfonsin had explained his proposal to deal 
with the human rights violations. He emphasised the concept of 'due obedience' based 
on three different levels of responsibility on human rights violations (Alfonsin, 
1992, p. 108). He had defined that the degree of punishment was to vary between 
those who had been responsible for the planning and supervision of the repression, 
those who had committed 'excesses' during the repression, and those who had simply 
obeyed orders from their superiors (Alfonsin, 1992, p. 108). This was the main 
framework for Alfonsin's policies towards the Armed Forces. This framework was 
known as the 'due obedience' proposal. 
135 
According to the 'due obedience' proposal, Alfonsin's main objectives were to 
prosecute and to punish the highest members of the Armed Forces, specifically the 
three Juntas Militares which governed the country between 1976 and 1983, and to 
forgive those members of the Armed Forces who had obeyed orders from their 
superiors. In order to achieve these objectives, Alfonsin reformed the Military 
Justice Code. He attempted to give the Armed Forces the opportunity for a 'seif- 
cleansing', assuring them a 'political decision' -the 'due obedience' proposal- to 
forgive the thousands of officials who had committed aberrant acts (Fontana, 1987, 
p. 387). Alfonsin did not attempt to punish all those who had participated in the 
implementation of State Terrorism, rather he intended to prevent the repetition of 
such State Terrorism by showing that anyone, including the holders of the highest 
office, can be judged (Alfonsin, 1992, p. 69). However, his objectives would be 
obstructed by pressure from human rights organisations, public opinion, and the 
Judiciary for the punishment of all members of the Armed Forces who were involved 
in the implementation of State Terrorism. 
ii. From the opportunity of 'self-cleansing' to the public judgement of the 
Juntas 
Three days after taking office, Alfonsin sent to Congress his proposal to 
abolish the self-amnesty law sanctioned by the military dictatorship (Clarin, 14- 
12-1983, p. 1). As explained above, this law established an amnesty for the 
perpetrators of subversive activities and 'excesses' of repression from the 25th May 
1973 to the 17th June 1982 (Clarin, 24-9-1983, p. 2). Alfonsin's proposal to 
abolish this law meant that human rights violations and subversive activities carried 
out under the 1976 military dictatorship could be investigated by the Judiciary. In 
addition to this, he ordered judgements to be made on Mario Firmenich, Fernando 
Vaca Narvaja, Ricardo Obregön Cano, Rodolfo Galimberti, Roberto Perdia, Hector 
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Pardo and Enrique Gorriarän Merlo -all of them members of the armed urban 
guerrilla-, and of Lt. General Jorge Videla, Admiral Emilio Massera, Brigadier 
Ramon Agosti, Lt. General Roberto Viola, Admiral Armando Lambruschini, Brigadier 
Omar Graffigna, Lt. General Leopoldo Galtieri, Admiral Jorge Anaya and Brigadier 
Basilio Lami Dozo -all members of the Juntas Militares (Clarin, 14-12-1983, p. 
2-3). 
Alfonsin also set up the Comisiön Nacional sobre Desapariciön de Personas - 
CONADEP- (National Commission on Disappeared People) made up of well-known 
figures such as the Catholic Bishop Jaime de Nevares, the Protestant Bishop Carlos 
Gattioni, the Rabbi Marshall Meyer, Professor of Epistemology Gregorio Klimovsky, 
jurist Ricardo Colombres, Doctor Rene Favaloro, the former Chancellor of the 
University of Buenos Aires Hilario Fernandez Long, the philosopher Eduardo Rabossi, 
the writer Ernesto Säbato and the journalist Magdalena Ruiz Guinazü. There were 
also six places for MPs and senators. The Commission was to accept denunciations and 
evidence of human rights violations and send them to the judiciary. It was also 
charged to discover the whereabouts of the desaparecidos and of the abducted 
children, and to present, within six months, a report to the President with a detailed 
account of its findings (Fontana, 1987, p. 386). 
In addition, Alfonsin sent his proposal for the reform of the Military Justice 
Code to the Congress (Clarin, 14-12-1983, p. 2-3). His proposal decreed that the 
Consejo Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) 
had to deal with the offences attributable to members of the Armed Forces, and those 
members of the security forces, the police, and the penitentiary service operating 
under the orders of the Armed Forces. The Consejo was to examine those offences 
committed between the 24th March 1976 and the 26th September 1983 (Clarin, 
14-12-1983, p. 2-3). In case of delay in the judicial procedures, the Consejo had 
to inform the Federal Chamber of Justice on the causes of this delay. If the Federal 
Chamber considered that the delay was unjustified, it would take over responsibility 
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for the judgements. Finally, the reform laid down that in the cases of individuals who 
had acted under orders of the highest officials of the Armed Forces and the Junta 
Mili to r, it could be presumed that these individuals acted under the mistaken belief 
in the legitimacy of these orders (Fontana, 1987, p. 384). 
In February 1984 the Congress passed the law for the modification of the 
Military Justice Code, but Senator Elias Sapag of the provincial Movimiento Popular 
Neuquino, invoked modifications to the legislation. Sapag's amendments laid down that 
those individuals who had acted under orders could not be excused from punishment 
when they had committed aberrant and atrocious acts (Clarin, 2-2-1984, p. 8). One 
of the objectives of Alfonsin's reform was to enshrine the three levels of 
responsibility distinguished by him -the so-called 'due obedience' proposal. Senator 
Sapag's modification undermined the juridical applicability of these distinctions. 
Alfonsin did not reject it, however, and sanctioned the law. He believed that the 
sentence of the Consejo Supremo would enable him to apply his 'due obedience' 
proposal since the sentence would clarify the hierarchy of the Armed Forces for the 
implementation of State Terrorism (Fontana, 1987, p. 388). 
The first military crisis under the democratic government was unleashed in 
September 1984 when the report of the National Commission on Disappeared People 
was published (La Naciön, 20-9-1984, p. 1). This report revealed the extent of 
State Terrorism. It gave details of concentration camp locations, tortures, the fate of 
some of the desaparecidos, and the whereabouts of their bodies. The Army Chief of 
Staff, General Jorge Arguindegui, publicly alleged the existence of a campaign within 
the Army against his authority; therefore the Minister of Defence decided to replace 
him with General Pianta (Fontana, 1987, p. 389). 
By this time, after two delays, the Consejo Supremo sent, to the Federal 
Chamber of Justice, a report supporting the Armed Forces' procedures in their 
struggle against the guerrilla (La Naciön, 26-9-1984, p. 1). This report was 
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condemned by the Federal Chamber, which decided to take over, due to the unjustified 
delay of the Consejo (La Naciön, 5-10-1984, p. 1). This was the first defeat of 
Alfonsin's policies towards the Armed Forces, since the Consejo did not condemn the 
struggle against the guerrilla movement, undermining the possibility of the process 
of 'self-cleansing'. 
The Federal Chamber of Justice began on the 22nd of April 1985 the public 
judgement against the Juntas Militares (La Naciön, 23-4-1985, p. 1). This was an 
historic event. Never before had the Argentinian military dictatorships been judged 
for their 'excesses'. From Alfonsin's point of view the public judgement established 
the foundations for the consolidation of democracy, since it would prevent future 
generations of Generals, Admirals and Brigadiers overthrowing democratic 
governments (Alfonsin, 1992, p. 69). 
iii. The failure of the 'self-cleansing' of the Armed Forces 
Alfonsin's policies towards human rights violations failed on two issues which 
would influence his subsequent years in office. First, the government misunderstood 
the perception of the Armed Forces over the accusations of human rights violations. 
The attempt of bringing about a 'self-cleansing' of the Armed Forces required that 
they would recognise the struggle against the guerrilla as illegitimate. Alfonsin 
expected them to condemn State Terrorism through the judgement of the members 
who applied it, but in fact the Consejo Supremo did not condemn State Terrorism. On 
the contrary, the Armed Forces, time and again, supported their struggle against the 
guerrillas and proudly recognised it as a complete success (Fontana, 1987). 
In fact the defence of State Terrorism unified the Armed Forces. During the 
military government the tension between them had been very evident -especially 
between Massera's Navy and Videla's Army leadership. Horizontal cleavages had 
appeared. These cleavages, based on ideological and professional differences, cut 
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across hierarchical lines of authority. Ideological differences had emerged in 
reference to Martinez de Hoz's economic strategy, which was resisted not only by 
former President Viola but also by a considerable number of low rank officials. The 
professional differences concerned the management of the Malvinas ware. Those low 
rank officials who did not approve Martinez de Hoz's plan were those who went to the 
Malvinas war and later criticised the management by Generals in their Buenos Aires' 
offices. Despite these differences, the Armed Forces were united in their defence of 
State Terrorism. Alfonsin misunderstood the importance that the Armed Forces 
attached to their struggle against the guerrilfa3 
The second failure was Alfonsin's attempt to set in motion the juridical 
applicability of the three levels of responsibility. Senator Sapag modified Alfonsin's 
proposals. Sapag's modification undermined the concept of 'due obedience' since, in 
fact, most of the actions under the implementation of State Terrorism had been 
aberrant and atrocious acts. 
Alfonsin's main objective was that once the Consejo Supremo had 'cleansed' 
the Armed Forces, the government would apply the concept of 'due obedience' to the 
rest of the officials. However, the Consejo Supremo and Senator Sapag's modification 
aborted Alfonsin's plan. 
As noted earlier, these two failures would have an influence in subsequent 
years. At the very beginning of the democratic government the Armed Forces were 
discredited. Information on concentration camps, torture, assassinations, and 
abduction of children swamped the first period of the democratic government. Also, 
the defeat of the Malvinas campaign had discredited the Armed Forces as a military 
force. Eighteen year old soldiers had died in the war while the military hierarchy sat 
in its Buenos Aires' offices. These two consequences of the military dictatorship 
would exacerbate the anger felt towards the Armed Forces. Indeed, under the 
democratic government, public opinion required not only the acknowledgement and 
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disclosure of the truth about the 'dirty war' but also the punishment of those who 
both ordered and committed the acts. 
Alfonsin's policies had the opposite effect from what he intended. Rather than 
undermining the political role of the military, they actually served to facilitate the 
'repo Iiticisation' of the latter. After the acknowledgement of the horrors of State 
Terrorism, Argentinian public opinion demanded the prosecution and punishment of 
human rights violators. By this time, Alfonsin could no longer control his policies 
towards the Armed Forces, the implementation of the 'due obedience' proposal would 
have been 'political suicide'4. Besides, by this time, Alfonsin was regarded, 
nationally and internationally, as a 'hero's since he ordered the judgement of the 
Juntas Militares, a previously unknown event in Argentina and Latin America. This 
was his main achievement as regards the Armed Forces and, indeed, established the 
foundations for the consolidation of liberal democracy. However, this achievement 
was, later, forgotten due to the sanction of the Punto Final (Full Stop) and 'due 
obedience' laws. I discuss the consequences of these two measure below. Now, I turn 
to analyse Alfonsin's relationship with the trades union movement. 
II. The coexistence with the sindicalismo peronista 
i. The Radical government's objectives 
From 1983 to 1985, Alfonsin's government applied two different strategies 
towards the trade unions. In the beginning Alfonsin's administration adopted a policy 
of confrontation. This failed, due to a number of factors. First of all, within the 
government there were two different approaches towards trade unionism. On the one 
hand, a combative line with the objective of undermining the power of the trade 
unions, taking advantage of Peronism's recent electoral defeat (Beliz, 1988, p. 
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169). This sector wanted to desperonizar the trade unions, breaking down their 
historical alliance with Peronism. The desperonizaciön therefore involved the 
political restructuring of the trade unions. However, it was also understood as the 
way through which Radicalism could find a powerful place in the trades union 
movement (Gaudio et al, 1990, p. 38). If this was the long-term objective, in the 
short-term to desperonizar meant to break down the historical alliance between the 
trades union movement and Peronism which gave the former a powerful place in the 
Argentinian political process. 
On the other hand, there was a moderate line, within the Radical Party, which 
argued that the government should consolidate alliances with the trade unions and 
business organisations in order to secure future achievements (Beliz, 1988, p. 
169). A consequence of the struggle between these two approaches was that the 
government policy itself was not unified and its decision-making process lacked 
coherence. Alfonsin, himself, on many occasions changed his position. At the 
beginning of his term in office, he supported the combative line. Arguing that 
unionists in charge of the main trade unions were those who had confronted Illia's 
government, Alfonsin believed that they no longer represented the workers (Gaudio 
et al, 1990, p. 17). He argued that the trades union movement was totalitarian 
(Abös, 1984, p. 101). In this sense, he attempted to 'democratise' the trades union 
movement. By 'democratise', the government was trying to modify an historical 
tendency of the trade union elections, namely the predominance of presenting only 
one candidate for the elections. In other words, in trade union elections there was 
only one candidate for each union, there was no opposition (Gaudio et al, 1990, p. 
36). Based on this assessment, Alfonsin argued that the trade unionists did not 
represent the workers (Gaudio et al, 1990, p. 17). Alfonsin wanted to end this 
practice, giving full participation to minorities. 
Alfonsin favoured the establishment of a social agreement among the 
government, the trade unions and the business organisations (Gaudio et a!, 1990, p. 
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20). However, before achieving it, the trades union movement, it was argued, should 
be'democratised'. Alfonsin explained his objectives towards the 'democratisation' of 
the trade unions, arguing that "the new trade union must be organised from the 
bottom to the top (... ) It has to be organised by the genuine expression of the workers 
without any influence from the state, the political parties or the business 
organisations; its electoral procedures must be controlled by the Judiciary, assuring 
the participation of minorities (... )71 (Discursos Presidenciales, 1983, p. 17). In 
this sense, the Radical government promoted the abolition of the legislation of the 
last military dictatorship on the trades union movement and its replacement by new 
legislation to guarantee the participation of minorities and secure independence from 
any political party. It also promoted that the Obras Sociales (Health Service Funds) 
would be independent from the trade unions and would be incorporated into a National 
Health Plan (Plataforma Electoral Nacional de la Uniön Civica Radical, 1983, p. 24). 
Regarding the new legislation for electoral procedures, the Radical's proposal 
was based on the non-recognition of the unionists who had been elected under the 
military dictatorship. Therefore, the first elections would be controlled by the 
government. The Radical government argued that, as the current unionists did not 
represent the workers, they could not be relied upon to control the elections (Gaudio 
et al, 1990, p. 52). The objective of this strategy was essentially to control the 
trade union elections and to undermine the power of the unionists by connecting them 
with the military dictatorship. It was a tool for weakening the role of Peronism 
among the trades union movement, and, therefore, to politically demobilise the 
workers. However, the Radical government failed in this attempt. 
Regarding wage policy, Alfonsin's administration maintained the decree-law 
of the last dictatorship which empowered the government to determine the level of 
wages. In order to match changes in the inflation rate the Radical administration 
decided to increase wages rates every three months (Gaudio et al, 1990, p. 46). The 
trade unions were demanding the establishment of free collective bargaining; the 
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government argued that the economic situation was too unstable to establish this 
demand since this would undermine government control of wage and price increases 
(Gaudio et al, 1990, p. 133). After the attempt to 'democratise' the trade unions 
failed, the discussion between the government and the trade unions focused on the 
level of wages and the establishment of free collective bargaining. 
As the analysis of Alfonsin's government shows, despite the modifications 
undergone by the labour movement under the military dictatorship, the trade unions 
proved to be still quite powerful. Indeed, the democratic government could not 
control the more combative sections of the trades union movement. 
ii. The trade unions position 
Under the military dictatorship, the trades union movement had been 
modified. As explained above, the economic structural reform which led to the 
dismantling of the industrial sector and the desasalarizaciön, terciarizaciOn and 
pauperizaciön of the working class, directly hit the power of the trades union 
movement. Moreover, the implementation of State Terrorism provoked the 
disappearance of the most combative sector of unionists (Gaudio et al, 1990, p. 26). 
Finally, the peak organisation, the CGT, was divided into two sectors the CGT-Brasil 
which confronted the military dictatorship and the CGT-Azopardo which negotiated 
with the military government. One of the main objectives of both CGTs was the 
unification of the organisation. 
Under the democratic government the trades union movement position was 
represented by 'unified' CGT policies. The CGT's priorities were to improve real 
wages, to reactivate the economy, and to modify the labour legislation enacted by the 
the military dictatorship, specifically to establish free collective bargaining (La 
Voz, 26-1-1984, p. 5). The CGT argued that democracy would be established only 
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after the improvement in real wages and the achievement of full employment 
(Clarin, 3-2-1984, p. 3). 
The first confrontation with the Radical government was focused on the new 
legislation for trade union elections. The CGT argued that the legislation was a tool to 
institutionalise state intervention in the internal matters of the trade unions. The 
CGT proved to be still able to block the government strategy through its connections 
with Senators from the Peronist Party and other provincial parties. After this 
confrontation, the main discussion focused on wage increases and the legislation f or 
free collective bargaining. 
The confrontation policy of the trades union movement was mainly based on 
the deterioration of the workers economic situation. It also pushed for the 
establishment of free collective bargaining, and the abolishment of the military 
dictatorship laws. Thirteen general strikes and thousands of official labour conflicts 
were the means through which the union movement confronted the democratic 
government. However, the most significant event was the support given to the Radical 
government by the unions at the first military rebellion. Indeed, this was the first 
time that the trades union movement supported a non-Peronist democratic 
government threatened by the Armed Forces. 
Although the trade unions proved to be powerful, achieving their most 
important objectives, they could not modify the government's overall economic 
strategy, and thus, they could not achieve an improvement in the workers situation. 
Let me now turn to an analysis of the first two years of confrontation between the 
trade unions and the Radical government. 
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iii. From confrontation to concertaciön 
In order to deal with the sindicalismo peronista, Alfonsin appointed Antonio 
Mucci of the graphic workers as Minister of Labour. Mucci belonged to the combative 
wing of the Radical Party whose objective was to desperonizar the trades union 
movement (Beliz, 1988, p. 169). One week after taking office Alfonsin sent his 
proposals for trade union elections to the Congress (Clarin, 21-12-1983, p. 2). its 
main objective was to 'democratise' the trade unions through a call for elections 
under a special regime. It applied to the trade unions that were still subject to 
government intervention or under the direction of a 'normalising delegate' (delegado 
normalizador ). Under the proposal, the Labour Minister would appoint a delegate 
who would form a Junta Fiscalizadora (Regulation Board) with representatives from 
all the different leadership teams. The Junta would control the delegate who, in 
order to call for elections, would assume the attributes of the General Secretary of 
each of the trade unions. The proposal also provided for the presence in the 
commissions of electoral minorities, the reduction of the term of office, the control 
of Electoral Justice and the implementation of secret, direct and compulsory voting 
(Clarin, 19-12-1983, p. 2). 
Trade unionists were unified in defending their role against Alfonsin's 
proposal: in January 1984, the leaders of both CGT-Brasil and CGT-Azopardo, 
agreed on the reunification of the CGT and the appointment of four co-secretaries: 
Sabi Ubaldini of the beer workers and Osvaldo Borda representing the rubber 
industry from CGT-Brasil, and Jorge Triaca of the plastic workers and Antonio 
Bafdassini of the post-office workers from CGT-Azopardo (Clarin, 11-1-1984, p. 
9}. They rejected the role of the government in designating a delegate to conduct the 
electoral process. Ubaldini argued that Alfonsin's proposal was an attempt to legalise 
government intervention in the trades union movement (Clarin 3-2-1984, p. 12). 
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Indeed, the democratic government, due to its non-recognition of the trade 
unions authorities, attempted to intervene in the electoral procedures by appointing 
a delegate to control the elections. Although the government stated that this 
intervention was only for the first round of elections, its main objective was to 
desperonizar the trades union movement. In this sense, the unionists, arguing for 
the independence of the movement, were also trying to block the desperonizaciön. The 
Radical government, behind the slogan of 'democratising' the unions, was attempting 
to break down union connections with Peronism, which was a tool to achieve the 
political demobilisation of the workers. In this regard, the Radical government 
intended to restructure social relations by modifying the historically powerful role 
of the unions in the political scenario. 
However, the government's proposal was rejected by the Senate. Senator Elias 
Sapag argued that only the workers had the right to decide on the internal 
organisation of the trade unions6 (Clarin, 15-3-1984, p. 3). The opposition of 
Sapag's party determined that the law was rejected. 
After the failure of this first attempt to increase influence over the trade 
unions, the government attempted to achieve a concertaciön social (social 
agreement), the first step towards which was the appointment of Juan Manuel 
Caseila as Minister of Labour (Gaudio eta!, 1990, p. 58) 7. The concertaciön social 
attempted a three-sided accord among labour organisations, business organisations 
and the government to attack inflation and change the economic situation. In addition, 
a new post was created, a Presidential delegate responsible for 'normalising' the 
trades union movement. Hugo Barrionuevo, a trade unionist, was appointed to the new 
position. His main task was to begin a new round of negotiations with the trade 
unionists to organise elections. (Gaudio et al, 1990, p. 55). Alfonsin had moved 
towards the more pro-unionist sector of the Radical party. He was now trying to 
achieve an agreement with the trade unions after being unable to undermine their 
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political power. As said, the appointment of Juan Manuel Casella was the first sign of 
Alfonsin's new approach to the trade unions. 
As the CGT had won the first confrontation with the government, now it began 
to demand the establishment of free collective bargaining as one of its most important 
objectives. The government was first arguing that free collective bargaining would 
be established after the trade union elections (Gaudio et al, 1990, p. 53). After the 
elections, the democratic government argued that the economic situation made free 
collective bargaining very risky, in the sense that the government would loose its 
control over wage and price increases, which could provoke increases in the inflation 
rate (Gaudio et al, 1990, p. 133). In this sense, the government implied that 
inflation derived only from wage increases. Later, however, the government would 
argue that the main cause of inflation was the high fiscal deficit. Nevertheless, the 
economic situation was always employed as an excuse to postpone the sanctioning of 
free collective bargaining legislation. 
The main discussion in the concertaciön framework focused on wage 
increases and, as it is shown below, the government took the final decision on the size 
of increases without taking into account the CGT's demands. But, by trying to agree 
with the CGT in the framework of the concertaciön, the government attempted to 
prevent labour conflict. While the CGT was joining the concertaciön, it could not 
oppose the government's economic strategy outside this framework. Indeed, for the 
two general strikes the CGT left the concertaciön, only to rejoin the process at a later 
date. The concertaciön was, in this sense, a means to control the opposition of the 
trades union movement. 
in the beginning the concertaciOn attempt focused on the electoral system for 
the trades union movement. One of its first outcomes was a proposal for electoral 
procedures, agreed between the trade unions and the government. This differed from 
Alfonsin's proposal in that the existing authorities -precisely those that Alfonsin did 
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not consider representative of the workers- would call for elections. In July, the 
new proposal was passed by the Congress (ClarIn, 5-7-1983, p. 7). 
In August, the first meeting of the concertaciön attempt was held at the Home 
Affairs Ministry. Representatives of the CGT, other workers organisations8, and 
employers organisations discussed the agenda with the Ministers of Economy, Health, 
Labour and Home Affairs. The objective of the government move was to avoid a 
struggle for the distribution of wealth, to prevent inflation, to increase wages, and to 
attain economic growth (Clarin, 3-8-1984, p. 3). 
The government, despite the concertaciön, decided to increase the statutory 
minimum wage (salario minimo vital 9), the conventional base wage for collective 
bargaining which would include a bonus (for attendance, seniority, productivity), 
and general wage levels by 18 per cent. The CGT accepted the increase but demanded 
that the bonus should be over and above the minimum wage arguing that it was an 
incentive for the workers and a supplement to the basic wage (Gaudio et al, 1990, p. 
97). As the government refused to grant this demand, the CGT decided to call a 
general strike for the 3rd of September and to leave the concertaciön process 
(Clarin, 30-8-1984, p. 2). By this time, the government had signed its first 
'letter of intent' with the International Monetary Fund. In this, the government 
committed itself to "continue to decree wage adjustments for the public and private 
sector on a monthly basis, with catch-up increases from time to time" (Stiles, 
1987, p. 70). This clause was crucial since it represented Alfonsin is commitment to 
maintain the buying power of the workers (Clarin, 26-9-1984, p. 2). However, 
despite Alfonsin's commitment the purchasing power fell between 1984 and 1985: 
from a base index of 100 in 1986, for the private sector purchasing power went 
from 101.62 in 1984 to 98.50 in 1985, while for the public sector it went from 
105.29 to 100.17, over the same period (Banco Central de la RepOblica Argentina, 
1992, figure 11.8). 
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According to CGT calculations, adherence to the first general strike was 87 
per cent, 60-65 per cent according to the government (La Naciön, 4-9-1984, p. 
1). After the September general strike the CGT returned to negotiate with the 
government within the framework of the concertaciön process (La Naciön, 6-9- 
1984, p. 1). As a condition upon its return, the CGT demanded that it be the only 
workers organisation involved in the concertaciön attempt (Gaudio et a!, 1990, p. 
105). The government accepted this condition, and thus, the Grupo de los 20 left the 
concertaciön attempt. 
In October, Casella renounced his position as Labour Minister and Hugo 
Barrionuevo was named by Alfonsin as his successor (Gaudio et al, 1990, p. 107). 
Barrionuevo, a militant of the Grupo de los 20, had previously been appointed as the 
Presidential delegate to agree with the trade unions the organisation of the electoral 
process. 
Due to its failure to agree with the government, in January 1985, the CGT, 
once again, left the concertaciön process. It demanded the establishment of free 
collective bargaining, the reactivation of the economy, the restitution of the Obras 
Sociales to the trade unions, and concertaciön without the 'interference of 
international capital' (referring to the negotiations with the IMF) (Clarin 7-1- 
1985, p. 3). After a meeting with Alfonsin who then took the compromise decision to 
reduce the fiscal deficit and to clamp-down on tax evasion, the CGT rejoined the 
concertaciOn process (Gaudio et al, 1990, p. 109). The government presented a 
report announcing its economic strategy for the next five years, the main objectives 
being to improve investment in order to increase exports, and to transform the 
productive basis of the country focusing efforts on investment and exports (La 
Naciön, 14-1-1985, p. 8). 
In February, the so-called Grupo de los Oncel 0, presented to the government 
its proposal for a social agreement and an economic development programme. The 
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main difference with the government's report was that the Grupo de los Once 
referred to the necessity of an economic adjustment. The report proposed an 
economic adjustment in order to attain growth, to prevent inflation, to maintain real 
wages, to reduce public expenditures, and to achieve tufl employment (Clarin, 9-2- 
1985, p. 2). The organisations demanded the reduction of the fiscal deficit, the 
control of tax evasion, the promotion of public and private investment, the reduction 
of the participation of the state in the economy and the promotion of exports. They 
also demanded steady economic growth as the guarantee to maintain real wages. 
Regarding the external debt, they stated that the effort to service the debt should be 
balanced by negotiations to postpone interest payments (Clarin, 9-2-1985, p. 2). 
Another difference between this plan and the government's economic policy was that 
the latter was promoting exports without increasing domestic demand while the 
Grupo emphasised the need to expand domestic demand. These elements were designed 
to mainly benefit the working class, and the industrial and agricultural sectors. 
However, the government argued that such a plan, in a context of high inflation, 
would simply increase the inflation rate even more. (Clarin, 10-2-1985, p. 15). 
The temporary coalition of the Grupo de los Once was a quite significant 
effort from the CGT and the employers organisations to achieve an agreement on 
economic policy. However, by this time the government had short-term troubles: in 
January due to an inflation rate of 25 per cent, the IMF considered that the 
September 1984 agreement had been broken (Machinea, 1990, table 11.2). The 
government was confronting both an increasing inflation rate and a new round of 
negotiations with the Fund. Moreover, due to his incapacity to prevent rising 
inflation, Grinspun resigned (Clarin, 19-2-1985, p. 14). Juan Vital Sourrouille, 
the new Economics Minister, began to prepare the ground for the Austral Plan. 
Under Grinspun's strategy, from a base index of 100 in 1980, the median 
wage index was 100.5 in 1983 and 127.1 in 1984 (Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 1987, p. 17). However, the CPI was 343.8 in 1983 and 
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626.7 in 1984 (IMF, 1988, p. 119). Therefore, purchasing power in 1984 was 68 
per cent of 1983 level. As Grinspun's economic policy could not prevent the rise of 
inflation, the periodic wage increases it sanctioned did not improve the workers 
situation. 
In April 1985, the Labour Minister announced his decision to increase wages 
by 90 per cent of the previous month's inflation starting from May> 1. This measure 
represented a further decrease in workers' purchasing power and as a response to it, 
the CGT approved a 'plan of action' (Plan de Lucha) comprising social demonstrations 
between the 30th of April and 17th of May in Rosario, Tucuman, Cördoba, Neuquen 
and Mendoza, to be followed by a general strike on 23rd of May with a social 
demonstration at Plaza de Mayo (Latin American Weekly Deport, 3-5-1985, p. 
10). 
On the 23rd of May the general strike together with the social mobilisation at 
Plaza de Mayo ended the first stage of the CGT's Plan de Lucha. This strike had total 
adherence in the industrial and tertiary sectors (Fraga, 1991, p. 25). It also had the 
support of the Argentinian Industrial Union (UTA), the Argentinian Rural Society 
(SRA), the Construction Chamber, and human rights organisations (Gaudio et al, 
1990, p. 118). In his speech, Ubaldini argued that if the government was unable to 
modify its economic policy, it must go (La Naciön, 24-5-1985, p. 1). After the 
Plaza de Mayo's demonstration the CGT rejoined the negotiations with the government 
to press for a change of economic strategy and to discuss the Grupo de los Once 
proposal (Clarin, 3-6-1985, p. 2). However, only a few weeks later, the CGT 
demanded a 50 per cent wage increase, and once again left the concertaciön (Clarin, 
3-6-1985, p. 2). 
With the launching of the Austral Plan, the government destroyed its own 
concertaciön strategy. 
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iv. The failure of the 'concertaciön' strategy 
The Radical government's objective to politically demobilise the trades union 
movement failed. The trade unions proved to be powerful enough to continue blocking 
the desperonizaciön process which forced the government into concertaciön. The 
concertaciön attempt was defeated not only by the incapacity of the government to 
control the trade unions but also by the aggravation of the economic situation. 
When the Grupo de los Once presented its economic proposal, the government 
did not even discuss it because, by this time, Grinspun had been replaced by Juan 
Sourrouille who was planning a heterodox economic programme. This signified the 
government's abandonment of concertaciön. Discussing the Grupo de los Once proposal 
could have achieved an agreement between the government and los Once, which could 
have given the necessary domestic support for the 1985 economic reform. However, 
the government rejected such agreement because it had already decided on a solution 
to the `external debt dilemma`. The improvement of investment in order to increase 
exports, one of the objectives of the government's proposal, was necessary to pay the 
interest on the debt (the proceeds from exports being the main source of revenue). 
Thus, in the dilemma -to pay or not to pay the debt- the government had already 
decided to service the debt. For the Radical government non-payment was the greater 
evil, since it would have put the whole democratisation process at risk. This meant 
that the disciplinamiento social started by the military dictatorship was not going to 
be reversed. 
Regarding the rejection of the Grupo de los Once proposal, the economic team 
emphasised the significance of the 'surprise element' in the launching of the Plan 
Austraf1 2. However, the 'surprise element' was no more essential than winning the 
domestic support for the reform. The government would, later, be widely criticised 
for its authoritarian way of applying the economic reform (Clarin, 16-6-1985, p. 
4-5). At least some pillars of the 1985 economic reform and the Grupo de ! os Once 
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proposal could have been discussed in order to try to obtain domestic support. The 
government, however, preferred to keep the economic reform secret, arguing that a 
price and wage 'freeze' could not be announced since it would, of course, be pre- 
empted by large price rises before the imminent 'freeze'. Thus, instead of being a 
means to reach a social agreement for the launching of the 1985 economic reform, 
the concertaciön was merely the framework within which the government and the 
trade unions fought over the level of wage increases. 
In order to understand the government's attitude towards both the 
concertaciön attempt and the Grupo de los Once proposal, one must look at the 
government's decision regarding the 'external debt dilemma'. When Grinspun's 
economic strategy failed, the government found itself under pressure from the 
international creditors and Argentinian public opinion. While the former demanded 
the payment of the external debt, the latter required economic growth. Indeed, by 
this time, the international creditors were threatening a cesaciön de pagos - 
suspension of payments- while Argentinian public opinion was unhappy with an 
annual inflation rate of 626.7 per cent for the first year of the democratic 
government (Fanelli et al., 1990, table 20) and a modest 2.2 per cent growth rate, 
GDP still below its 1980 level (Fanelli et al., 1990, table 1). Payment of the debt 
and the achievement of economic growth were clearly incompatible. The government 
took a decision which was an ambiguous path between the two extremes of the 
'external debt dilemma'. The Austral Plan was a heterodox strategy -in distinction 
to orthodox IMF plans- through which the debt would be partially repaid without 
implementing harsh economic adjustment. But, the government did not clearly 
communicate the 'external debt constraint' -that is, the incompatibility between 
paying the debt and achieving economic growth. Hence, while the CGT was demanding 
economic growth, the government was trying to negotiate the degree of adjustment 
with its international creditors. The government was happy with what it had 
achieved: the Austral Plan was an alternative program to orthodox IMF plans. The 
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CGT was unhappy with the government's strategy: the Austral Plan was not an 
economic growth strategy. The concertaciön attempt failed due to the government's 
unilateral decision over the 'external debt dilemma'. The government's decision, in 
not according growth full priority, served to deepen the effects of the dictatorship 
disciplinamiento social. 
Thus, the Radical government could neither control the political power of the 
trade unions nor avoid implementing an economic adjustment. The latter would, of 
course, exacerbate the confrontation with the trade unions. I turn now to analyse the 
Radical's ultimately unsuccessful attempt to resist the IMF. 
III. The economy: resisting the International Monetary Fund 
i. The external debt: the power of the international creditors over a new 
democracy 
It has become a common place to state that external debt -its size and the 
conditions for its repayment- as well as its interest payments, constrains economic 
growth. However, it has not yet been highlighted, exactly how the external debt, 
through the pressure of the international creditors, constrained the new Latin 
American democracies. 
Latin America, in the eighties, has seen the development of two contradictory 
processes. On the one hand, the military dictatorships began to fall. On the other, 
from 1982, the external debt crisis emerged. A lot has been said and written about 
these two processes. Most schoiarsl 3 agreed that the debt threatened democratic 
consolidation. However, by the earlier nineties, no military government had 
overthrown a democratic government in South America. Nevertheless, there were 
155 
some coups threats -such as in Venezuela-, 'unusual coups' -such as that of 
Fujimori-, and even some 'constitutional constrains to democracy' -such as Paz 
Estenssoro's state of siege when implementing the New Economic Policy in Bolivia. 
However, military dictatorships like those of the sixties and seventies did not 
emerge. While the external debt clearly limited economic policy choices, it did not 
reverse the process of democratization14. The international creditors -namely the 
IMF, the commercial banksl5, the World Bank- and the US government became 
crucial actors in the economic policy making process. In Dornbusch's (1990, p. 
322) words "today no Latin American government undertakes significant economic 
change without checking first in Washington". Alfonsin's Austral Plan was mooted in 
IMF circles before it was discussed even by the Radical Party itselfl 6 
The eighties were labelled the 'lost decade' since Latin American countries had 
to deal with both a deep internal economic crisis and the external debt. In 1989 the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL, 1989, table 
9.1) estimated that per capita output in the 1980s in the region as a whole declined 
by almost 10 per cent, following the increases of almost 40 per cent in the seventies 
and 30 per cent through the sixties. 
Despite their internal crisis and the differences between them, Latin 
American countries were compelled to apply IMF adjustment plans in order to deal 
with the internal crisis in such way as to allow them to pay the external debt. The 
dilemma was either to pay the debt or to be 'let out' of the international financial 
system. It was not debt repayment or democracy -as most democratic politicians 
believed, most notably Alan Garcia and Raül Alfonsin- but rather debt repayment and 
democracy (Drake, 1989, p. 53). Indeed, while foreign governments (mainly that of 
the US) (Canitrot, 1991,129) supported democracy they also demanded debt 
repayment. There was no other choice for a liberal democratic state than to negotiate 
with the IMF. Although, the new democracies made efforts to avoid the IM F's plans, 
eventually all of them were obliged to accept IMF conditions 7 
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The so-called 'Washington consensus' was the set of policies that was 
'suggested' as a uniform solution for all Latin American countries, despite the 
considerable differences between them. The 'Washington consensus' has been defined 
as macroeconomic prudence, outward orientation and domestic liberalisation 
(Williamson, 1990, p. 1). 'Washington' was understood as the IMF, World Bank, US 
executive branch, the Inter-American Development Bank, those members of the US 
Congress interested in Latin American politics, and the think tanks concerned with 
economic policy (Williamson, 1989, p. 1). The main policy instruments of the 
'consensus' were defined as fiscal discipline and the reduction of some public 
expenditures such as subsidies, tax reform, market-determined interest rates, 
competitive exchange rate, import liberalisation, promotion of foreign direct 
investment, privatisation, deregulation and new laws on property rightsl8 
However, the so-called 'Washington consensus' did not take into account either the 
differences among Latin American economies nor the domestic consequences of the 
external debt services. 
The main criticism of this 'consensus' was that in the face of spiralling 
interest payments on the debt, public expenditure could not easily be cut. This forced 
the new democratic governments to look for reductions in social expenditure, cutting 
back their already minimal 'welfare states' (Meller, 1990, p. 33). 
Moreover, Latin American countries transferred to the developed countries a 
net flow of resources amounting to US$ 203 billion between 1982 and 1989 
(Iglesias, 1990, p. 346). This amount was nearly half of the region's total debt. The 
'consensus' did not take into account these transfers and how they constrained the 
possibilities for Latin American economies to grow. On the contrary, while the 
'Washington consensus' was being suggested as the solution for Latin America, 
periodical increases of interest rates raised interest payments on the debt. Latin 
American countries could do nothing to prevent the spiral. 
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Likewise, a decline by 20 per cent in the terms of trade during the 1980s 
was, by 1989, costing Latin America an additional US$ 30 billion per year 
(Iglesias, 1990, p. 346). Once again, Latin America did not control this situation. 
The philosophy behind the 'Washington consensus' was that internal 
structural reforms were necessary to stabilise Latin American economies and enable 
them to gradually pay off the external debt. However, what this strategy ignored was 
the detrimental effect such programs would have on economic growth in Latin 
America. In the process of implementing the measures, which would permit a 
reduction in the external debt liability, the new democratic governments of Latin 
America provoked deep economic crisis. 
The experiences of adjustment showed that the 'Washington consensus', in 
promoting stabilisation, restricted rather than fostered economic growth. This was 
notably the case in Bolivia where the New Political Economyl9 (considered as an 
orthodox adjustment program), applied in 1985 by Paz Estenssoro, stabilised the 
economy but also produced a deep economic recession2 0. Argentina is the best 
example of a government which, recognising the negative effects of the IMF plan, 
tried to avoid full implementation of the latter. 
Indeed, as explained in more detail below, in the first years of the democratic 
government, Argentina tried to treat the external debt as a 'political issue' and to 
negotiate with the creditor governments and the commercial banks without 
committing itself to an agreement with the IMF. The debt was a 'political issue' in two 
respects. First, Argentina argued, at the Quito Conference in January 1984, that the 
debt had a 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' component. It stated that "40 to 50 per cent 
of the private debt is fictitious, yet the state assumed responsibility for it, 
indiscriminately, in late 1982" (Latin America Weekly Report, 13-1-1984, p. 2). 
Alfonsin's government explained the 'illegitimate' side of the debt arguing that 
between mid-1980 and March 1981 
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"local takers covered their positions by purchasing cheap 
foreign exchange on the free market while keeping their 
commitment registered (with the Central Bank), which 
enabled them to repatriate capital... Through this 
undeclared outflow of foreign exchange they cancelled 40 
per cent to 50 per cent of the private external debt- 
commitments which the state later assumed as its own" 
(Latin America Weekly Report, 13-1-1984, p. 2). 
This was the 'illegitimate'2 1 side of the external debt which Argentina felt it 
was not obliged to pay. Second, the debt was viewed as a 'political issue' since the debt 
crisis emerged simultaneously with the democratisation process. Alfonsin wrongly 
believed that the international creditors would be more lenient with a democratic 
government. He thought that the creditor governments would show their support for 
democracy by not pressing for repayment of the debt. This would allow Argentina to 
avoid an IMF negotiation which would impose an economic adjustment. However, after 
one year in office, the government signed its first letter of intent with the IMF. The 
debt was not regarded by the IMF as a 'political issue'. Neither the 'illegitimate' side 
nor the significance of democracy were considered by international creditors. 
For the incoming democratic government, the burden of a US$ 45.069 
miIIio n2 2 external debt became the most serious legacy of the military dictatorship. 
The interest payments created a vicious circle. In order to service the interest 
payments, the government had to take away from the economy some resources while 
asking Argentinian society to adjust according to the IMF plan. However, after seven 
years of military dictatorship, most of the population were expecting concrete and 
short-term benefits from democracy. This was notably the case of the working class 
which had suffered most under the dictatorship, with a 17 per cent decline in 
industrial wages from 1971 to 1981 (Gerchunoff and Dieguez, 1984, p. 25). 
Therefore, in such a context, the democratic government had to deal with both the 
interest payments of the external debt and the social demands of the working class. If 
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it did not pay and did not apply the economic adjustment, it had to confront the 
international creditors. If it did pay and did apply the adjustment, it would have to 
confront the opposition of the trade unions. 
Of course the money which would be reused to service the debt would use up 
resources which could otherwise be invested in improving the productive capacity of 
the Argentinian economy. Such investment was essential since the original debt taken 
out by the military dictatorship had not been used to undertake structural 
improvements of the Argentinian economy. Rather it had been used for speculation in 
the financial market or had been transferred abroad through the process of capital 
flight (Crystal, 1994). Moreover, the private debt, which represented 
approximately 30 per cent of the total debt (see Table n2 7), had been 'nationalised' 
during the last period of the dictatorship, transferring liability to Argentinian 
citizens. With the 'nationalisation', the debt became a fiscal problem by the way of an 
increase of the fiscal deficit. 
Taken together these problems rendered the incoming democratic government 
unable to service the debt. However, a moratorium would worsen the situation even 
more since it would provoke the closure of any financial aid to Argentina. This was 
the vicious circle. 
Regarding this dilemma, the democratic government decided that to service 
the debt would be more beneficial than to declare a unilateral moratorium. The 
attempts to organise a debtors club among the Latin America countries failed and each 
country started a negotiation process with the IMF. Alfonsin was influenced by the 
example of PerO, where Alan Garcia's plan for paying only 10 per cent of export 
revenues, provoked the international creditors and the US government to withdraw 
financial aid even though Perü's poverty together with the threat of Sendern 
Luminoso and of the drugs dealers put the democratisation process at risk2 3 
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Despite the 1982 war, Argentina was still reliant on its commercial 
relations with European countries. Although Alfonsin's electoral victory was 
welcomed by France and Spain, this did not lead to the improvement of economic 
relations24. The protectionist measures applied by the European Community on its 
agricultural products damaged the trade between Europe and Argentina. Due to the 
protectionist measures and the attitude of the European countries towards Argentina 
after the war, Aifonsin's administration tried to improve relations with Europe 
instead of further harming the already damaged relationship (Russell, 1987). To 
service the debt became crucial in order to maintain Europe's support. 
The relationship with US government was also damaged because of the war 
and, once again, in order to improve this relationship Alfonsin felt obliged to pay the 
external debt. Moreover, the Reagan administration, despite having welcomed the 
return to democracy, was quite clear in regarding a negotiation with the IMF as a 
prerequisite to start negotiations with the commercial banks and the debtor 
countries2 5. 
In order to rebuild Argentina's international relations, Alfonsin's government 
decided not only to pay the debt but also to accept the IMF conditions. The external 
debt constrained the democratic government since the decision whether to pay or not 
determined the fate of the government. Both decisions restricted the margin of 
manoeuvre of the government. Whether it paid or not, its resources were going to be 
scarce. Argentina possessed few resources to continue servicing its debt. However, 
this very situation rendered non-payment, and the isolation which this would lead to, 
hard to contemplate. Indeed, the confrontation with the international financial 
market could even have provoked a military coup. Either way, non-payment would 
have put the democratisation process at risk. 
As indicated earlier, debt was viewed as a threat to democratisation, however, 
with the benefit of hindsight, the threat was not to the consolidation process but to 
161 
the power of the government. Not denying the broader importance of democracy for 
countries which have suffered military dictatorship for years, it seems that the 
legacy of the dictatorship had left Alfonsin's government with limited economic 
policy choices. Thus, the two choices -to pay or not to pay the external debt- both 
promised serious difficulties. 
Furthermore, Alfonsin was not merely faced with the contradictory demands 
of the IMF for economic stabilisation and domestic pressures for immediate 
improvements in living standards. He also had to contend with the concerns of 
Argentina's main economic groups over debt re-payment. Due to the dictatorship's 
nationalisation of the private debt, resources for the interest payments now had to be 
found through an adjustment of fiscal policy. This obliged Alfonsin to raise export 
taxes, a move which would be sharply opposed by Argentina's agricultural 
conglomerates. These economic groups, being internationally oriented, were of 
course concerned that Argentina not be isolated from the international economic 
system. However, when Alfonsin shifted the debt liability to fiscal policy, directly 
hitting these economic groups, with the prospect of higher taxes, the latter became 
more ambivalent towards government efforts to service the debt. 
ii. The political side of inflation 
When the Radical government took office the external debt and the 
concentration of capital were the main features of an economy out of control with an 
inflation rate of 600 per cent for the last quarter of 1983, a fiscal deficit of 14 per 
cent of GDP, an external debt of 67 per cent of GDP, and international reserves of 
US$ 1 billion while arrears with external creditors amounted US$ 3.2 billion 
(Machinea, 1990, p. 12). The external debt was US$ 44 billion while capital flight 
was estimated at US$ 22.4 billion; hence, the latter accounted for no less than half of 
the debt (Dornbusch, 1989, p. 8). 
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Before analysing the government's economic strategy, let me briefly analyse 
the political side of the inflation phenomenon. Economically, inflation is understood 
as a distortion of economic variables. The 'monetarist' approach assumes the cause of 
inflation to be excessive monetarist expansion (Goldthorpe, 1978, p. 186). Other 
schools of monetarism (mainly followers of von Hayek's theories) understood 
inflation as caused by wage increases due to the pressure from organised labour. 
However, Goldthorpe's sociological analysis of inflation correctly states that 
inflation is the "particular manifestation, within a given historical context, of the 
social divisions and conflicts which such an economy tends always to generate" 
(1978, p. 197). Thus, inflation is the monetary expression of the distributional 
conflict of the society and of the "on-going changes in social structures and 
processes" (Goldthorpe, 1978, p. 195). In this sense, Argentina's high inflation 
represents the economic expression of the crisis of the state and its social relations. 
As the following analyses show, the Radical government explained high 
inflation in terms of the high fiscal deficit and wage increases. The high fiscal deficit 
was mainly caused by the interest payments of the external debt, tax evasion, and 
state subsidies to the private industrial sector. Therefore, behind the fiscal deficit 
were Argentina's wealthiest sector and the international creditors. 
The wage increases, the other economic cause of inflation represented the 
fight by workers to maintain their purchasing power. In this sense, the workers 
rather than producing inflation were reacting to it. 
Thus, if we adopt Goldthorpe's analysis Argentina's inflation was an 
expression of its class conflict. As I analyse below, the government had greater 
difficulties reducing the fiscal deficit than preventing high inflation rates. Indeed, 
the government was able to temporarily control the inflation rate, which was finally 
unleashed by the expansion of the fiscal deficit. 
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This shows that the Radical government could not modify the military 
dictatorship's disciplinamiento social. The political side of inflation shows that in 
order to prevent high inflation the government should reduce the fiscal deficit by the 
non-payment of the external debt, a tax reform to avoid tax evasion, and the 
suspension of state subsidies to the private sector. That is to reverse the 
disciplinamiento social of the military dictatorship, As the Radical government did 
not reverse it, the last years of the democracy saw an exacerbation of the class 
conflict expressed by a hyperinflation process. Let me now analyse Alfonsin's first 
attempt to stabilise the economy. 
iii. The Radical's attempt to stabilise the economy and resist the IMF 
Bernardo Grinspun2 6 was appointed Minister of Economy and Raül Prebisch 
economic adviser. The government defined its economic objectives as the reactivation 
of the economy, the increase of real wages and the elimination of inflation (Ambito 
Financiero, 2-1-1984, p. 9). Prebisch stated that there were two main problems: 
inflation, caused by the high fiscal deficit which had to fall from 14 per cent of the 
GDP to 4 per cent by the end of 1984, and the debt, which he defined as a political 
problem (Clarin, 17-12-1983, p. 8). Regarding the latter, in his first week in 
office, Grinspun announced that he had requested from Argentina's international 
creditors a period of six months in which to investigate the total amount of the 
external debt and to prepare a payment proposal (Clarin, 16-12-1983, p. 3). 
Enrique Garcia Vazquez, President of the Central Bank, stated that this measure was a 
unilateral moratorium and that the government would distinguish between 
'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' debt to decide its payment proposal (Schvarzer, 
1986b, p. 39). This 'illegitimate' side of the debt was the capital flight favoured by 
the exchange rates mechanisms of the military dictatorship. As explained above, the 
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Radical government argued that Argentina did not have to pay this `illegitimate' 
external debt. 
Turning to the domestic economy, Grinspun presented his plan -Lineamientos 
de un programa inmediato de reactivaciön de la economfa, mejora del empleo y los 
salarios reales y ataque al obstäculo de la inflaciön (Outline of an immediate 
programme for the reactivation of employment and real salaries, and an attack on the 
obstacle of inflation)- whose main objectives were to achieve an increase in the 
level of wages of 6-8 per cent in 1984, to reduce inflation to 50 per cent, to 
increase economic growth by 5 per cent, to reduce the public sector deficit by 10 
per cent of GDP, to reduce public expenditure and to reduce interest rates (C i ar in, 
25-1-1984, p. 12). With respect to the external debt, this report argued that the 
main problems were the high cost of debt servicing which necessitated a 
renegotiation of terms. It also stated that Argentina had decided to meet its obligations 
and, in order to do this, the country 'needed the cooperation' of the creditor country 
governments since the debt, in its origins and nature, was a political problem 
(Clarin, 25-1-1984, p. 12). As said above, the debt was viewed as a political 
problem since a significant part of the debt was 'capital flight', and the debt, 
increased by a military dictatorship, had to be paid by a new democratic government. 
Therefore, the Radical government demanded 'cooperation' of the creditor country 
governments to distinguish the 'illegitimate` side of the debt, and to avoid a deepening 
of the economic crisis which could put the democratisation process at risk. 
As early as January 1984, Alfonsin's policy towards the external debt 
negotiations became clear. The policy constituted three concurrent strategies. First, 
the Radical government suspended all payments on the principal of the debt and, 
consistently, delayed interest payments. Second, the government tried to negotiate 
the interest payments with the banks and the Paris Club although it had not achieved 
a prior agreement on the interest payments with the IMF. This was the 'cooperation' 
demanded from foreign governments; namely, their support for an alternative to the 
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IMF plan. Thirdly, Argentina participated at the Quito Conference held in January 
1984 which was an effort to achieve a common front of Latin American debtors. At 
this Conference, Argentina insisted on the distinction between 'legitimate' and 
'illegitimate' obligations, and that the negotiations should cover only the former 
(Latin American Weekly Report, 13-1-1984, p. 2). 
The Cartagena Consensus of May 1984 -signed by Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia and Mexico- was another effort to emphasise the political aspect of the 
external debt. The Consensus declared that external circumstances had exacerbated 
the Latin American situation, Of these circumstances, the increase of the US prime 
rate -the third increase in two months- and the protectionist measures of the US and 
the European Community were particularly debilitating to the economic situation of 
the debtor countries (Clarin, 27-5-1984, p. 2). The former increased the interest 
payments while the latter decreased the possibility of export earnings. Regarding the 
prime rate increase, Alfonsin underlined that the rise over the last two months added 
over US$ 600 million to the country's external indebtedness. Thus, Argentina's 
ability to meet its international obligations were under severe strain. Alfonsin said 
"it is as if the (financial) centres had gone mad, but we will not pay usury. It would 
seem as if the developing countries were being attacked with a neutron bomb in 
reverse, which would leave men, women and other creatures alive, while destroying 
the nation's productive apparatus. This madness must be ended once and for all" 
(Latin America Weekly Report, 18-5-1984, p. 2). 
The main decisions of the Cartagena Consensus were to pay the external debt 
and for this payment to proceed on a country-by-country basis (O`Connell, 1988, p. 
373). Therefore, Latin America could not establish a unified 'debtor front' to press 
the international creditors for concessions, at least in the rescheduling of interest 
payments. The Latin American governments decided to negotiate bilaterally which 
meant that henceforth they would be competing among themselves. Therefore, the 
Cartagena Consensus, despite having organised periodical meetings between 
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governments, was not able to coordinate the negotiations between the governments 
and their international creditors. The Latin American governments believed that a 
negotiation on a country-by-country basis would give them more benefits. This was 
mainly the position of Mexico and Brazil, which as the largest debtors had a better 
level of bargaining than Argentina or Uruguay (O'Connell, 1988, p. 373). Thus, the 
strategy of converting the external debt into a political issue and achieving a common 
front of Latin American debtors failed. 
Alfonsin's second strategy towards the external debt also failed. The main 
cause of his failure was the refusal of international creditors -the banks, creditor 
governments and the Paris Club- to begin a negotiation round without an agreement 
between Argentina and the IMF having been achieved. The agreement with the IMF 
meant, principally, that the Fund would control Argentina's economic strategy, 
imposing an economic adjustment program which would enable Argentina to service 
its debt. As explained above, the so-called 'Washington consensus' was an economic 
strategy to enable the debtor countries to pay the debt. A negotiation without such 
IMF agreement gave Argentina the opportunity to apply any type of economic 
strategy, which could risk future interest payments. The control by the IMF assured 
the payment of the debt, and thus, the banks, the creditor governments, and the Paris 
Club refused to begin a negotiation round with Argentina before it achieved an 
agreement with the Fund. 
The Argentinian government's strategy of delaying interest payments and 
negotiations with the IMF achieved limited objectives. Although in the first eight 
months the democratic government did not obtain money with which to pay its 
creditors, it did obtain more time to pay its debt. Nevertheless, the main goal of 
Alfonsin's strategy was that, by delaying interest payments, Argentina could increase 
its low level of international reserves which went from US$1 billion at the end of 
1983 to US$ 3.5 billion by mid 1984 (Latin America Weekly Report, 27-7-1984. 
P. 5). This gave Argentina a stronger position in the negotiation with its 
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international creditors since it did not need fresh money in the short-term. The 
government believed that if Argentina did not strengthen its position as far as 
possible, the attitude of the international creditors would become more implacable 
(Clarin, 26-2-1984, p. 11). In this sense, Alfonsin argued that Argentina would 
pay the debt "without accepting recessive recipes, because we (the Radical 
government) are committed to raising the workers' real wages" (Latin America 
Weekly Report, 13-1-1984, p. 3). This was the main element of the strategy: a 
tough initial position, realising the need to compromise later. Let me now explain the 
first negotiations with the banks which shows the tough early bargaining stance and 
Argentina's subsequent change. 
iv. Negotiating with the banks and the Fund 
Argentina had to meet interest payments to the commercial banks every three 
months. In March and June 1984, last-minute plans were arranged between the 
government and the banks. These arrangements were made due to financial aid from 
the governments of Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela and the United States; 
therefore, Argentina did not use its international reserves for these payments2 7. For 
the incoming deadline of September, the Argentinian government changed its 
strategy. A round of negotiations with the IMF began in order to avoid the declaration 
of a cesaciön de pagos -suspension of payments- by the commercial banks, and to 
reach an agreement with them before September (Latin America Weekly Report, 
17-8-1984, p. 10). In August 1984, an IMF report announced that Argentina had 
agreed with the Fund some objectives to be implemented in a future economic plan 
(Clarin, 12-8-1984, p. 2). This communique intended to loosen the negotiations 
with the commercial banks regarding the September-deadline interest payments. 
These interest payments had been refinanced since 1982, however, as a way to press 
Argentina to accede an IMF agreement which would oblige it to service its debt, the 
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commercial banks did not refinance them in September, rather they decided to renew 
these credits daily (Schvarzer, 1986b, p. 45). Argentina, then, paid US$ 125 
million to the banks (Clarin, 16-8-1984, p. 2). The banks decided to renew the 
credits daily since they distrusted Argentina's sudden decision to achieve an 
agreement with the IMF. By this time, it was clear that if Argentina did not begin to 
service its interest payments, a cesaciön de pagos (suspension of payments) would 
be declared by the banks. As The Economist (4-8-1984, p. 13) put it: "an 
agreement (between Argentina and the IMF) now seems possible some time next 
month, because the alternative for President Alfonsin is economic, followed by 
political, bankruptcy". Indeed, an exacerbation of the economic crisis was viewed as 
a threat to the consolidation of democracy since the crisis would provoke social 
unrest which had been, historically, the first step towards a military coup. In 
Clarke's (1990) terms, Alfonsin tried to prevent the economic crisis becoming a 
political crisis. An agreement with the IMF seemed to be the only solution to the 
economic crisis which would not undermine democracy. This strategy was also 
followed by other Latin American debtors countries. 
Thus, Alfonsin's initial strategies towards the external debt failed: the Latin 
American countries did not organise a 'debtor front', the European and the US 
governments together with the commercial banks imposed an IMF plan to start 
negotiations with Argentina, and thus, Argentina could no longer maintain its 
strategy of delaying interest payments. It was, then, clear that, like Mexico in 1982, 
Argentina had to start negotiating with the iMF. Aifonsin's government tried to avoid 
the full implementation of an IMF adjustment program, since as he stated the 
government wanted to improve the workers' real wages. Moreover, as explained 
above, an IMF orthodox plan gives to the market the role of regulator of the economy. 
This was opposed to Radical Party ideology, which gives this role to the state 
(Alfonsin, 1992). However, as the attempt to resist the IMF failed, the government 
169 
had no way out other than negotiating with the Fund. Despite this, the Radical 
government did not implement an orthodox IMF plan. 
The day of the first general strike, Grinspun affirmed that an agreement with 
the IMF would be necessary (Clarin, 3-9-1984, p. 1). After nine months, the 
Economics Minister had gone from rejecting the implementation of an IMF plan to 
reaching an agreement with the Fund. In September 1984, Alfonsin announced in 
New York that an agreement with the IMF had been reached (Clarin, 26-9-1984, p. 
1). He also affirmed that the agreement facilitated negotiations with the commercial 
banks and the Paris Club (Clarin, 26-9-1984, p. 1). Alfonsin and his Economics 
Minister, after nine months in office, had changed their strategy towards the 
external debt negotiations. 
The agreement with the IMF was based on a plan to reduce the rate of inflation 
-from its current annual level of 1200 per cent to 300 per cent and eventually 150 
per cent-, a gradual elimination of price controls, a reduction of the public deficit 
from 8.1 per cent of GDP to 5.4 per cent by the end of 1985, and an increase in 
exports (Stiles, 1987, p. 70). However as early as January 1985, the IMF 
considered that the agreement had been broken due to the existence of a monthly 
inflation rate of 25 per cent (Machinea, 1990, table 11.2). 
Domestically, Grinspun's economic strategy to prevent inflation had also 
failed. He had assumed a Keynesian strategy, similar to that applied by the Radical 
government twenty years earlier. His strategy attempted to stimulate demand 
through an increase in real wages. He tried to prevent 'inflation through a gradualist 
approach by setting at 10 per cent the monthly rate of prices and wages adjustment, 
together with a larger adjustment for public utility rates and the exchange rate 
(Machinea, 1990, p. 13). As a consequence of these measures, there was an increase 
in prices, which, together with the indexation of wages on a monthly basis to 
preserve the purchasing power, pushed the inflation rate to a still higher level 
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(Machinea, 1990, p. 13). As Machinea concludes (1990, p. 13) "within the context 
of an easy monetary policy and a large fiscal deficit, full indexation resulted in a 
continuous acceleration of the inflation rate up to September 1984 (27.5 per 
cent)". The economic team believed that wage increases and 'cheap' credit would 
induce a rise in supply through the reactivation of 'idle capacity', and thus, stability 
and growth would be achieved (Canitrot, 1991, p. 131). However, the strategy 
failed since it did not take into account the profound modifications of the economy, 
namely, the concentration of capital, the burden of the external debt, the high levels 
of inflation, the high fiscal deficit and the powerful role of the financial sector (the 
so-called patria financiera -financial fatherland). Moreover, in the context of global 
capital, 'Keynesianism in one country' proved not to be a viable solution. 
Keynesianism, emphasising state management of the national economy, was overcome 
by the globalisation of capital (Radice, 1984). Grinspun's plan of implementing "a 
tougher monetary policy, together with the attempt to increase public utility rates 
and to devalue the exchange rate in real terms did not lead to a significant slowdown 
in the inflation rate and caused instead a sharp drop in economic activity" (Machinea, 
1990, p. 14). Under Grinspun's strategy, the annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
was 688.0 per cent, and the Wholesale Price Index (WPI), 585.0 per cent (CEPAL, 
1991). While the annual rate of price increase was 625 per cent in the last quarter 
of 1983, it reached 1080 per cent in the third quarter of 1984 (Torre, 1990a, p. 
10). Thus, due to his incapacity to prevent increasing inflation rates, in February 
1985, Grinspun resigned (Clarin, 19-2-1985, p. 14). 
v. New Economics Minister, new economic strategy 
The new Economics Minister, Juan V. Sourrouille was more an Alfonsinista 
(a follower of Alfonsin) than a Radical member. He was the author of a number of 
books on Argentina's economy2 8. He was considered by the Radical Party as an 
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outsider and a technocrat. Likewise, most of the men of the economic team were 
Alfonsinistas, notably Adolfo Canitrot, Under Secretary of Economic Coordination, 
Jose Luis Machinea, Under Secretary of Economic Policy, and from August 1986 
President of the Central Bank, and Mario Brodershon, President of the Banco 
Nacional de Desarrollo -BANADE- (National Bank of Development). This would, 
later, cause some disagreements between the Radical Party and the economic team. 
However, initially, due to Alfonsin's powerful leadership and the success of the 
Austral Plan, the Radical Party, in general terms, supported the economic team. 
As Planning Secretary, Sourrouille had presented a report, Lineamientos de 
una estrategia de crecimiento econömico 1985-1989 (Guides for an economic 
strategy for growth 1985-1989), whose main objectives were to improve 
investment in order to increase exports, and to transform the productive basis of the 
country focusing efforts on investment and exports (La Naciön, 14-1-1985, p. 8). 
Sourrouille had recognised the external debt as a condicionante (constraint) on 
Argentina's development (La Naciön, 14-2-1985, p. 8). According to him, due to 
this condicionante, Argentina had to increase its exports to service the debt. As this 
would transfer crucial resources, investment was needed to increase exports and 
bring in foreign currency reserves (La Naciön, 14-2-1985, p. 8). 
As Economics Minister, Sourrouille defined his objectives as the recovery of 
economic growth and the 'fight against inflation' (Ambito Financiero, 1-3-1985, p. 
12). He confirmed that wages would be increased monthly by 90 per cent of the past 
inflation rate, the fiscal deficit would be reduced by controlling public expenditure, 
and Argentina would pay its external debt obligations (Ambito Financiero, 1-3- 
1985, p. 13). He stated the necessity to reform the tax system and the financial 
sector. Finally, he pointed out that the domestic market would expand because of the 
effect on demand from the increase of exports and private investment; if this did not 
occur, he argued, the domestic market would be hit by inflation and stagnation 
(Ambito Financiero, 1-3-1985, p. 18). 
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From now on, some measures were taken to prepare the ground for the 
launching of the Austral Plan: controls on industrial prices were made more flexible, 
public utility rates were increased, from April to June the peso was devalued 
against the dollar at a monthly rate of 34 per cent, and export taxes were increased 
(Machinea and Fanelli, 1988, p. 124). Nevertheless, the new economic team could 
not prevent increases in the CPI and the WPI. The former increased to 29 per cent in 
April before dropping to 25.1 per cent in May, and the WPI increased significantly, 
reaching 31.5 per cent in April and 31.2 per cent in May (Ambito Financiero, 8-1- 
1987, p. 6). 
On the 26th of April, Alfonsin called for a popular demonstration to support 
democracy against threats of a new military coup. In his speech, he stated that there 
was a demand from the working class for wage increases, a demand for organising the 
economy by an adjustment policy, and a demand for economic growth. He defined this 
context as one of 'war economy' (La Nacißn, 27-4-1985, p. 12). He focused the 
economic problem on the high inflation rate and argued that the government would 
concentrate its efforts to prevent it. What Alfonsin called 'war economy' would be 
later defined as the economic reform of 1985: the Austral Plan. 
Despite these 'introductions' to the Austral Plan, the essential element to 
'prepare the ground' for the heterodoxe 9 shock was the negotiations with the IMF and 
the US government to obtain their support. In April, Sourrouille and Machinea went 
to the US to present the economic reforms to the IM F3 O. In May, an IMF staff 
member, Ted Dessa, went to Buenos Aires to meet Alfonsin to discover his decision 
regarding the implementation of the reforms. Alfonsin confirmed his decision to 
apply the Plan. Sourrou lle also explained the reforms to the IMF member who 
finally confirmed the acceptance of the Plan by the Fund (C{arin, 16-6-1985, p. 
14). This marked a 'u-turn' in the Radical government strategy. Before analysing 
173 
the new strategy, let me draw some conclusions on the first two years and the cause 
of the economic 'u-turn'. 
vi. A changing perspective: the relationship with the IMF 
After nine months in office, Alfonsin understood the constraints imposed by 
the international creditors upon his economic policy making process. As his Home 
Affairs Minister, Antonio Tröccoli, put it: "Argentina is condemned to twenty five 
years of constraints" (Schvarzer, 1986b, p. 45). 
Although by delaying interest payments Argentina had achieved some goals, it 
was finally forced to reach an agreement with the Fund due to pressure from the 
commercial banks, the Paris Club and the US government. Alfonsin's strategy to 
avoid an IMF plan collided with the attitude of foreign governments and commercial 
banks. Indeed, they denied the possibility of achieving an agreement with Argentina if 
the country did not have a previous agreement with the Fund. As Ferreyra Aldunate, 
leader of Partido Blanco of Uruguay, put it, "all European countries have said to us 
we will help you as soon as you achieve an agreement with the IMF. This is true for 
all the European countries ... there 
is no alternative to the IMF. However, it is also 
true that this path has no way our "31 (Schvarzer, 1986b, p. 42). This attitude, 
together with the pressure from the commercial banks for the interest payments of 
March, June and September 1984, put Alfonsin's government in crisis. By 
September, it was clear that Argentina had to pay in order to avoid the declaration of 
a cesacion de pagos (payment suspension) from the banks. Some 'threats' made this 
risk clearer: Robert McNamara, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, 
wondered "could you imagine what can happen to a President if his government was 
suddenly unable to import insulin for diabetics? " (Schvarzer, 1986b, p. 48). This 
was the kind of veiled 'threat' used to persuade Argentina's government of the 
'benefits' of achieving an agreement with the IMF. Indeed, after nine months, 
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Argentina understood its domestic `benefits: the first agreement with the IMF 
provoked the first general strike. 
The September 1984 agreement marked the end of the government's strategy 
of resisting the IMF. Indeed, it was the starting point of the government's decision on 
the 'external debt dilemma'. The agreement signified that Alfonsin had finally 
accepted the rules of the IMF. Pressure from international creditors, mainly the 
commercial banks, showed that Argentina's new democracy had no solution other than 
to service its external debt. Alfonsin's strategy of resisting the IMF was condemned 
by the US government, European governments, and -of course- the commercial 
banks. By September 1984 Argentina was threatened by the commercial banks with 
the declaration of cesaciön de pagos (suspension of payments). The democratic 
government could not pursue its strategy of delaying interest payments. The 
'external debt constraint' became evident: from now on Grinspun's gradualist 
approach to the economic crisis and economic growth had to be abandoned. 
IV. Conclusion 
During its first two years in office, the Radical government was unable to 
resolve the crisis of the Argentinian state. The government could not control the 
power of the trades union movement. It could not implement its own policies towards 
human rights violations. And finally, it could not resist an agreement with the IMF 
which defeated its initial economic strategy. 
Grinspun's strategy was an attempt to avoid a 'monetarist' restructuring of 
the state and its class relations. However, it did not attempt to modify the 
disciplinamiento social, and, in this sense, it could not prevent high inflation rates. 
The Radical economic 'u-turn' -the launching of the Austral Plan- did not signal the 
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implementation of such 'monetarist' restructuring. But it did not fully rectify the 
legacy left by the military dictatorship. Thus, the Austral Plan also failed to prevent 
high inflation rates, and the Radical government, gradually, began to prepare the 
ground for a 'monetarist' restructuring. Therefore, as said, the military dictatorship 
constrained the democratic government which would see all its attempts to resolve 
the crisis of the Argentinian state defeated. 
As a result of these defeats, the economic crisis was exacerbated. From now on 
the government begun to be more worried about the economic situation than the 
political situation. While the first two years were dominated mainly by the 
'democratisation' of trade unions, and human rights policies, subsequent years would 
be dominated by the 1985 economic reform and its failure. 
However, regarding the main political objective of the government, that is 
the consolidation of democracy, the public judgement of the Juntas Militares was the 
basis for undermining the political power of the Armed Forces. Nevertheless, due to 
the exacerbation of the economic crisis, the human rights violations would become a 
secondary issue and therefore the government lost the necessary domestic support to 
confront the Armed Forces. In this sense, the government would be forced to concede 
in its policy towards human rights. 
The economic crisis also strained the relationship with the trades union 
movement. The government attempted to control the trade unions by different 
strategies, all of which, the trade unions were able to block. 
As the 1985 economic reform was the most important event of subsequent 
years, let me now turn to analyse it. 
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1 In Argentina military service is compulsory at the age of 18. It lasts between 12 
and 16 months. Military service consists of three months of military training and 
later of any kind of service such as working as a waiter, driver, or secretary. 
2 Interview with Ernesto Löpez, 1-12-1993, Buenos Aires. 
3 Interview with Andres Fontana, 6-12-1993, Buenos Aires. 
4 Interview with Andres Fontana, 6-12-1993, Buenos Aires. 
5 Interview with Ernesto Löpez, 1-12-1993, Buenos Aires. 
6 In the Senate House there were 56 seats, 21 from the Peronist Party and the rest 
divided among the Radical Party and provincial parties such as the Movimiento 
Popular Neuquino, the Pacto Autonomista-Liberal from Corrientes province, and the 
Partido Bloquista de San Juan. There were 24 votes against Alfonsin proposal 
corresponding to the Peronist Senators and three Senators from the Movimiento 
Popular Neuquino led by Senator Elias Sapag (Ciarin, 15-3-1984, p. 2). 
7 The appointment of Juan Manuel Casella, then a Radical Deputy, was viewed by 
Peronism as a triumph because the new Minister belonged to the conciliatory line of 
the Radical Party (Beliz, 1988, p. 169). 
8 Mainly the Grupo de los 20. The third Minister of Labour of the Radical 
government, Hugo Barrionuevo, belonged to this group which can be characterised as 
close to the CGT-Azopardo line. The inclusion of the Grupo in the concertaciOn was 
due to the government's argument that the CGT was not representative of the 
workers. 
9 It is the lowest wage a worker can earn and is fixed according to the cost of a basket 
of goods considered necessary to the monthly consumption of a four-member family. 
Both, the basket and the wage, are calculated by the National Institute of Statistics 
and Census (INDEC). 
10 The constitution of the Grupo de los Once was mainly a consequence of the 
government's call for the concertaciön. The group became a coalition between 
employer organisations and trade unions against the political economy of the Radical 
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government. It was formed by the CGT, the Sociedad Rural Argentina (Argentinian 
Rural Society), the Confederaciones Rurales Argentinas (Argentinian Rural 
Confederations), Confederaciön Intercooperativa Agropecuaria (Agrarian 
Confederation of Cooperatives), the Uniön Industrial Argentina (Argentinian 
industrial Union), the Camara de la Construcciön (Construction Chamber), the 
Camara de Comercio (Chamber of Commerce), Asociaciön de Bancos Argentinos 
(Argentinian Banks Association), Camara de Actividades Mercantiles (Chamber of 
Trading Activities), Uniön de Empresas Comerciales Argentinas (Union of 
Commercial Organisations) and the Confederaciön del Comercio, la Industria y la 
Producciön (Confederation of Trade, Industry and Production). 
11 This meant to exclude the first three months of 1985 when the inflation rate was 
25.1 per cent, 20.7 per cent, and 26.5 per cent respectively (Machinea, 1990, 
table 11.2) 
12 Interview with Adolfo Canitrot and Jose Luis Machinea, 19-10-1993 and 25- 
10-1993, respectively, Buenos Aires. 
13 There is an extensive bibliography on this issue, for instance, Stallings, B. and 
Kaufman, R. (1989), Bianchi et al (1985), Thorp, R. and Whitehead, L. (1987), 
Roett, R. (1984), Lessard, D. and Williamson, J. (1987), Williamson (1990) 
(1993), French-Davis et al. (1986), Nelson et aL (1989), Nelson (1990), Sachs 
(1989a) and (1989b), Balassa (1986), Remmer (1991), Fanelli et al. (1990) 
Solimano and Serven (1993), Hilt and Pastor Jr. (1993), and Haggard and Webb 
(1993). 
14 See Remmer (1991). 
15 Argentina's main creditor banks are Manufacturers Hanover, Citicorp, Morgan 
Guaranty, Chase Manhattan, Continental Illinois, Midland and National Westminster 
(Branford and Kucinski, 1990, p. 118). 
16 Interview with Juan Vital Sourrouille, 19-10-1993, Buenos Aires. 
17 For more details see Williamson (1990). 
18 This is the set of policies also named as the 'orthodox approach". Orthodoxy is well 
defined by Stallings and Kaufman (1989, p. 2) as "market-oriented approaches ... 
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that emphasise fiscal and monetary restraint, reductions in the size of the state 
sector, liberalisation of trade restrictions, and collaboration with creditors". An 
heterodox approach is defined as a policy where the state plays a more active role in 
regulation and investment decisions and more emphasis is placed on distribution and 
employment (Stallings and Kaufman, 1989, p. 2). For a detailed account of the 
differences see Nelson et a! (1989) and (1990), Kahler (1990), and Haggard and 
Kaufman (1989). 
19 It has to be highlighted here that the New Political Economy implied a substantial 
debt relief. Paz Estenssoro argued that the economic situation was so severe that a 
period of complete moratorium on interest payments was required. For more details 
see Sachs (1988) and (1989a). 
20 For more details on the Bolivian case see Williamson (1990), Sanchez de Losada 
(1985), Stallings, B. and Kaufman, R. (1989), Bianchi et al (1985), Thorp, R. and 
Whitehead, L. (1987), Roett, R. (1984) Palermo (1990) and Sachs (1988) and 
(1989a) . 
21 This 'illegitimate' side of the debt was the capital flight favoured by the exchange 
rate mechanisms of the military dictatorship. See Crystal (1994), Lessard and 
Williamson (1987), Pastor (1990) and Dornbusch and De Pablo (1988). 
22 Argentinian Central Bank, unpublished data. 
23 For the Peruvian case see Schydowlsky (1986), Stepan (1978), Lowenthal 
(1983), Carbonetto (1987) and Sachs (1990). 
24 For an account of AlfonsIn's foreign policy at the beginning of his presidential 
period see Russell (1987) and Escude (1989). 
25 For more details on the relationship with Reagan's administration see Russell 
(1987) and Canitrot (1991). 
26 Bernardo Grinspun was Trade Secretary under Ilüa's presidency (Clarin, 10- 
12-1983, p. 3). 
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27 For more details on these negotiations see Schvarzer (1985) and (1986b), 
Stiles (1987), Smith (1989) and (1990), and Latin America Weekly Report (9- 
3-1984) and (6-7-1984). 
28 For instance Mallon, R. and Sourrouille, J. (1975) La politica econömica en una 
sociedad conflictiva (Buenos Aires: Amorrortu), and Sourrouiile, J., Kosacoff, B. 
and Lucängeli, J. (1985) Transnacionalizaciön y politica econömica en /a Argentina 
(Buenos Aires: CET/CEAL). 
29 As said above, an heterodox plan relies more on government controls and guidance 
and less on the market mechanism which is the central characteristic of IMF 
orthodox plans. For a detailed account of the differences see Nelson et al (1989) and 
(1990). 
30 Interview with Juan Sourrouille, 19-10-1993, Buenos Aires. 
31 italics in text 
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Chapter 5 
The deepening of the crisis 
1985-1987 
Introduction 
From 1983 to 1985, the Radical government saw all its attempts to resolve 
the crisis fail. The launching of the Austral Plan marked the beginning of a new 
strategy. From now on, the economic aspect of the crisis began to be more important 
since it intensified as inflation could not be contained. The Austral Plan was an 
attempt to resolve the economic aspect of the crisis which would allow the 
government to resolve its political elements. However, the early failure of the Plan 
frustrated this attempt. 
The first military rebellion, however, showed that crisis would not be 
resolved, this time, with the seizure of state power by the Armed Forces. 
Nevertheless, the rebellion showed the constraints of Alfonsin's policies towards 
human rights violations. He could no longer afford a serious confrontation with the 
Armed Forces in a context of deepening economic crisis. 
Finally, the government attempted to control the trades union movement by 
dividing it. However, it also failed in this attempt. The trade unions proved to be still 
powerful enough to block or modify state strategies. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section analyses the 
Austral Plan and the causes of its failure. It analyses to what extent the Radical 
government attempted to modify the dictatorship's disciplinamiento social. The 
second section describes the opposition of the trade unions to the Austral and the 
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government's attempt to, once more, control the labour movement. This time the 
Radical government attempted to control the trade unions by dividing them and by 
including a Peronist unionist in the Cabinet. The third section deals with the first 
military rebellion, analysing its causes and consequences. The reasons why the 
rebellion did not end in a military coup are analysed. Finally, the fourth section 
concludes by highlighting the reasons why the Radical government, despite having 
changed its strategy, was unable to resolve the crisis of the state. 
I. The Austral Plan 
With the IMF`s blessing, on the 14th June 1985 the President announced the 
implementation of the Austral Plan. He stated that the main objective of the economic 
reform was the 'fight against inflation'. Due to high inflation rates, gradualism was 
now ineffectual. He presented the plan as a profound reform of Argentina's economy 
(Clarin, 15-6-1985, p. 3). His Economics Minister explained that it rested upon 
three main pillars. First, a general wage and price freeze was decreed (with the 
exception of prices in flexible price markets such as meat, fruits and vegetables for 
which only maximum profit margins were fixed). Wages were increased by 23 per 
cent before the freeze in order to compensate for the price rises during the first half 
of the month. The exchange rate parity was set at 0.80 austral to 1 US dollar. 
Interest rates on deposits and loans were reduced from 28 per cent and 30 per cent 
per month, respectively, to 4 per cent and 6 per cent per month (Clarin, 15-6- 
1985, p. 4). 
Second, the Plan aimed to reduce the fiscal deficit. The target was to decrease 
the fiscal deficit from its 1984 level of 12.8 per cent of GDP to 2.5 per cent of GDP 
by the second half of 1985. This would be attained through increases in the real 
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prices of public services, increases in export taxes, improvements in the collection 
of direct taxes, the implementation of a 'compulsory saving tax' paid by taxpayers in 
proportion to their income and wealth taxes paid in 1984, and a reduction in the 
Central Bank deficit due to the fall in nominal interest rates. Likewise, as a result of 
the fall in the inflation rate, the real value of collected taxes would increase. The 
fiscal deficit would be financed by external credit; no extra money would be issued to 
finance it (Clarin, 15-6-1985, p. 34). 
Third, a new currency and the de-indexation of the economy were applied in 
order to prevent 'inertial' inflations and the redistribution of wealth as a result of 
the sudden decrease of the inflation rate. The austral was the new currency (1 
austral = 1000 pesos) and it would be revalued daily against the peso according to a 
conversion scale (Clarin, 15-6-1985, p. 34-35). 
As the Austral Plan had been previously approved by the IMF and the US 
government, the reaction of Argentina's international debtors was quite positive. On 
the 22nd of July the government signed a new letter of intent with the IMF2 
Argentina would respect the targets of the Austral Plan and the IMF would issue a 
US$ 1.2 billion loan together with one of US$ 470 million from the Treasury of the 
United States (Clarin, 25-7-1985, p. 3). These two loans were the sign of the 
approval of the Plan by the IMF and the US government. 
An agreement was also reached with creditor banks concerning the 1984- 
1985 Financial Plan which had started to be negotiated under Grinspun's 
administration (Ambito Financiero, 28-8-1985, p. 1). Argentina would receive a 
credit of US$ 2.2 billion in fresh funds, and would pay the arrears on interest 
payments which had been accumulated from February 1985 (Ambito Financiero, 
28-8-1985, p. 1). A timetable was agreed for the gradual repayment of matured 
debts from 1982 to the end of 1985. For the first time since the beginning of the 
debt crisis, Argentina would be up to date in its interest payments by the end of 
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November 1985 (Stiles, 1987, p. 76). These commitments ensured the necessary 
external financing and the essential political support from the IMF, the commercial 
banks, the European governments and the US government to enable the successful 
launching of the Austral Plan. 
The initial effects of the Austral Plan were much better than the government 
expected3. The inflation rate for consumer prices fell from 30.5 per cent in June to 
6 per cent in July and again to 3 per cent in August; and for wholesale prices from 
42 per cent to -0.9 per cent, and to 1.5 per cent, respectively (Ambito Financiero, 
8-1-1987, p. 6). The fiscal deficit decreased from 8.3 per cent of GDP in the first 
half of 1985 to 2 per cent in the second half (Machinea, 1990, p. 27). The fiscal 
revenue rose from 23 per cent of GDP to 28 per cent as a result of the automatic 
increase in the real value of tax revenues, the heavier taxes on exports and fuel, and 
the 'forced saving' system mentioned above (Machinea, 1990, table II. 7). 
A significant improvement in the balance of payments was another result of 
the Plan. The current account and balance of payments deficits fell from US$ 2390 
million and US$ 1744 million to US$ 953 million and US$ 556 million, 
respectively. International reserves increased by US$ 2 billion between June 1985 
and the end of the year (Machinea, 1990, p. 41). 
A slight upturn in the economy took place during the last quarter of 1985 and 
gathered pace in 1986. The amount of idle capacity in the industrial sector fell from 
32 per cent in the second quarter of 1985 to 23 per cent by the second quarter of 
1986 (Machinea, 1990, p. 28). In the last quarter of 1985 overall seasonally 
adjusted GDP increased over 4 per cent and industrial output rose by 13 per cent 
(Machinea and Fanelli, 1988, p. 136). In 1986 the increase in GDP was 5.7 per 
cent. Likewise, in 1986 fixed gross investment increased by 11 per cent, this rise 
being led by purchases of productive equipment which rose over the previous year 
by 16.7 per cent (Machinea and Fanelli, 1988, p. 138). 
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Political measures however, undermined the economic reform. In October 
pressures for wage increases from the Armed Forces distorted the economic strategy. 
As aid-above; from April the three Juntas Militares of the last dictatorship were on 
trial for human rights violations. In order to avoid another confrontation with the 
Armed Forces, Alfonsin suggested to his economic team a wage increase for the 
miIitar y4. The Radical government decided to increase pensions by 15 per cent and 
wages of Armed Forces personnel by 25 per cent (Machinea, 1990, p. 33). To avoid 
presenting these measures as a special concession to the Armed Forces a general wage 
increase of 5 per cent was established together with an increase of 25 per cent for 
teachers (Mac'hinea, 1990, p. 33). These increases were, undoubtedly, political 
measures ahead of the legislative elections to be held in November 1985. From 
January 1986 wages increased by 5 per cent and private companies were authorised 
to grant up to a further 5 per cent against increases in productivity (Machinea, 
1990, p. 33). 
As explained above, one of the main pillars of the Austral Plan was a general 
wage freeze. This, together with the de-indexation of the economy, was applied in 
order to prevent 'inertial inflation'. These wage increases contradicted the basis of 
the Plan. The increases would fuel 'inertial inflation'. However, Alfonsin, aware of 
the unrest within the Armed Forces due to the public judgement of the Juntas 
Militares, preferred to sacrifice economic stability to political concerns5. The wage 
increases also pushed up government expenditure and the fiscal deficit. Thus, in 
November 1985, the IMF stopped the disbursement of a US$213 million installment 
because Argentina had not met the agreed fiscal target: the public sector deficit was 
over 4.5 per cent of GDP instead of the agreed 3.6 per cent. Argentina had to start 
new negotiations with the IMF (Machinea, 1990, p. 42). 
These wage increases transgressed the 'monetarist' approach, since the 
Radical government was unable to control monetary expansion. Due to this, the IMF 
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withdrew its support of the Austral Plan. The Radical government had different 
objectives from the Fund. Alfonsin's priority was to preserve political -rather than 
economic- stability. Thus, the government needed to regulate the economy, 
contradicting the Fund's 'monetarist' preferences. 
As said, the main causes of these wage increases were the public judgement of 
the Juntas Militares and the approaching legislative elections. The November 
legislative elections were viewed by the government as a test of support for its 
economic policy6. The ruling party, Uniön Civica Radical, won in 20 of the 24 
electoral districts. It obtained 43 per cent of the total vote cast while the Peronist 
Party obtained 34 per cent. The Radical Party gained 1 parliamentary seat, the 
Peronist Party lost 8, the Intransigent Party (moderate left wing) won 3, and the 
Uniön del Centro Democrätico (right wing) won 1 (Clarin, 6-11-1985, p. 40). 
At the beginning of 1986, some indicators were suggesting that the economic 
stabilisation achieved due to the implementation of the Austral Plan was beginning to 
weaken. From December to March, the CPI rose by 3.2 per cent in December, 3 per 
cent in January, 1.7 per cent in February and 4.6 per cent in March; the WPI went 
from 1 per cent in December, 0 per cent in January, 0.8 per cent in February, to 
1.4 per cent in March (Ambito Financiero, 8-1-1987, p. 6). Likewise, nominal 
wage increases granted by the private sector were generally higher than the official 
guidelines. In addition, by March 1986, the real exchange rate rose against the 
dollar by more than 20 per cent (Canavese and Di Tella, 1988, p. 175). The October 
wage increases were viewed as the main cause of the acceleration of the inflation 
rate, mainly because they provoked a rise in the fiscal deficit and thus the 
government had to print more money? 
To prevent further increases in the inflation rate, in February 1986, a 
second phase of the Austral Plan was announced. Alfonsin described it as a phase of 
growth with stability (Clarin, 7-2-1986, p. 4). In his speech, he referred to the 
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trade unions requirement of a unilateral moratorium on the external debt. For him, 
it was wrong to believe that resources from foreign trade could be redirected to 
domestic development instead of being used to pay debt interest. With a moratorium 
these resources would disappear since they came from Argentina's foreign trade with 
those who were also its creditors. If Argentina transgressed the rules of the 
international system, its foreign trade would decline, and thus, no resources could be 
invested for domestic growth (Clarin, 7-2-1986, p. 5). Alfonsin argued that the 
Latin America situation was the consequence of an unjust international economic 
order. The decline in the terms of trade, and the increase in interest rates worsened 
the situation of Latin American countries. He explained that this was due to the 
industrialised countries 'egoism', condemning the underdeveloped countries to 
poverty and stagnation. He demanded from the industrialised countries the reduction 
of interest rates and the elimination of trade discrimination (Clarin, 7-2-1986, p. 
38). 
In his speech, Alfonsin was justifying his economic strategy and his 
acceptance of the IMF plan and arguing that most of the reasons for Argentina's 
economic crisis were found in the effect of the international economic system. 
Alfonsin implied the constraint of the external debt. He pointed to the choice between 
servicing the debt or declaring a moratorium, and declared the intention of his 
government to pursue the former. To justify this view, he emphasised that no 
government had declared a moratorium without incurring substantial costs. By 
explaining the restrictions on Argentina's foreign trade, Alfonsin indicated 
Argentina's low bargaining leverage with international creditors. He also recognised 
the negative impact of some measures over which his government had no control. 
Alfonsin had communicated to the population the constraints upon Argentina's 
economic growth. 
Sourrouille subsequently explained that the objective of the new stage was to 
ratify and deepen the Austral Plan through the 'rationalisation' of the state apparatus 
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(mainly by privatising public enterprises), industrial regeneration, and the 
reduction of export taxes (Clarin, 7-2-1986, p. 2,38-39). The Economics 
Minister recognised the decline in real wages over the last year and awarded a 
compensatory 5 per cent increase (Clarin, 7-2-1986, p. 2). He stated that the 
interest payments on the debt amounted to 5 per cent of GDP, and that the tax reform 
and the 'compulsory saving' scheme were implemented to finance the interest 
payments. These measures were based on the nationalisation of the private debt. The 
Minister explained that as the state has to service the private debt, these measures, 
directed against the wealthiest sector of the population, were a trade off for the 
nationalisation of the debt of 1982 (Clarin, 7-2-1986, p. 38). Sourrouille argued 
that 1986 would be a year of growth with stability. In order to overcome the 
stagnation of the economy and the constraint of the debt, the solution was to expand 
exports and investment. Export taxes were reduced to promote exports. He also 
announced a privatisation plan which included Somisa, Petroqufmica General 
Mosconi, Petroquimica Bahia Blanca and Petroquimica Rio Tercero (steel and 
petrochemical industries). These measures had to be approved by the Congress. 
Finally, he agreed with Alfonsin over the diagnosis of the crisis: the extraordinarily 
high interest rates together with the decline in terms of trade (Clarin, 7-2-1986, 
p. 39). 
The tax reform and the 'compulsory saving' scheme were partially 
implemented since the government never really fought against tax evasion which was 
one of the main causes, together with interest payments on the external debt, of the 
high fiscal deficit (Dornbusch and De Pablo, 1988, p. 156). Therefore, these 
measures did not have a significant impact. Moreover, the government decided to 
reduce export taxes benefiting the exporters, who, in Argentina, constituted a large 
part of the wealthiest sector. Therefore, while the government was taking resources 
from the wealthiest sector of the population, it was also assisting them through the 
reduction of export taxes. Thus, ultimately the tax reform (and the 'compulsory 
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saving' scheme), a trade off for the nationalisation of the private debt, was a 'dead 
letter' 
The February 1986 measures, like the Austral Plan, did not attempt to 
change the restructuring of social relations which had been achieved by the military 
dictatorship. In fact, privatisation had been an objective of the dictatorship itself. 
The objective of privatisation, as Sourrouille expressed, was to reduce government 
expenditures and to improve productivity levels (Clarin, 7-2-1986, p. 38). 
However, these enterprises were not loss-making. The petrochemical and steel 
industries, both private and public (but especially the former) were one of the most 
dynamic sectors (Ostiguy, 1990). Therefore, in privatising them the government 
would have lost resources. It would also have provoked an even higher concentration 
of capital, since the most likely buyers were the GEN (Ostiguy, 1990). In fact, the 
privatisation plan was not implemented due, in large part, to the opposition of the 
Peronist Party in Congress. 
i. The failure of the Austral Plan 
In April 1986, nine months after the launching of the Austral Plan, 
Sourrouilie announced several modifications to the strategy. The main change was the 
suspension of the wage and price freeze ('defreezing'). Rigid price controls were 
replaced by a new scheme of 'administered' prices, wherein realignments would be 
accompanied by changes in costs. Nominal wages in the private sector could be 
adjusted within a band determined by the government. Public utility rates would 
shift in accordance with predetermined increases. In order to maintain the exchange 
rate value in real terms, exchange rate variations would be set in terms of a 
crawling peg; the exchange rate was, therefore, semi-fixed between two limits 
determined by the government (Clarin, 5-4-1986, p. 4). The austral was 
devaluated 3.6 per cent against the dollar; there was an increase of 6 per cent in 
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public services tariffs, and a general increase in wages by 5 per cent (Ambito 
Financiero, 7-4-1986, p. 1). 
'Administered' prices supposed a degree of negotiation with trade unions and 
employers organisations. However, the Radical government had, of course, been 
unable to negotiate with these sectors during its first years in office. There had been 
an endless confrontation, mainly with trade unions, against the government's 
economic strategy. Therefore, the policy of 'administered' prices assumed a level of 
cooperation between the government, trade unions and employers organisations, 
which was over ambitious (Torre, 1990a, p. 16). Moreover, the 'administered' 
prices policy and the gradual public price increases implied the end of the original 
philosophy of the Austral Plan since these measures re-established indexation 
mechanisms which would fuel 'inertial inflation' (Canavese and Di Tella, 1988, p. 
163). The Radical government gradually began another 'u-turn' to resolve the 
economic crisis. However, its new 'u-turn' could not prevent the rise of the inflation 
rate. 
Nominal wages in the industrial sector increased 18 per cent in the second 
quarter of 1986 and 16.5 per cent between July and August. In public enterprises 
the real wage increased 8.7 per cent between the third quarter of 1985 and the third 
quarter of 1986, and in the banking sector by 20 per cent in the same period 
(Canavese and Di Tella, 1988, p. 175). These increases, and an increase in aggregate 
demand, were understood as the cause of the acceleration of inflation (Canavese and 
Di Tella, 1988, p. 175). The CPI was 4.7 per cent in April, 4 per cent in May, 4.5 
per cent in June, 6.8 per cent in July and 8.8 per cent in August. The WPI was 3 per 
cent in April, 2.7 per cent in May, 4.6 per cent in June, 5.1 per cent in July and 
9.4 per cent in August (Ambito Financiero, 8-1-1987, p. 6). 
A new set of anti-inflationary measures was announced in late August which 
included an increase of 3 per cent per month in public utility rates and the exchange 
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rate in order to meet the inflation target. The exchange rate was indexed and public 
service prices were 'over-indexed`8 to help public enterprises and the Treasury 
solve the fiscal problem. Real interest rates began to increase steadily from 0 per 
cent in September to 5 per cent per month in December. Another devaluation of the 
austral was implemented, 3.1 per cent against the dollar. In August the austral had 
been devaluated six times by a total of 12 per cent. By the end of the month the 
official exchange rate was US$1=1.13 australes, and for the black market dollar, 
1.20 australes (Clarin, 30-8-1986, p. 2). 
As a result of the August economic measures the inflation rate fell between 
October and December. The CPI in September was 7.2 per cent; in October, 6.1 per 
cent; in November, 5.3 per cent; and in December, 4.7 per cent. In these months the 
WPI was 6.8 per cent, 5.3 per cent, 4.9 per cent, and 3 per cent, respectively 
(Ambito Financiero, 8-1-1987, p. 6). 
Industrial activity declined in December 1986 to August 1985 levels 
reducing tax revenues. Likewise, the terms of trade deteriorated by almost 22 per 
cent during 1985 and 1986. As a result, there was a fall in the 1986 trade surplus 
which became a US$ 2.5 billion current account deficit (Ambito Financiero, 13-1- 
1987, p. 18). All this contributed to an increase in the fiscal deficit which went up 
to 9 per cent of GDP by the last quarter of 1986 (Machinea, 1990, p. 60). Despite 
all these negative effects, from September 1985 to September 1986 GDP rose by 11 
per cent, industrial output by 26 per cent, and investment in machinery and 
equipment by 35 per cent. In the same period the inflation rate ran at 50.1 per cent 
(Smith, 1990, p. 14). 
At the beginning of 1987, new agreements with the IMF were reached. The 
Fund granted Argentina a US$ 1.35 billion standby until March 1988. Due to 
Argentina's losses from the fall of international prices for agricultural products a 
compensatory financing facility of US$ 480 million was granted. Argentina's target 
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was to reduce the fiscal deficit to 3 per cent of GDP and inflation to 40 per cent. The 
World Bank also decided to lend Argentina US$ 2 billion for the period 1987-1988 
for a programme of growth and structural changes such as privatisations, the final 
works of the hydroelectric central Yaciretä, and a power distribution project. 
Likewise, Argentina presented its proposal for a 1987 Financial Plan, which was 
approved by the Committee of Banks. The Plan determined the refinancing of US$ 
29500 million. A new agreement was also reached with the Paris Club which re- 
scheduled US$ 1462 million (Ambito Financiero, 13-1-1987, p. 1-2). 
In its letter to the Fund, the government recognised that the April measures 
had been inflationary. The report stated that the deficit of the balance of trade had 
increased from US$ 950 million in 1985 to US$ 2650 million in 1986. This was 
due to the decline of the terms of trade and the surge in imports because of the 
reactivation of domestic activity. According to the government's estimations, the 
arrears of US$ 500 million with the Paris Club would be paid by the 15th June 
1987. The external debt would increase by US$ 2.7 billion in 1987, amounting US$ 
51.5 billion. Finally, the government declared that the steady growth of the GDP and 
investment were essential elements of its economic strategy and that this growth was 
necessary to facilitate the external debt payments9 (Ambito Financiero, 13- 1- 
1987, p. 18). 
The government aimed to achieve economic growth to service the external 
debt. The Radical government had now made a full 'u-turn' from its initial 
objectives. Alfonsin had argued, in 1984, that Argentina would pay the debt "without 
accepting recessive recipes, because we (the Radical government) are committed to 
raising the workers' real wages" (Latin America Weekly Report, 13-1-1984, p. 
3). However, in reality three years later, real wages had fallen. From a base index 
1986=100, real wages in the private sector went from 115.83 in 1984 to 92.06 in 
1987, and in the public sector, from 119.51 to 92.96 (Banco de la Republica 
Argentina, 1992, table 8. A). In order to avoid a recessive program, the Radical 
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government did not implement an IMF plan. Neither, however, did it change the 
economic structure implemented by the military dictatorship, and thus it did not 
improve the workers' situation. Because of the failure of Grinspun's strategy to 
prevent high inflation, and of the pressure from international creditors to apply a 
set of policies which enabled interest payments, the Radical government could not 
change the economic structure formed by the dictatorship. 
ii. The Australito 
In its attempt to control the economic situation, on February 1987, the 
government introduced, once again, a price and wage freeze (Ambito Financiero, 26- 
2-1987, p. 1-2). The new plan -the Australito- contained three main objectives: to 
improve the position of the Argentinian economy in the international system, to 
reform capital markets, and to restructure and privatise public companies. The 
price and wage freeze of the Australito lasted until the end of June. Before the 
freeze, as a partial compensation for past inflation, a wage increase of 3 per cent was 
granted, on top of the 13 per cent for the private sector and the 9 per cent for the 
public sector already agreed for the first quarter of the year. Likewise, before the 
freeze, public tariffs rose by 2 per cent and the austral was devalued by 6.6 per cent 
against the dollar. The Australito determined that the exchange rate would be frozen 
during March and April, while in May and June the austral would be devalued by 2 
per cent against the dollar (Ambito Financiero, 26-2-1987, p. 1-2). 
In the first half of 1987 the inflation rate was above its annual projection. In 
June the Australito was abandoned, mainly because of its unpopular wage and 
monetary policies. In this month the devaluation of the austral was greater than 
expected, the value of the dollar rose by 10.2 per cent overtaking the envisaged rate 
(Latin American Weekly Report, 9-7-1987, p. 9). 
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Sourrouille announced some new measures, such as the elimination of export 
taxes on wheat and other crops, the privatisation of most public companies, the 
assumption of public companies' debts by the Treasury, and an increase of 10 per 
cent in transport fares and petrol prices (Clarin, 21-7-1987, p. 2-3). By July 
the inflation rate reached double digits, 11.9 per cent (Smith, 1990, p. 22). The 
gap between the official and the parallel dollar exchange rate was increasing; in 
August it reached 43.36 per cent. There were mini-devaluations of 9.72 per cent in 
July and 14.95 per cent in August (Manzetti and Dell'Aquila, 1988, p. 21). 
In July the government signed a new standby agreement with the IMF which 
imposed the correction of relative prices through increases in public utility rates 
and the exchange rate. In return, the IMF agreed to disburse US$ 1.04 billion, 
including the first payment of the US$ 1.5 billion credit approved the previous 
February (Clarin, 11-7-1987, p. 2). In the agreement, the government recognised 
that it did not reach the targets of the last agreement of January 1987 since the 
inflation rate was greater than estimated, the balance of payments was deeply in 
deficit, and the fiscal deficit was higher than expected. The objectives of the new 
agreement were to implement a fiscal adjustment, a restrictive monetary policy and 
to limit to 5 per cent wage increases for the third quarter of the year. The report 
also stated that the government would further open up the economy. The control of the 
IMF over Argentina's economy was increased, as now, the Fund would control the 
development of strategies every two months (Clarin, 11-7-1987, p. 2). These new 
measures constituted a deepening of the 1976-1981 economic structural reform. 
They were also an attempt to reduce the role of the state as regulator of the economy. 
The Radical government, with IMF supervision, was preparing the ground for the 
full implementation of a 'monetarist' restructuring of the state and its social 
relations. 
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In September 1987 elections were held to renew half of the Chamber of 
Deputies, all the provincial governorships, provincial Congresses and municipal 
authorities. As with all the elections in a democratic system, the September elections 
were a test of support for Alfonsin's policies. The Radical Party obtained 37.4 per 
cent of the total vote cast while the Peronist Party reached 41.4 per cent (Clarin, 
9-9-1987, p. 12). The Radical Party lost its majority in the Chamber of Deputies. 
It also lost all but two (Cördoba and Rio Negro) of its seven governorships (Clarin, 
8-9-1987, p. 8-9). The biggest loss was in Buenos Aires province (one of the 
largest districts in Argentina). The Peronist Party won sixteen out of twenty two 
governorships (Clarin, 8-9-1987, p. 8-9). The September elections showed that 
Alfonsin had lost political credibility and support. 
iii. The reasons behind the Austral failure 
Analysing the failure of the Austral Plan, one conclusion to be drawn is that 
the plan was insufficient to achieve a durable stabilisation. The Austral Plan, after 
having prevented the hyper-inflation process, did not have a well defined second 
stage1 0. The plan gave Alfonsin's administration a significant opportunity to bring 
down inflation but this period was not used to consolidate the deflation. The lack of 
fiscal discipline was one important cause of the failure of the Austral Plan, and was 
one of the reasons why inflation accelerated. 
The measures taken by Sourrouille's economic team did not go to the core of 
the fiscal question. One of the main factors here was the tax system and tax evasion. 
In 1985, corporation taxes represented 1 per cent of GDP. Only one and a half 
million inhabitants are registered as taxpayers. Less than one third presented the 
declaration of their obligation to pay tax and less than one per cent of the registered 
taxpayers declared their obligation to pay some kind of tax. Moreover, 84 per cent of 
195 
the total income of VAT and corporation tax was paid by just 6 per cent of the 
registered taxpayers (Dornbusch and De Pablo, 1988, p. 156). Likewise, there are 
a huge variety of authorised exemptions especially established through industrial 
subsidies' 1. The Austral Plan did not implement any significant change in the tax 
system nor improve the system of tax collection. 
The Plan also collapsed because of a negative external shock. The decline in 
the terms of trade was regarded as having been particularly detrimentall 2. From an 
index of 100 for 1980, the terms of trade were 98.8 in 1984,91.4 in 1985 and 
79.9 in 1986 (World Bank, 1988). Despite a record 43 million tons of grain 
exports in 19851 3 (Clarin, 7-2-1986, p. 39), the fall of the terms of trade led to 
a deficit in the trade account. Due to an increase in productivity as a result of the 
positive effects of the Plan, there was an increase in imports which provoked a 
decline in the surplus on the trade account. Both, the decline in the terms of trade and 
the increase of imports, provoked a fall in the surplus on the balance of trade. In 
1985, the surplus on the balance of trade was US$ 4315 million; in 1986, US$ 
1555 million; and in 1987, just US$ 257 million (Fanelli and Frenkel, 1990, p. 
196). The international prices of agricultural products were 20 per cent lower in 
1987 than in 1985. The effect of the deterioration in terms of trade from 1985 to 
1987 amounted to 3.4 per cent of the GDP, accounting for almost 50 per cent (U$S 
1900 million) of the reduction in the balance of trade surplus for this period (US$ 
4500 miilion)(Machinea, 1990, p. 64). In addition, the fall in international 
agricultural prices was the main factor behind the reduction of export taxes, which 
contributed to an increase of the fiscal deficit. These taxes were 1.93 per cent of the 
GDP during 1985 (2.18 per cent during the second semester) and only 0.32 per 
cent in 1987 (Machinea, 1990, p. 64). 
The main problem of the Austral Plan was that its objectives were limited. Its 
concern was to prevent hyperinflation, and it did not propose a plan of action once 
this had been achieved. However, while the Plan prevented hyperinflation, it could 
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not permanently prevent the acceleration of the inflation rate. The main cause for the 
failure of the Austral was its policy ambiguity. It neither restructured the main 
features of Argentina's economy, nor attempted to deepen them. As an example, the 
Plan attempted to reduce the fiscal deficit without changing the main causes of it: the 
interest payments of the external debt, tax evasion, and a high variety of government 
subsidies to the industry -most notably tax exemptions. This was also the cause of 
the existence of high inflation rates. 
After the failure of Grinspun's strategy and the Austral, the government 
realised that economic adjustment, the implementation of a 'monetarist' approach, 
might be the only tool to resolve the crisiS1 4. However, Alfonsin did not want to 
'make the adjustment' if this implied that most of its cost would be borne by the 
working class (Canitrot, 1991, p. 13)1 5. Nevertheless, as the government ran out 
of alternatives, it began to prepared the ground for a full implementation of economic 
adjustment. 
The failures of the Radical government to resolve the economic crisis 
exacerbated its confrontation with the trade unions. Let me now analyse the trade 
unions reaction towards the Austral Plan. 
dl. The relationship with the unions in the context of the Austral 
With the announcement of the Austral, the government abandoned its 
concertaciön attempt. Indeed, while the concertaci©n intended to achieve an agreement 
between the government, the trade unions and business organisations on economic and 
social policies, the Austral Plan was unilaterally implemented by the government. 
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As a response to the launching of the Austral, the CGT published a document 
entitled "Defending production and employment in order to defeat inflation" 
(Defender la producciön y el trabajo argentinos para derrotar la inf/aciän). This 
document was known as Los 26 puntos (The 26 issues). In the document, the CGT 
presented an alternative economic policy whose main instruments were: a 'unilateral 
moratorium' on the interest payments of the external debt, the re-organisation of 
the financial market, the nationalisation of bank deposits, a tax reform, the 
promotion of exports and import substitution development, the re-activation of 
public investment, a promotion of private investment, the defense of democracy, an 
increase of the education budget, and the construction of houses (Beliz, 1988, p. 
228-233). From now on, the CGT would permanently demand the implementation of 
this economic strategy in order to achieve economic growth. The GGT's document also 
called for a new general strike, against the implementation of the Austral, to be held 
on the 29th August to be followed by a social demonstration (Ambito Financiero, 30- 
8-1985, p. 1). 
In July 1985 the government created the Economic and Social Conference 
(Conferencia Econömica y Social -CES) whose objectives were similar to those of the 
concertaciön attempt. Its first meeting was held in August -before the general 
strike- and was attended by the President, the Ministers of Economy, Labour, Home 
Affairs and Welfare, three members from the UTA, one from the Confederaciön 
General de la Industria, one from the Camara Argentina de la Industria, and five 
members from the CGT (Gaudio et al, 1990, p. 139). As its predecessor, the CES 
became an ineffectual talking shop on percentages and could not avoid the organisation 
of strikes. 
Indeed, although the November 1985 election gave the government the 
impression that it had general support, by this time, important groups of workers 
were holding 'struggle plans'. The metallurgical union (UOM ), the construction 
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workers (UOCRA), the textile workers (AOT) and the railway unions (La 
Fraternidad, Uni©n Ferroviaria, Asociaciän de Senaleros y Jerärquicos) were 
pressing for wage increases through national strikes (Latin American Weekly 
Report, 13-12-1985, p. 4). 
As a result of the acceleration of the inflation rate at the beginning of 1986 - 
which went, as said, from 3.2 per cent in January to 4.6 per cent in March- the 
government decided that the CES would be the framework for wage negotiations which 
would be held sector by sector with the commitment that any increase would not be 
transferred to price rises. The government estimated an increase of about 6 or 7 per 
cent. In the negotiations the CGT asked for a general wage increase of 28 per cent, the 
employers accepted this increase with the condition that they be allowed to transfer 
it to price rises. The government, however, accepted no more than a7 per cent 
increase for the lowest wages. Once again, as during the concertaciön attempt, the 
CGT left the CES and called for a general strike to be held on the 24th of January 
(Clarin, 7-2-1986, p. 9). The CGT required an economic emergency plan to 
promote 'growth with social justice'. It stated that the external debt was unpayable 
and that Argentina had to service the debt in accordance with its capability (Clarin, 
7-2-1986, p. 9). 
The February 1986 measures were rejected by the CGT since the 
government, after recognising the decline in real wages over 1985, gave a 
compensation of 5 per cent while the decline of real wages was 3 per cent for the 
private sector and almost 10 per cent for the public sector (Banco Central de la 
Republica Argentina, 1992, table 8. A). Against the February 1986 measures, the 
CGT called for a general strike to be held on the 25th of March for a period of twelve 
hours (Fraga, 1991, p. 25). 
The April 1986 measures were criticised by the SRA. During 1986 relations 
between the agricultural sector and the government deteriorated. The agricultural 
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sector viewed itself as the real 'loser' of the Austral Plan, due, mainly, to the export 
taxes and the decline in the terms of trade. Regarding the new set of measures of 
April 1986, Guillermo Alchourön, president of the SRA, complained about the 
secondary role given to agriculture compared to the industrial sector. He declared 
that the farmers were disappointed with this second phase of the Austral Plan 
because it did not include any measures for the agricultural sector. He argued that 
the plan did not have the right approach to the promotion of the sector which actually 
generates Argentina's wealth. A'ichourön criticised the government's promotion of 
industrial exports, while the agricultural exports were subject to an export tax of 
around 32 per cent (Acuna, 1990, p. 37). In that year agricultural production 
contracted by 2.8 per cent. As a result of this discrimination against the agricultural 
sector, 1986 was characterised by Jornadas de Protesta Agropecuaria -days of 
agricultural protests- organised by the SRA, CONINAGRO, FAA and CRA. The protests 
involved farmers coming from the provinces to Buenos Aires, blocking traffic on 
national routes, organising lock-outs and demonstrating against the government in 
Plaza de Mayo (Clarin, 22-4-1986, p. 9). 
After the announcements of the April 1986 measures, a new round of 
negotiations on the framework of the CES started. Once again the main discussion 
focused on the extent of wage increases. Finally, the government decided the 
percentage independently and applied it by decree. The CGT's response was to call for 
the sixth general strike for the 13th of June (Gaudio et al, 1990, p. 153). The four 
strikes mentioned had total adherence in the industrial sector and partial in the 
tertiary sector (Fraga, 1991, p. 25). 
i. Alfonsin's new strategy 
By this time, Alfonsin started to implement a new political strategy in order 
to neutralise the CGT's opposition. In order to weaken the CGT, he supported wage 
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negotiations between trade unions and employers. Indeed, these negotiations 
attempted to undermine the role of the CGT, as the peak organisation, which 
represented all trade unions in its wage negotiations with the government. The most 
important event was lead by the metallurgical union (UOM). Its General Secretary, 
Lorenzo Miguel, demanded a wage increase over the band determined by the 
government. The private sector, under pressure from the government, which did not 
approve the transfer of wage increases to price rises, did not grant the increase. 
After this refusal, the UOM started an indefinite strike which represented a loss of 
1.5 per cent of GDP. Sourrouille himself eventually authorised the private sector to 
transfer the costs of the wage increase to price rises. After 33 days of the strike, the 
agreement determined a wage increase of 48 per cent which would be paid in 
different steps (Gaudio et al, 1990, p. 154). This event was significant because it 
showed the continuing weakness of the government vi s-'a- vi s the trade unionsl 6. In 
order to avoid social conflict, the government compromised its economic objectives. 
To transfer the costs of wage increases to price rises fuelled inflation. Moreover, 
historically, the struggle of the UOM and its results was a test case for other trade 
unions. Therefore, Alfonsin's strategy to isolate the CGT and negotiate with trade 
unions threatened the survival of his own economic plan. By August 1986 the 
government had approved over 50 agreements for wage increases (Latin American 
Weekly Report, 14-8-1986, p. 5). 
Despite Aifonsin`s new strategy, the CES negotiations continued. In this 
framework, the CGT mainly demanded a general wage increase. Due to the failure of 
these negotiations, the CGT called for a general strike on the 9th of October and on the 
26th of January 1987. Both strikes had total adherence in the industrial sector 
(Fraga, 1991, p. 25). 
By this time the CGT was organising its first delegates congress for ten years. 
Under the dictatorship, the CGT ran with an informal leadership. Once the democratic 
government took office, the CGT started to organise its internal 'normalisation' but 
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this was postponed due to internal struggles. The congress eventually took place on 
the 7th of November and the General Secretary, Saül Ubaldini, retained his post 
(Gaudio et al, 1990, p. 131). 
After the January strike, the government tried to gain some internal 
confidence among trade unionists in order to attain two different objectives. The 
political aim was to weaken Peronism by dividing the labour movement. The social 
aim was to negotiate a 'social peace' -the absence of strikes and demonstrations 
against the government- in the months prior to the elections. In other words, the 
government, once again, attempted to control the power of the labour movement. In 
order to do this, Alfonsin's government began negotiations with the Grupo de los 15, a 
faction of the labour movement. This group was formed by important trade unions 
such as UOM, Light and Power, plastic sector workers, car workers, and commercial 
workers, and led by 'orthodox' Peronists such as Lorenzo Miguel, Carlos Alderete, 
Jorge Triaca, Jose Rodriguez and Armando Cavalieri. All of them had experience of 
negotiating with governments, from the military dictatorship to Alfonsini 7. The 
Grupo de los 15 had a very different strategy from the CGT's. The Grupo was 
negotiating with the government wage increases by sector -most notably, the August 
UOM's agreement. In the framework of these agreements, trade unionists were 
achieving their objectives. Thus, the objective of the Grupo was to end the CGT's 
confrontation since the general strikes did not achieve trade unions' objectives. 
Indeed, the Grupo de los 15 did not want to support more general strikes (Gaudio et 
a/, 1990, p. 170). 
As a result of the agreement reached by the government and los 15, in April 
1987, Carlos Alderete, from the Light and Power workers, was appointed Mini st er 
of Labour (Ciarin, 28-3-1987, p. 2). The terms of the agreement obliged a process 
of negotiations and dialogue, instead of the confrontation led by the CGT. The 
government would approve wage accords such as that the UOM achieved in August 
1986, free collective wage bargaining would begin in 1988, and the Congress would 
202 
legislate a new national health system which would involve, union participation in 
the running of workers' social welfare funds (Obras Socia/es). The trade unionists 
promised to discourage strikes and to persuade orthodox Peronists in the Chamber of 
Deputies to support the labour legislation that the government proposed (Beliz, 
1988, p. 22). 
One of the results of the agreement with los 15 was that in the next wage 
increases reached by the UOM there was a three-month no-strike clause (McGuire, 
1992, p. 47). During Alderete's six months as Minister of Labour there was no call 
for a general strike. However, the confrontation with the workers movement moved 
to the Cabinet. 
As soon as Alderete took office he announced that he was considering with 
Sourrouille's economic team an emergency wage increase. This was rejected by the 
Economics Minister (Clarin, 30-4-1987, p. 2). Alderete began to apply a special 
policy -he was unofficially approving wage accords between trade unions and 
employers. According to the government's policies the key point of these accords was 
the promise from the employers not to transfer the wage increase to price rises. 
Alderete was approving wage accords without that promise (Gaudio et al., 1990, p. 
176). After this confrontation, Sourrouille and Alderete agreed an increase of 17.6 
per cent of the minimum wage and from June a general increase of 6 per cent (Gaudio 
et al., 1990, p. 177). 
However, the confrontation between Alderete and Sourrouille then changed, 
focusing on labour legislation. The participants in this struggle were the 
government, Alderete and the CGT, and the employers organisations such as the UTA 
and the group of Capitanes de la Industria 18. The labour legislation concerned wage 
bargaining, union statutes and the administration of workers' social welfare funds. 
The President received members of the UTA, SPA., Camara Argentina de Comercio, 
Camara Argentina de la Construcciön, Asociaciön de Bancos Argentinos, and the 
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Capitanes who complained about the legislation. The most controversial point was the 
enlargement of strikers right (including the work-to rule or trabajo a desgano as 
one of the strike rights). The employers' organisations argued that this undermined 
the productivity of the country. Finally, Alfonsin decided to postpone the discussion 
of the legislation in the Congress until after the September elections (La Naciön, 1 4- 
6-1987,3rd. section, p. 1). 
In seeking to incorporate a Peronist trade unionist into the Cabinet, Alfonsin 
was attempting to divide and weaken the union movement. Indeed, the CGT, at the 
beginning, opposed the negotiations between the government and los 15. In fact, the 
CGT vetoed Alfonsin's first candidate, Jose Rodriguez from SMATA, who after the 
CGT's decision did not accept Alfonsin's offer. Finally, the CGT accepted Alderete's 
appointment due to the pressure from the Grupo de los 15 (Gaudio et al, 1990, p. 
171). In this sense, Alfonsin's objective was also to neutralise the CGT's 
confrontation by exacerbating the internal divisions of the labour movement. 
Alfonsin's second objective was to avoid being confronted with opposition 
from the trades union movement as the same time as there was internal unrest 
within the Armed Forces (Alfonsin, 1992, p. 19). This coexistence could, according 
to Alfonsin, have put democratisation at risk. However, when the Easter military 
rebellion occurred, Alderete and the CGT's General Secretary were supporting the 
democratic government. This was the first time in Argentina's history that the CGT 
actively supported a non-Peronist democratic government threatened by the Armed 
Forces. In Alfonsin's point of view this was due to Alderete incorporation into the 
Cabinet1 9 
However, Alfonsin's first objective was defeated. He could not control the 
trade unions. From the very beginning of his government, Alfonsin attempted to 
control and to politically demobilise the trade unions. However, as said, all his 
attempts had failed. On the other hand, the trades union movement did achieve some of 
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its objectives: free collective bargaining and the expansion of strikers rights would 
be sanctioned. Moreover, the government had given many wage increases as a 
consequence of the pressure of the trade unions. Alfonsin's policies were also defeated 
when in the Easter military rebellion trade unionists supported the democratic 
government. Thus, his argument about the authoritarian basis of the trades union 
movement lost validity. 
The powerful role of the trade unions was an important obstacle to the 
resolution of the crisis of the Argentinian state. Indeed, Alfonsin could not apply an 
economic adjustment program in the context of confrontation with the trade unions. 
The trade unions were able to block state policies. Indeed, they undermined the 
Austral Plan through their endless demands for wage increases. Alfonsin argued that, 
in order to consolidate democracy, he had to concede to the trade unions; however, 
this shows the government's incapacity to control the trade unions. 
III. The Armed Forces 
The public judgement of the Juntas Militares began a new stage in the 
relationship between the Radical government and the Armed Forces. On the 9th of 
December 1985 the Federal Chamber of Justice passed sentence on the Juntas 
Mifitares. Lt. General Jorge Videla and Admiral Emilio Massera were given life 
sentences, Lt. General Roberto Viola was given seventeen years, Admiral 
Lambruschini eight years, and Brigadier Orlando Agosti four and a half years. 
Brigadier Omar Graffigna, Lt. General Leopoldo Galtieri, Admiral Jorge Anaya and 
Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo were acquitted (Clarin, 10-12-1985, p. 2-4,54). 
The last three remained under confinement awaiting the outcome of the trial over 
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their management of the Malvinas war (Latin American Weekly Report. 13-12- 
1985, p. 1)2 0 
Point number 30 of the sentence of the Federal Chamber undermined 
Alfonsin's objectives. The text provided for "the trial of superior officers who 
commanded the zones and subzones of defense during the war against subversion and 
of all those who had operational responsibilities" (Clarin, 10-12-1985, p. 55). 
Point 30 determined that all the evidence that had been presented to the Federal 
Chamber would be given to the Consejo Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas which would 
be responsible for setting in motion the judgements (Clarin, 10-12-1985, p. 55). 
Point 30 aborted the government's intention of providing a political solution to the 
question of human rights violations after the sentence of the Federal Chamber. 
Indeed, to propose a law which established 'due obedience' would have created tension 
between the Judicial and Executive Powers. Therefore, Alfonsin had to abandon his 
proposal of 'due obedience'. 
Alfonsin wanted to resolve the question of human rights violations. He well 
understood that the Armed Forces would not passively accept that their officials - 
retired or on active duty- were being judged by civilian tribunals for acts committed 
in 'their war' against guerrillas. The main problem was how to put an end to the 
question of human rights violations without being accused of weakness vis-'a-vis the 
Armed Forces, or even worse, of forgetting the 30000 desaparecidos, their parents, 
husbands, wives, children and friends who were waiting for justice. Alfonsin could 
not resolve this predicament. 
A double discourse begun. On the one hand, Alfonsin was trying to approach 
the Armed Forces with promises of a political solution -the three levels of 
responsibility or 'due obedience'- and with the recognition of the need to conclude the 
trials. On the other hand, Alfonsin was still emphasising his commitment to punish 
those who had committed human rights violations. Alfonsin's policy towards the 
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Armed Forces became ambiguous21. He applied quite different strategies in an 
attempt to avoid the very thing that eventually occurred: a military rebellion. 
Alfonsin's first strategy was to apply the so-called Instrucciones a! Fiscal 
General del Consejo Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas (Instructions to the General 
Prosecutor of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces). The Instructions were sent 
by the Minister of Defense. They established that: 1) subordinates would be 
punishable when they had been able to decide on their acts, they had known the 
illegitimacy of the order or they had committed aberrant or atrocious acts; 2) it 
should be understood that the subordinate was able to decide when not to follow the 
orders he had been given; 3) it should be considered that the subordinates acted in 
ignorance of the illegitimacy of the orders; and 4) subordinates were responsible for 
aberrant or atrocious acts when these acts were in excess of the orders given 
(Ciarin, 25-4-1986, p. 2-3). 
After the Instructions were known, Alfonsin faced a crisis within the 
Judiciary. The Federal Chamber of Justice threatened to resign. Julio Strassera, the 
General Prosecutor of the trial of the Juntas Militares also threatened to resign 
(Acura and Smulovitz, 1991, p. 17). Most of the political parties -including the 
Radical Party- and the human rights organisations were against the Instructions. 
They argued that they were an intrusion of the Executive Power into the judgements 
and constituted a 'hidden amnesty'. They also called for a social demonstration against 
the Instructions (Acuna and Smulovitz, 1991, p. 17). Finally, Alfonsin in his speech 
on the ist of May in the Congress announced that he would give new instructions to 
avoid 'due obedience' protecting those who had committed aberrant and atrocious acts 
under orders but who in reality had been able to decide not to carry out these 
commands (Clarin, 2-5-1986, p. 10). The Radical government was unable to 
implement its own policies. Indeed, pressure from organisations of human rights, 
the Judiciary and the political parties -also the Radical Party-, blocked and modified 
Alfonsin's policies. 
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Before the end of the year, Alfonsin applied his second strategy. He sent a 
proposal to the Congress to deal with the increasing number of judgments against 
officials from the Armed Forces. The Punto Final (full stop) law had the objective 
of ending the trial of human rights violators by establishing a deadline for starting 
court enquiries of military officials accused of such violations. After the deadline no 
other trial could be started. The law established a 60 day deadline from the day of its 
sanction (Clarin, 6-12-1986, p. 4). It was passed by the Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies by the end of December 1986 (Clarin, 31-12-1986, p. 2)22 
Although January is a holiday month for the Judiciary, the Federal Chambers 
of Cördoba, Bahia Blanca, Tucuman, Rosario, Mendoza, Comodoro Rivadavia and La 
Plata suspended the holiday in order to clear the backlog of judgements before the 
new law come into force. By the 23rd of February 1987 -date of the deadline of the 
Punto Final law- 487 cases had been presented to courts against over 300 officials, 
thirty per cent of whom were on active duty (Clarin, 22-2-1987, p. 2-3). The 
Punto Final law intended to end the judgements of Armed Forces officials. However, 
the Judiciary's reaction modified government expectations. The government thought 
that less cases would have been presented (Clarin, 22-2-1987, p. 2-3). In this 
sense, the Radical government saw, once again, the frustration of its objectives. 
Indeed, the Armed Forces were in a situation of internal upheaval. Horizontal 
cleavages -based on ideological and professional differences- had appeared within the 
Armed Forces under the military dictatorship. However, the Armed Forces were 
united in their defence of State Terrorism. The horizontal cleavages deepened due to 
Alfonsin's policies and the reaction of the hierarchy of the Army. Low rank officials, 
although they did not approve Martinez de Hoz's economic strategy, did support State 
Terrorism and, in fact, they themselves applied it and also went to the Malvinas war. 
These low ranking officials were now majors or lieutenant colonels who were being 
judged by civilian courts for human rights violations. They thought that they were 
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being abandoned by those who had commanded them in the implementation of State 
Terrorism. A strong feeling of solidarity developed amongst them. Before going to 
face the civilian tribunals, they were celebrating in front of farewell masses. They 
were also distributing documents to journalists in which they argued that 
"the current military hierarchy was part of the Armed 
Forces during the war against the guerrilla, occupying 
significant posts... The legality that then they did not 
require of the Juntas Militares, they want now to impose it 
on their subordinates who just obeyed their orders... these 
judgments affect the dignity and the honour of the Armed 
Forces and it is not a question of acceptable percentages of 
convicted or accused" (Fontana and Llenderrozas, 1992, p. 
190). 
The Army was, then, internally divided. Senior officials opposed the Generals 
and their attitude towards the trials for human rights violations. The Instructions as 
well as the Punto Final law were not enough to placate these officials. On the 
contrary, they provoked a confrontation between different levels of the Army 
hierarchy. Senior officials viewed the Generals as accomplices in Alfonsin's attack on 
the Armed Forces. The Easter rebellion was the outcome of the internal upheaval of 
the Army. 
i. The first military rebellion 
On the 14th of April 1987, major Ernesto Barreiro refused to present 
himself to the Federal Chamber of Cordoba and took refuge in the 14th Airborne 
Infantry Regiment in Cördoba (Clarin, 16-4-1987, p. 2-3). Barreiro had the tacit 
support of the regiment's commander, lieutenant colonel Luis Polo. Three days later, 
lieutenant colonel Aldo Rico barricaded himself and his followers in Campo de Mayo 
Regiment in Buenos Aires to support Barreiro's action (Clarin, 16-4-1987, p. 2- 
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3). The main demand of the rebels -known as carapintadas - was for a political 
solution to human rights trials, a change at the top of the Army -they specifically 
wanted General Eduardo Rios Erenü to be removed-, and their own pardoning 
(Clarin, 16-4-1987, p. 2-3). 
The Army Chief of Staff, General Rios Erenü, ordered troops to repress the 
rebels but they did not obey him. Therefore, he resigned (Clarin, 18-4-1987, p. 
44). The Army was divided between the 'rebels or carapintadas' and those who while 
not supporting the rebellion refused to repress it. The main point of disagreement 
between the 'rebels' and the 'legalists' was the method adopted by the former in 
disobeying internal Army discipline. Alfonsin found himself with the support of 
generals who did not have any power over their subordinates2 3 
During the days of the rebellion social demonstrations supporting the 
government were held in all the main squares of Argentina. In Buenos Aires, Plaza de 
Mayo had been crowded since the very beginning of the rebellion and there were also 
social demonstrations against the military rebellion in front of the Campo de Mayo 
Regiment (Clarin, 18-4-1987, p. 2-3). The 'rebels' were completely isolated from 
civil society and democracy was supported by all the political parties and other 
institutions such as the Church and the representative organisations of labour and 
business. An Acta de Cornpromiso Dernocrätico (Democratic Commitment Act) was 
signed by all the political parties whose leaders were in the House of Government 
during the days of the rebellions (Clarin, 18-4-1987,2). The CGT called for an 
indefinite strike to support democracy and Ubaldini joined the political leaders in the 
House of Government (Clarin, 18-4-1987, p. 8-9). This was the first time in 
Argentina's history that the political parties, the representatives of the 
organisations of labour and business, the Church and society had supported 
democracy against a military rebellion. 
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With this popular pressure against the rebellion, Alfonsin went to the Campo 
de Mayo Regiment on the 19th of April. As Commander-in-Chief of the Army 
Alfonsin ordered the 'rebels' to surrender. When he returned to give a speech in 
Plaza de Mayo he made the mistake of calling some of the carapintadas `heroes of the 
Malvinas war' (Clarin, 20-4-1987, p. 2-3). Because of this, it was perceived that 
Alfonsin had negotiated with the rebels. Less than one month later this view seemed to 
be confirmed when Alfonsin sent his 'due obedience' proposal to the Congress (La 
Naciön, 5-6-1987, p. 1 and 4). 
The 'due obedience' law had the effect of exonerating all officials at the rank of 
lieutenant colonel or lower charged with human rights offences -whether or not they 
had committed excesses- and more senior officers who were not key decision-makers 
(La Naciön, 5-6-1987, p. 4)24. Although the concept of 'due obedience' was one of 
Alfonsin's initial objectives, its sanction was viewed as a result of military 
pressures. After three and a half years in office, Alfonsin achieved his objective only 
after a military rebellion. 
The Semana Santa military rebellion had many consequences. First, after the 
rebellion the Army was clearly divided. Although the demands of the 'rebels' were the 
same as those of the Army proper, the method chosen by the 'rebels' was to break up 
the Army's internal discipline. Secondly, the high rank officials were against the 
'rebels' but did not repress them showing that despite internal differences the Army 
was still unified. Thirdly, after Semana Santa, in addition to the question of human 
rights violations, the question of the carapintadas added a new conflict in the already 
tense relationship between the democratic government and the Armed Forces. The 
final consequence was the legislation of Alfonsin's 'due obedience' proposal. 
However, Semana Santa had a positive side. It was a military rebellion which 
was not repressed by force and did not end in a military coup. The President himself 
ended the rebellion when he went to Campo de Mayo to order the rebels to surrender. 
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Why did Semana Santa not give rise to a military coup? One could suggest that the 
'rebels' did not want to overthrow the democratic government (Norden, 1990,168- 
169). However, I argue that the deep opposition of Argentinian society to the 
military rebellion isolated the 'rebels'. The support for democracy from the political 
parties, the CGT, the SRA, the UTA, the Catholic Church, the Capitanes de Is Industria 
and thousands of people in Plaza de Mayo and in Campo de Mayo was the most 
important factor in explaining why Semana Santa was no more than a rebellion. Last 
but not least, the international community also condemned the military action 
(Clarin, 17/18-4-1987). 
This support was a consequence of the discrediting of the Armed Forces, 
partially achieved by Alfonsin's policies towards human rights violations. Therefore, 
Alfonsin's policies, despite the Punto Final and the due obedience laws, did help to 
consolidate democracy. However, as said, due to the intensification of the economic 
crisis, the human rights violations issue became secondary and it lost the essential 
domestic support needed to confront the Armed Forces. In other words, the sanction of 
the Punto Final and the due obedience laws were consequences of the failure of the 
government's economic strategy. The government was gradually loosing domestic 
support due to its incapacity to stabilise the economy, and thus, it could no longer 
maintain an open conflict with the Armed Forces. 
IV. Conclusion 
The Radical government, after four years in office, could not resolve the 
crisis of the Argentinian state. Most clearly, the Radical government, after the 
failure of Grinspun's strategy to resist the IMF and to prevent high inflation, did not 
attempt to resolve the crisis of the Argentinian state. It did not intend to radically 
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restructure the state, and at the same time, class relations. The Austral Plan was not 
an attempt to achieve a 'monetarist' modification of the economic structure and the 
structure of class relations in Argentina. Its limited objectives were to prevent 
hyperinflation and to reduce the fiscal deficit. As it did not intend to modify the 
military dictatorship legacy, it maintained it and gradually deepened measures taken 
by the dictatorship. In this sense, economically, the Radical government prepared the 
ground for a 'monetarist' restructuring of the state and of its relation to the economy. 
In its four years in office, the Radical government had applied many 
strategies to control the power of trade unions. As demonstrated, all its attempts 
failed. The government conceded to most of the trade unions demands since it was 
unable to undermine their power. The power of unionism was an important barrier 
to the restructuring of the state and its class relations. As showed, most of the 
government's economic strategies were undermined by the power of the trade unions. 
Finally, the Radical government was threatened by a military rebellion. In 
this area, the government did achieve its objectives. It resisted the military 
rebellion, and thus, its main political objective -the consolidation of democracy- 
was strengthened. Despite Alfonsin's concessions to the Armed Forces -the Pun to 
Final and due obedience laws- he was able to avoid a military coup for two reasons. 
First, because of international and domestic support for democracy, and second, the 
CONADEP report and the public judgement of the Juntas Militares which discovered 
the horrors of State Terrorism and discredited the Armed Forces. Thus, while the 
crisis of the Argentinian state was not resolved by the democratic government, this 
crisis did not lead to the seizure of state power by the Armed Forces. This was 
Alfonsin's main political achievement. 
As the Radical government did not resolve the crisis, it lost the 1987 
elections. The analysis I will present of the government's last two years in office 
shows that the government began to prepare the ground for the 'monetarist' 
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restructuring of the state, that the trade unions ended their policy of confrontation in 
order to support the Peronist party for the 1989 general elections, and that the 
Armed Forces, again, attempted to retain their historical role by threatening the 
maintenance of democracy. The downfall of the Radical government was caused by its 
incapacity to resolve the economic crisis which became a political crisis, making the 
'monetarist' restructuring of the state and of its class relations seem inevitable. 
1 The economic team argued that, in a highly inflationary situation, future inflation 
is a function of past inflation. They believed that 'inertial' inflation can not be solved 
by orthodox policies. Sourrouille's economic team believed that the way to end this 
vicious circle was to abandon indexation (Dornbusch and De Pablo, 1988, p. 116). 
2 As said above, the September 1984 agreement with the IMF had been cancelled in 
January 1985 by the Fund since Argentina did not achieve the targets of the 
agreement due to a monthly inflation rate of 25 per cent. As the Radical government 
had decided to service the debt it had to agree with the Fund on the domestic economic 
strategy which would allow the interest payment. This was the main objective of the 
IMF 'letter of intent'. The government would apply a specific economic strategy, and 
pay the debt, so that, it could receive fresh money from the Fund mainly to pay the 
interest of the debt. As the 1984 agreement was cancelled, Argentina began new 
negotiations with the Fund. For more details on the 'conditionality' of the IMF 
agreements see Mosley (1987) and Sachs (1989a). 
3 Interview with Adolfo Canitrot, 19-10-1993, Buenos Aires. 
4 Interview with Jose Luis Machinea, 25-10-1993, Buenos Aires. 
5 Interview with Adolfo Canitrot and Jose Luis Machinea, 19-10-1993 and 25-10- 
1993, respectively, Buenos Aires. 
6 Interview with Juan Sourrouille, 19-10-1993, Buenos Aires. 
Interview with Adolfo Canitrot, 19-10-1993, Buenos Aires. 
8 'Over-indexed' means that the increase of public service prices was above the 
inflation target. 
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9 Icy emphasis. 
10 Interview with Daniel Heyman, 10-9-1992, Buenos Aires. 
11A very useful work on this topic is Basualdo and Azpiazu (1990). 
12 Interview with Juan Sourrouille, 19-10-1993, Buenos Aires. 
13 In 1984 the volume of grains was 40 million (Sociedad Rural Argentina, 1992, 
p. 93). 1985 constituted a record which Argentina would not reach in the incoming 
years. 
14 Interview with Adolfo Canitrot and Jose Luis Machinea, 19-10-1993 and 25- 
10-1993, respectively, Buenos Aires. 
15 Interview with Adolfo Canitrot and Jose Luis Machinea, 19-10-1993 and 25- 
10-1993, respectively, Buenos Aires. 
16 Interview with Jose Luis Machinea, 25-10-1993, Buenos Aires. 
17 As explained above, during the presidential electoral campaign Alfonsin announced 
that some trade unionists had reached a pact with some military officials. They were 
the same trade unionists Alfonsin called to make a pact. 
18 In the transition to democracy, a new group of businessmen was created in 
opposition to the Consejo Empresario Argentino, a business organisation which had 
been closely connected to the military dictatorship. During the transition some 
businessmen understood that a democratic government would require a different 
form of business organisation. This group was known as Grupo de los nueve (Group 
of the nine). Its objective was to support industrial development in order to weaken 
the agricultural sector. The Grupo de los nueve declared its support for 
democratisation. The Grupo de los nueve was the antecedent of the Capitanes de la 
Industria (captains of industry). They were Manuel Gurmendi from ACINDAR (steel 
company), Ricardo Gruneisen from ASTRA (petrol and petrochemical companies), 
Jaime Nurlez from Bagley (food company), Sebastian Bagö from Laboratorios Bagö 
(pharmaceuticals), Julio Hofiman from BGH (electrical products), Carlos 
Bulgheroni from BRIDAS (GEN), Miguel Roig from Bunge y Born (multinational 
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company), Gerardo Cartellone from Carteillone (construction), Guillermo Kohl from 
Celulosa Jujuy (paper production) and SAAB Scania, Martin Blaquier from Ledesma 
(sugar company), Amalia Lacroze de Fortabat from Loma Negra (cement company), 
Francisco Macri from SEVEL (automobile company), Amin Massuh from Massuh 
(paper production), Vittorio Orsi from Perez Companc (GEN), Enrique Pescarmona 
from IMPSA/Pescarmona (GEN), Javier Gamboa from Alpargatas (textile company), 
and Roberto Rocca from Techint (multinational company). Alfonsin promoted and 
supported the Capitanes de la Industria. There was frequent communication between 
the Capitanes and the government. The Capitanes aim was to organise a group to 
influence the government. The Conse%o Empresario Argentino could not do this 
because of its links with the military dictatorship. The Capitanes wanted also to 
distance themselves from the 'liberal' point of view of the UTA. Both organisations, 
the UiA and the Consejo Empresario Argentino, were discredited due to their support 
of the military dictatorship. The Capitanes wanted to show that the bourgeoisie could 
prosper and be influential in a democracy. From Alfonsin's point of view, the 
Capitanes were a significant support. He wanted to integrate the bourgeoisie into the 
redemocratisation process. As the bourgeoisie had traditionally supported military 
coups, Alfonsin wanted to dispel the perception that democracy was against business. 
For more details see Ostiguy (1990), Sguiglia (1992), Majul (1992), and Acevedo 
et al (1990). 
19 Interview with Adolfo Canitrot and Jose Luis Machinea, 19-10-1993 and 25- 
10-1993, respectively, Buenos Aires. 
20 In 1986 Galtieri was given twelve years, Anaya fourteen, and Lami Dozo eight 
years for their responsibility in Argentina's defeat in the Malvinas war (Latin 
American Weekly Report, 9-5-1986, p. 2). 
21 Interview with Andres Fontana, 6-12-1993, Buenos Aires. 
22 In the Senate the bill was passed by 25 votes in favour, 10 votes against (8 
Peronist senators and the two representatives of the Movimiento Popular Neuquino) , 
11 Peronist senators did not attend. In the Chamber of Deputies the bill passed by 
126 votes in favour, 16 votes against and 1 abstention, 111 deputies did not attend. 
The absence of the Peronist deputes made it easier for the bill to be sanctioned with 
the two third required for its direct treatment. Therefore, in both Houses the 
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Peronist Party cooperated with the government to pass the bill (De Riz, 1991, p. 
24). 
23 The Air and Naval Force supported the democratic government but because they 
perceived that the rebellion was not an attempt to overthrow the democratic 
government but an internal problem of the Army, they did not want to repress the 
'rebels' (Clarin, 18-4-1987, p. 2). 
24 The law was passed in the Chamber of Deputies by 119 voted in favour and 59 
votes against. The Senate modified the law and passed it by 23 votes in favour and 4 
votes against. Finally, the Senate's modifications were passed by the Chamber of 
deputies by 125 votes in favour and 54 against (Acuha and Smulovitz, 1991, p. 20). 
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Chapter 6 
The downfall 
1987-1989 
Introduction 
After the failure of the Austral Plan and the September 1987 electoral defeat, 
the Radical government attempted to avoid an exacerbation of the economic crisis. 
Economically, the launching of the Plan Primavera was an attempt to temporarily 
stabilise the economy as a means to win the 1989 general elections. However, the 
Plan intensified the economic crisis mainly due to its policies discriminating against 
international creditors and agricultural exporters. With the collapse of the Plan, the 
economic crisis became a political crisis. In order to avoid the breakdown of 
democracy, Alfonsin resigned, bringing forward the presidential hand-over. 
In this context, the level of confrontation with the trade unions decreased. The 
CGT was more concerned over the internal elections of the Peronist Party. The 
sindicalismo peronista was divided; while the CGT supported Antonio Cafiero, 
governor of Buenos Aires province, the grupo de los 15 supported Carlos Menem, 
governor of La Rioja province. After Cafiero's defeat in the internal elections of the 
Peronist Party, the role of the CGT was neutralised. The grupo de los 15 and Carlos 
Menem criticised the CGT's confrontational policy. Thus, during the last two years of 
the Radical government the rote of the CGT was gradually undermined by the Peronist 
Presidential candidate, Carlos Menem. This explain the CGT's indifference during the 
hyperinflation process and the phase of wide-scale looting. 
Finally, two military rebellions and a guerrilla attack on an Army unit 
slightly modified the confrontation with the Armed Forces. The two military 
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rebellions were consequences of the Easter rebellion since their main objective was 
that the carapintadas not be judged for having disobeyed the Army's internal 
discipline. The guerrilla attack on an Army unit actually benefited the Armed forces, 
the latter being allow back to participate in the resolution of internal conflicts which 
was the basis of State Terrorism. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section analyses the 
economic crisis and the political causes of its intensification. The second section 
analyses the reason for the CGT's change of policy and its neutralisation by the 
Peronist Presidential candidate, Carlos Menem. The third section deals with the two 
military rebellions and the guerrilla attack, analysing their main causes and 
consequences. The fourth section concludes by briefly analysing the reasons for the 
intensification of the economic crisis and the downfall of Alfonsin's government. 
I. New Economic Measures 
After the failure of Grinspun's strategy and the Austral Plan, the Radical 
government had no economic strategy to resolve the economic situation. Rather it 
attempted to control the crisis by short-term measures. However, regarding the 
external debt, the government modified its policy. In April 1988 the government 
began to delay interest payments on the external debt. Although it did not declare a 
'unilateral moratorium', it announced its decision to suspend interest payments until 
after the 1989 general elections. This return to Grinspun's strategy confronted the 
government with Argentina's international creditors, intensifying the economic 
crisis. In this context, Alfonsin was forced to resign in order to avoid the political 
crisis ending in the collapse of democracy. 
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After the electoral defeat a new set of economic measures was applied: prices, 
wages, the exchange rate and public utility rates were all frozen. A two-tier market 
was implemented to eliminate the black market. This measure implied that the price 
of the dollar was, in the financial market, freely determined while, for commercial 
transactions, it was fixed by the Central Bank (La Naciön, 14-10-1987, p. 1). 
After the elections, crucial international support was obtained from the US 
government. Sourrouille managed to win the support of James Baker, Treasury 
Secretary and the World Bank for the new set of measures applied in October. A 
bridge loan of US$ 1.95 billion in fresh funds was announced in Washington by the 
Chairman of the creditors' steering committee (Latin American Weekly Report, 8- 
10-1987, p. 4). This credit gave a breathing-space for Alfonsin's government after 
its electoral defeat. 
As a consequence of the October measures, by the end of December, the 
inflation rate was 3 per cent -in October it had reached 20 per cent. The freeze was 
abandoned however when the exchange rate was devalued by 7.5 per cent. In order to 
avoid distortions of relative prices the freeze had to be abandoned due to the large 
fiscal deficit of the public sector -this was 6.3 per cent of GDP for the last quarter 
of the year (Machinea, 1990, p. 69). 
The first half of 1988 proved the government's inability to, once again, 
reduce the fiscal deficit, to prevent increases in the inflation rate, and to reach an 
agreement with the IMF and the commercial banks. Regarding the latter, due to 
Argentina's incapacity to meet the IMF's target for 1987 -that, is the reduction of 
the fiscal deficit to 1.14 per cent of GDP for the last quarter of the year (Clarin, 
11-7-1987, p. 2)- the Fund stopped a withdrawal of US$ 225 million. In January 
after several meetings between the government and the IMF staff, an agreement could 
not be reached. The main disagreement was over Argentina's efforts to bring down the 
fiscal deficit. The negotiations broke the stalemate after the January 1988 military 
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rebellion. The IMF changed its position in order to demonstrate its support for 
democracyl . Thus, after the rebellion, in February, an agreement with the IMF was 
achieved. The agreement was based on periodical increases in public utility rates as 
well as the establishment of new taxes in order to reduce the fiscal deficit (Clarin, 
15-2-1988, p. 2). 
In April 1988, Argentina suspended the interest payments. The Radical 
government after four and a half years in office decided to 'unilaterally' suspended 
the service of the debt without declaring a 'unilateral moratorium'. The government 
suspended the payments mainly due to a very low level of international reserves, 
which was by the end of 1987 around US$ 1 billion (Machinea, 1990, p. 70). This 
low level was caused by the large current account deficit of 19872 and the delays in 
the disbursements from the commercial banks (Machinea, 1990, p. 69). As 
explained above, the Radical government implemented this strategy of delaying 
interest payments at the beginning of 1984 when the level of international reserves 
was also US$ 1 billion. By mid-1984 they stood at US$ 3.5 billion. Therefore, one 
of the main objectives of the 1988 de facto moratorium was to increase the level of 
international reserves which, as I will explain below, was essential for the 
launching of the Primavera Plan. 
In order to avoid a confrontation with the international creditors, the 
government did not declare a 'unilateral moratorium', but continuing negotiations. 
Thus, the de facto moratorium was never presented as a political issue, rather it was 
explained as being based on economic difficulties. However, the launching of the 
Primavera Plan explained that the de facto moratorium was preparing the ground for 
measures to be applied in the exchange market. 
By this time, the increase in public utility rates -which reached 22 per cent 
from February to March (Clarin, 9-4-2988, p. 17)-, the rise in the international 
prices of grains3, and the uncertainty in the exchange market because of the low 
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level of international reserves caused an acceleration of the inflation rate due to 
their effect on the fiscal deficit. From January to March the CPI went from 9.1 to 
14.7, and from April to August went from 17.2,15.7,18,25.6 to 27.6 per cent 
(Ambito Financiero, 8-7-1988, p. 2 and 8-9-1988, p. 1). 
On the 9th of July internal elections were held in the Peronist Party. Carlos 
Menem`, governor of La Rioja province, became the Presidential candidate of the 
Peronist Party in opposition to the candidature of Antonio Cafiero, governor of 
Buenos Aires province (Clarin, 11- 7-1988, p. 1). This meant that the campaign 
for the general elections of 1989 began approximately one and a half year earlier 
than the date of the elections. The campaign was focused mainly on the economic 
situation, and both candidates, from the ruling party and the opposition, criticised 
the economic team and the President himself. After the internal elections of the 
Peronist Party, the Radical government, in its last attempt to resolve the economic 
crisis and win the 1989 general elections, implemented a new set of economic 
measures. 
! l. The Primavera Plan 
The Plan Primavera, launched at the beginning of August, was based on a 
price agreement with the UTA and the Camara Argentina de Comercio (Argentinian 
Chamber of Commerce, CAC) to be periodically renewed. In order to obtain the UIA's 
support, the government made some concessions. VAT was reduced from 18 to 15 per 
cent which represented a total revenue loss of 0.5 per cent of GDP. The Plan included 
a price agreement for 180 days, a devaluation of the austral against the dollar by 
11.4 per cent, and an increase in the public utility rates of 30 per cent. The 
wholesale prices could be increased by 5 per cent until the end of September. Public 
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utility rates would remain unchanged until the end of September. In October they 
would increase by 3 per cent, and afterwards they would be indexed at slightly below 
the inflation rate (Ambito Financiero, 4-8-1988, p. 1). 
Although the two-tier market continued, some changes were implemented: the 
imports and private interest payments would be paid by the free market, the 
proceeds from agricultural exports and 50 per cent of the proceeds from industrial 
exports by the official market, and the other 50 per cent would be sold in the free 
market. The Central Bank's strategy was that the gap between both exchange rates 
should not be larger than 25 per cent and that, in order to maintain it, the Bank 
would use monetary policy. The exchange rate system implied a tax on agricultural 
products which was going to be collected by the Central Bank, buying dollars at the 
official exchange rate and selling them in the free market. The tax was equivalent to 
the difference between the exchange rates in both markets (Ambito Financiero, 4- 8- 
1988, p. 1). The government decided this policy due to its promise of not increasing 
taxes on agricultural exports. However, as the two-tier market implied a tax, the 
agricultural sector did not support the Plan (Ambito Financiero, 4-8-1988, p. 1). 
i. The World Bank's support: Argentina's lifeline 
The Alfonsin administration obtained the support of the World Bank for the 
Plan Primavera through an unprecedented loan package. The President of the World 
Bank, Barber Conable, went to Buenos Aires to negotiate the loan and to support the 
plan pointing out that "Argentina is implementing a programme which can be 
beneficial for the people of that country" (Latin American Weekly Report, 29-9- 
1988, p. 3). At the September meeting of the IMF and the World Bank, held in 
Berlin, Mr. Conable announced his decision to recommend US$1.25 billion in new 
loans for Argentina (Ambito Financiero, 26-9-1988, p. 1). This announcement was 
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highly controversial because the loan was approved before Argentina had reached an 
agreement with the IMF. 
The Financial Times (27-9-1988, p. 4) pointed out that, regarding the debt 
problem, this loan would change the relationship between both institutions. It argued 
that, in the Argentinian case, the World Bank was taking the lead, incorporating in 
the agreement some macroeconomic conditions which were usual in an IMF letter of 
intent. In the Financial Times' words, the World Bank was 'usurping' the role of the 
IMF. The newspaper suggested that this was a result of pressure from the US 
government: "the US administration anxious for the debt crisis not to blow up during 
the election period has pushed the World Bank into this more central role" 
(Financial Times, 27-9-1988, p. 4). This was also suggested by The Economist 
(11-3-1989, p. 20), which also highlighted that the support which Argentina 
obtained from the World Bank was unusual, considering that the country was, as a 
borrower, as 'bad' as any. The article also emphasised that this agreement was made 
with the country which, since 1982, had re-scheduled its debt three times and taken 
US$ 7.7 billion in new cash from the banks. It also pointed out that the agreement 
with the World Bank was based only on Argentina's promise to reduce its fiscal 
deficit from 4.6 per cent of GDP to 2.4 per cent for 1989. 
It was suggested (Latin American Regional Reports Southern Cone, 1988, 
17-11-1988, p. 5) that the US government put pressure on the World Bank to 
support the Radical administration, fearing the possibility of a Peronist victory in 
the approaching general elections. Machinea, who was then President of the Central 
Bank, points out (1990, p. 125) that the 1988 agreement "produced frictions 
among some developed countries and inside the US government, as well as a lot of 
trouble to some members of the World Bank". There were two different sides within 
the US government. On the one hand, George Schultz, Secretary of State, and James 
Baker, Secretary of the Treasury wanted to support Argentina's democracy and 
Alfonsin's government. They put pressure on the World Bank to grant the September 
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loan. On the other hand, David Muldford, Under-Secretary of the Treasury, and 
Michel Camdessus, Director of the IMF, and the commercial banks, were against such 
agreement on the grounds that from April 1988, Argentina stopped paying interest 
(Morales Solä, 1990, p. 41). The commercial banks soon gave a reply to the World 
Bank's attitude. In October the Chase Manhattan Bank announced that it would 
transfer US$ 550 million of Argentina's credit to the 'non-performing category' - 
that is that Chase recognised that this money would not be paid back. After this, some 
other commercial banks threatened to do the same if Argentina did not suspend its 'de 
facto moratorium' (Morales Solä, 1990, p. 41). However, this did not affect 
Argentina's international position due to the World Bank's support. 
Turning to the domestic sphere, the Primavera Plan initially performed 
better than expected as the CPI went from 11.7 per cent in September to 6.8 per 
cent in December (Ambito Financiero, 11-1-1989, p. 4). The price agreement with 
the UTA and the CAC was renewed. The exchange market seemed under the government 
control. The Central Bank increased its reserves due to the mechanism implemented 
through the exchange market. Likewise, from September the government began to 
implement reductions on tariffs, starting to open up Argentina's economy as had been 
agreed with the World Bank (Ambito Financiero, 5-9-1988, p. 1). 
In October, with the better performance of the economy and international 
support, the government announced that the general elections would take place on the 
14th of May (Ambito Financiero, 8-9-1988, p. 1). This meant there would be 
considerable time between the elections and the Presidential change-over which 
would be held on the 1 0th of December. The earlier positive results of the Plan and 
its international support was the main reason why the government decided such a 
long transition (Alfonsin, 1992, p. 8). The government knew the limits of the Plan 
and after May an electoral defeat would have been highly probable. Therefore, the 
main political objective of the Primavera Plan was to stabilise the economy in order 
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to win the 1989 general elections. In this sense, the de facto moratorium was also a 
tool to win the elections by improving the economic situation. 
November was the best period of the Spring Plan. The CPI was 5.7 per cent 
and the WPI was only 3.9 per cent (Ambito Financiero, 11-1-1989, p. 4). 
However, in the exchange market the situation was not so good. Between August and 
November the official dollar was adjusted by only 7.98 per cent while the inflation 
rate was 58.2 per cent (Garfunkel, 1990, p. 38). The atraso cambiario -the 
overvaluation of the austral- was the focus of criticism of the Plan and would later 
provoke its abandonment. The atraso was strongly criticised by the agricultural 
sector and the exporters since they had to deal with a low dollar (compared with the 
black market dollar) and the domestic inflation rate. 
By the time of the implementation of the Primavera Plan, the economic team 
had lost direction, but they did not leave the government due to their loyalty to 
Alfonsin, who did not have any other economic team to replace them5. A6, -maid, the 
main objective of the Plan was to control short-term variables in order to win the 
general election. International support from the World Bank was essential to obtain 
domestic credibility. Indeed, the exchange market mechanism was very risky, even 
though international support was supposed to enable the Central Bank to maintain the 
level of international reserves. The US government and World Bank appeared to be 
Alfonsin's lifeline. 
However, in January 1989, due to Argentina's inability to meet the World 
Bank's target, the Bank announced that the disbursement of US$ 350 million 
scheduled for the end of February would not take place (Ambito Financiero, 3-3- 
1989, p. 1). The 'unprecedented' loan became a dead letter. The government thereby 
lost its international 'lifeline'. The reasons why the World Bank and the US 
government left Argentina without support were, mainly, the Presidential change in 
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the US, and Menem's international campaign to change his image, lead by a Peronist 
MP and one of his economic advisers, Domingo Cavallo6 
Under the Bush administration, Nicholas Brady was appointed Secretary of 
the Treasury and David Muldford was confirmed as Under-Secretary. James Baker 
replaced George Schultz as Secretary of State. These changes, together with the power 
vacuum created as a result of the change of administration, undermined the US 
government's support for Alfonsin. The Wall Street Journal (18- 5- 1989, p. 10) 
stated that it was not so clear whether the change in US policy was a political decision 
or the consequence of the US Presidential change. In addition, Domingo Cavallo, a 
Harvard economist, began an external campaign on behalf of the Peronist candidate, 
especially in Washington, to modify Menern's image. He was to convince US policy- 
makers that the Menem Presidency would not be 'dangerous' either for the US 
government or for the commercial banks. He also had to prove that the loans asked 
for by Alfonsin had an electoral objective (Morales Sold, 1990,51). In other words, 
Cavallo aimed to prepare a favourable international context for a Peronist victory. 
He was, at least in part, successful and the international support given to Alfonsin's 
government -mainly from the World Bank- weakened. Morales Solä suggests (1990, 
p. 51) that Cavallo's mission undermined Alfonsin's international support by 
clarifying Menem's strategy -which rather than being 'dangerous' would become a 
guarantee for the international creditors and the US government. 
By this time, the President of the Central Bank, Machinea, announced that 
Argentina would not pay the arrears of the debt until an IMF agreement had been 
reached. He criticised Peronist contacts with international creditors -especially 
bankers- arguing that if the Radical government was not forced to pay the arrears, a 
Peronist government would adopt the same policy of delaying payments (Ambito 
Financiero, 6-2-1989, p. 4). Cavallo, who made these 'Peronist contacts', affirmed 
that while the government delayed interest payments, it was 'wasting' Argentina's 
international reserves in trying to control the exchange market. He confirmed that a 
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Peronist government would not service these arrears (Ambito Financiero, 6-2- 
1989, p. 4). The electoral campaign was also played out in New York and 
Washington. This Peronist attitude became crucial. 
indeed, Carlos Menem was the most probable victour in the approaching 
general elections yet, despite the international and national efforts to modify his 
image, his economic strategy was unclear, apart from two slogans: a salariazo (a 
massive wage increase) and a revoluciön productiva (a productive revolution) 
(Ambito Financiero, 27-2-1989, p. 1). Uncertainty over the general elections and 
the ambiguity of the Menem's economic positions, together with the precariousness 
and vulnerability of the economic situation, unleashed a run on the austral to the 
dollar at the end of January. Nevertheless, the crucial element was, once again, the 
international creditors. 
As said above, US government and World Bank support were Alfonsin`s 
lifeline. Therefore, when both adopted a 'hands off' approach, Argentina's economy 
began to collapse. The instability of the economic situation together with the normal 
uncertainty provoked by general elections, could have been controlled if the World 
Bank had not suspended its loan. Without this international support, it was assumed 
that the Central Bank could not maintain the exchange rate mechanism. Uncertainty 
over a 'dollarised' economy unleashed a run on the austral. 
ii. Argentina's Black Monday 
In order to maintain the gap between the two exchange rates, the Central Bank 
sold US$ 12.1 million in December, US$ 668.1 million in January and US$ 242.3 
million in the first three days of February (Garfunkel, 1990, p. 82). From the 
30th of January to the 3rd of February, the Central Bank lost US$ 495 million. At 
the last week-day of the Plan Primavera, the commercial dollar was 14.06 australes 
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and on the black market, 17.67 australes (Garfunkel, 1990, p. 82). It was then that 
the government decided to change the exchange market. The 6th of February marked 
the end of the Spring Plan and the beginning of the end of the Radical government. 
Black Monday resulted in big losses for important enterprises7 which, 
following the advice of some of the members of the economic team, did not abandon the 
austral, believing that the international reserves of the Central Bank were high 
enough to maintain the exchange market system. They were not the only losers. The 
other side of the coin shows that the austral was devalued 60 per cent in only 26 
days, thereby depreciating the salary of the workers (Garfunkel, 1990, p. 32). 
The reasons why the Spring Plan collapsed were firstly, the end of the World 
Bank's support, secondly, a run against the austral due to the approaching elections 
and the uncertainty of the economic strategy of Carlos Menem, and finally, the 
reluctance of exporters to sell foreign exchange, speculating on an adjustment of the 
exchange market. The chaos provoked by the end of the Plan was, mainly, caused by 
the reluctance from the exporters to sell foreign exchange which provoked an 
indefinite rise of the dollar because demand was rising and supply was lacking. The 
exporters no longer wanted to pay the cost of the combination of an inflation rate of 
81.5 per cent from August 1988 to January 1989 with an adjustment of the 
commercial dollar of only 17.17 per cent for the same period (Garfunkel, 1990, p. 
41). The Central Bank continued losing reserves while exporters did not sell foreign 
exchange, expecting a new exchange market modification and speculating with the 
next government's strategies. Exporters began to sell foreign exchange in 
Montevideo, Uruguay (Clarin, 27-2-1989, p. 10). 
While dollar supply was very low, its demand was excessively high. A 
government research paper explained that some of the most powerful banks were 
buying dollars, making demand rise. These banks had as customers the most 
important transnational companies operating in Argentina. According to this 
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document, the Republic of New York Bank bought US$35 million; the French Bank, 
US$24; Morgan, US$24; Citibank, US$20; Chase Manhattan, US$8; and among the 
national banks, Credito Argentino bought US$14 million, and Provincia de Buenos 
Aires, US$7 (Majul, 1990, p. 19). From the government's point of view, this was a 
strategy of Argentina's international creditors, mainly the commercial banks, to 
undermine the precarious stability reached by the Spring Plan and prove that - 
whoever governs- Argentina had to pay its debt in order to attain any permanent 
stability. 
The exchange market modification of February attempted to minimise the 
impact of the 'run' against the austral on prices. The new exchange market 
determined that the exchange rate for all commercial transactions would be set by 
the government while the financial transactions would operate in the free market 
(Ambito Financiero, 7-2-1989, p. 1). There was a commercial dollar (14.41 
australes) for agricultural exports, a special dollar (18.01 australes) for imports 
and a free dollar which was estimated by the government to be 20 per cent over the 
special dollar (Garfunkel, 1990, p. 83). In a few days the free dollar jumped 45 per 
cent, reaching 27 australes. It also jumped and fell 12 per cent in only one day, with 
margins of 26 per cent between the purchase and the sale (Garfunkel, 1990,87). 
These oscillations represented a spectacular wealth transfer within the private 
sector and between the private sector and the state. 
At the end of February, new measures were implemented in the exchange 
market. 80 per cent of the proceeds from agricultural exports were to be sold in the 
commercial market, and 20 per cent in the free market; of those from the industrial 
exports, 30 per cent would be sold in the commercial market, 50 per cent in the 
special one and 20 per cent in the free market (Ambito Financiero, 21-2-1989, p. 
1). Despite the measure, the run against the austral and the strengthening of the 
dollar continued. 
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The price agreement between the government, the UTA and the CAC was broken 
by the unilateral decision of the government to allow an increase of 7.5 per cent 
(Ambito Financiero, 24-2-1989, p 1). The government's decision was not so 
different from the previous agreement. However the unilateralism of the decision 
was a good excuse for the U [A and CAC to break the agreement (Päginafl 2,1-3- 
1989, p. 1). Soon after, Terrabusi, an enterprise belonging to Gilberto Montagna, a 
representative of UTA in the team which negotiated the previous agreement, increased 
its prices by 30 per cent (Majul, 1990, p. 49). 
Despite the run against the austral, the CPI was 8.9 per cent in January and 
9.6 per cent in February and the WPI, 6.9 per cent and 8.3 per cent, respectively 
(Ambito Financiero, 7-3-1989, p. 5). 
At the end of March, when the dollar reached 48.40 australes (Ambito 
Financiero, 30-3-1988, p. 1), Eduardo Angeloz, the Presidential Candidate of the 
Radical Party, publicly demanded the resignation of the economic team (Ambito 
Financiero, 30-3-1989, p. 12). After four years in office, Sourrouille and his 
team left Alfonsin's government. Sourrouille's letter of resignation stated that his 
failure was mainly based on the lack of a political and social pact to neutralise the 
actions of those who wanted to obstruct an economic reform and the stabilisation of 
the economy (Ambito Financiero, 3-4-1989, p. 1). However, such a political and 
social pact was never the government's objective. As explained, the concertaciön 
attempt was interrupted by the government's unilateral decision to implement the 
Austral Plan. Moreover, the Radical government did not fully attempt to implement 
an economic reform. While it did intend to stabilise the economy through the Austral 
Plan, this was, as said, not a comprehensive economic reform program. Therefore, 
as Sourrouille put it "those who wanted to obstruct an economic reform and the 
stabilisation of the economy" were, in fact, asking for a specific economic reform: 
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the 'monetarist' restructuring of the state and of its relation to the economy. This 
was sought mainly by Argentina's international creditors and the upper bourgeoisie. 
After four years as a member of the economic team, Machinea stated that 'the 
external debt is unpayable' (Pägina/12,19-3-1989, p. 6). He affirmed that the 
interest payments represented 7 per cent of the GDP. Argentina, under the Radical 
government, had paid only 50 per cent of the interest, refinancing the rest. He 
argued that for the middle- and long-term the only solution was a unilateral 
moratorium, however this measure was highly risky for the short-term 
('Päginall2,19-3-1989, p. 7). From Machinea's point of view, Argentina's main 
economic problem was the payment of the external debt which constrained 
Argentina's economy. As the debt was viewed as a fiscal problem (Pagina/12,19-3- 
1989, p. 7), the 'only' solution to it was a restructuring of the state. Thus, the 'only' 
solution seemed to be the implementation of the monetarist approach of the 
'Washington consensus', since the Radical government had no viable strategy. 
iii. The political significance of Black Monday 
Black Monday was the event which signalled that the economic crisis had 
become a political one. As the Radical government proved unable to resolve the crisis 
of the Argentinian state, the crisis deepened and class struggle intensified. By this 
time, the state appeared to "all social forces as the primary barrier to the resolution 
of the crisis and the realisation of their particular aspirations" (Clarke, 1990, p. 
27). Black Monday was provoked to show that the 'monetarist' restructuring of the 
state was inevitable. It was provoked by the 'hands off approach of the international 
creditors, the reluctance of agricultural exporters to sell the proceeds from exports, 
and the run against the austral unleashed by the banks. The objective of these groups 
was to demonstrate that the incoming government -either from the ruling party or 
the Peronist Party- had to resolve the crisis of the Argentinian state by a 
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'monetarist' restructuring. That is, to fully apply an orthodox IMF program whose 
main measures were "fiscal discipline and the reduction of some public expenditures 
such as subsidies, tax reform, market-determined interest rates, competitive 
exchange rate, import liberalisation, promotion of foreign direct investment, 
privatisation, deregulation, and new laws on property rights" (Williamson, 1989, 
p. 1). This was the set of policies promoted by the 'Washington consensus'. These 
market oriented policies would resolve the political crisis of the state by 
restructuring both the state and the working class. It was, thus, to deepen the 
military dictatorship's disciplinamiento social by subordinating the working class 
economically and politically. Thus, Black Monday, together with the consequences 
which provoked A'ifonsin`s resignation, was the price that the Radical government 
paid due to the non-implementation of an IMF plan. That is, it was the result of the 
government's reluctance to apply a 'monetarist' restructuring of the state and of its 
class relations. Black Monday also represented a redistribution of income against the 
working class, since the devaluation of the austral constituted a depreciation of 
wages. 
iv. Argentina after Sourrouille 
In April, Juan Carlos Pugiiese, a veteran member of the Radical Party, who 
had been Minister of Economy under Illia's administration, was appointed to replace 
Juan Sourrouilie. Enrique Garcia Väzquez was again appointed as President of the 
Central Bank (Ambito Financiero, 3-4-1989, p. 1). Due to the pressure of the 
exporters and the low level of international reserves, the exchange market was 
modified to an exchange rate system where 50 per cent of goods transactions would 
operate in the free market. This implied a devaluation of 60 per cent for agricultural 
exports, and that import and food prices would be tied daily to the exchange rate 
oscillations (Ambito Financiero, 5-4-1989, p. 1). Thus, inflation accelerated. 
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Interest rates increased to 100 per cent per month. By the end of April, nothing 
could stop the rise of the dollar which reached 90 australes (Garfunkel, 1990, p. 
143). The CPI was 33.4 per cent in April and the WPI was 58 per cent (Ambito 
Financiero, 5-5-1989, p. 1). 
After two weeks, the exchange market was again modified. The proceeds from 
all the exports were sold in the free market with a deduction determined by the 
difference between the free dollar and the dollar fixed daily by the government - 
which was, at the beginning, determined at 36 australes (Ambito Financiero, 14-4- 
1989, p. 1). 
The Grupo de los Ocho 8 proposed to the government a set of economic 
measures which had two main pillars: an improvement for exporters and the 
reduction of the fiscal deficit. Rumours that Roberto Alemann would be appointed 
Minister of Economy appeared9. A meeting was held between Alfonsin and the 
representatives of the Grupo de los Ocho (Ambito Financiero, 27-4-1989, p. 1) The 
outcome of this meeting was a new economic plan. Prices were frozen and public 
utility rates increased by 20 per cent. The exchange market underwent the most 
"expected` 0 and crucial modification: its unification and liberalisation (Ambito 
Financiero, 27-4-1989, p. 1). 
The general elections took place the 14th of May. Carlos Menem won the 
elections with 41 per cent of the total vote cast, the Radical candidate 37 per cent 
(Clarin, 15-5-1989, p. 1). 
Five days after the general elections, the dollar reached 175 australes 
(Ambito Financiero, 19-5-1989, p. 1). The government tried to achieve an 
agreement with the Peronist Party to accelerate the Presidential change-over, 
scheduled for 10th December. These negotiations failed: Peronism did not want to be 
seen cooperating with the government. After winning the general election, Menem had 
announced some modifications to his economic strategy. Most notably, he now 
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proposed the unification of the exchange market, the reduction of export taxes and the 
payment of the external debt (Ambito Financiero, 4-4-1989, p. 9). These three 
policies were mainly the demands of those actors who had opposed Alfonsin. The 
unification of the exchange rate and the reduction of export taxes were demands from 
the agricultural and industrial sectors, while the payment of the external debt was, 
of course, demanded by the international creditors. Menem went from proposing a 
salariazo (massive wage increase) and a revoluciön productiva (productive 
revolution) to these new announcements which showed that the incoming Peronist 
government had understood the true objectives of Black Monday. The Peronist 
government would begin the 'monetarist' restructuring of the state and its class 
relations. 
As Pugliese could not stop the run against the austral he was replaced by 
Jesus Rodriguez (Ambito Financiero, 26-5-1989, p. 1), a young man from the 
Coordinadora -the internal faction of the Radical Party that, despite foreseeing a 
defeat, was still loyal to Alfonsin. Soon after taking office, Rodriguez implemented a 
new set of measures to be applied after 10 days suspension of most banking activity. 
Exchange rate control was re-applied, a crawling peg was announced, the export tax 
was fixed at 35 per cent for agricultural goods and 20 per cent for industrial goods 
and public utility rates were adjusted. The Congress approved new taxes which 
included the suspension of industrial promotion benefits. The exchange rate was fixed 
at 177 australes per dollar (Ambito Financiero, 29-5-1989, p. 1). 
During the first ten days of the Rodriguez plan hyper-inflation was at its 
peak. Price lists in dollar terms, purchases with dollars notes, non-acceptance of 
credit cards, daily increases of prices, the closure of shops due to the impossibility 
of determining prices, workers unable to go to work because the transport cost was 
almost 90 per cent of their salary, and looting were some of the main features of the 
hyper-inflation process. 
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From the 24th to the 31st of May the looting became the principal political 
issue (Ambito Financiero, 31-5-1989, p. 1). Looting was spontaneous. It took place 
mainly in Rosario, Cordoba, Mendoza and Greater Buenos Aires. The government 
established a state of siege for 30 days in an attempt to prevent an escalation of 
violence (Ambito Financiero, 30-5-1989, p. 1). Initially looting was non-violent, 
women and children merely taking food from supermarkets. However, in Rosario 
violence increased as shop owners began defending themselves with guns. The police 
had to be helped by the Gendarmeria (Frontier Police Corps) to prevent an 
escalation of violence at Rosario. Bombs in 'the City' at Buenos Aires, in some Radical 
Party's offices and some Communist Party's offices provoked panic. Violence 
increased in Greater Buenos Aires, six people died in San Miguel and approximately 
eighty were injured. In Rosario five people died and hundreds were arrested (Clarin, 
1-6-1989, p. 2). 
The looting was the workers' reaction to hyperinflation. While the 
bourgeoisie was speculating against the austral, making prices rise, the workers 
were trying to 'survive'. The looting was the other side of Black Monday. It showed 
workers' reaction to Black Monday's redistribution of income. It also showed the 
capacity of the working class to defend its interest independently from the trades 
union movement: the CGT did not call a general strike nor did it organise a social 
demonstration. As I will analyse below the CGT was more concerned with the 
approaching general elections than with the workers situation. Despite this, the 
workers organised themselves to demonstrate that they would not passively accept 
any economic strategy. Black Monday and the looting were the two sides of the income 
distribution struggle in Argentina. They represented the intensification of 
Argentina's class struggle. 
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v. Hyperinflation 
In the first week of June the dollar reached 370 australes, the monthly 
interest rate was over 100 per cent, the CPI for May was 78.5 per cent and the WPI 
was 103.7 per cent (Ambito Financiero, 8-7-1989, p. 1). These were records even 
for Argentina's history of high inflation. 
The Economist (13-5-1989, p. 95) pointed out that 
"At first sight it seems ridiculous to argue that it might do 
a country good to have, like Argentina, a collapsing 
currency and a monthly inflation rate of more than 40 per 
cent. That is equivalent to an annual rate of 6000 per cent, 
high enough to satisfy the most stringent definition of 
'hyperinflation' (... ) High-but-stable inflation, though 
extremely damaging, is tolerable (... ) Hyperinflation, on 
the other hand, is intolerable. At the limit, money ceases to 
mean anything and transactions are conducted in foreign 
currency, or by barter. As the economy opts out of the 
domestic monetary system the government has a chance to 
start afresh. In the midst of a real crisis (as opposed to the 
countless phoney crises that preceded it), the government 
is more likely to be believed. If an election and a change of 
government is in the offing at just the right time, so much 
the better". 
Argentina seemed to be, according to The Economist, at the right time and at 
the right stage. Domingo Cavaifol 1, who had been appointed by the elected President, 
Carlos Menem, as Foreign Affairs Minister, agreed with The Economist's point of 
view. Cavallo advised Menem not to establish an agreement with the Radical 
government which would undermine Menem's public image. Cavallo thought, as The 
Economist suggested, that after the hyperinflation process, the Peronist government 
would be able to apply the, in his opinion, necessary adjustment. Machinea (1990, 
p. 118) also points out that one of the alternatives could have been to let the 
237 
situation explode in order to introduce a completely new program afterwards. 
However, he states that for the government this was not a viable option since 
hyperinflation was considered as one of the greatest dangers for the consolidation of 
democracy. He suggests that after hyperinflation -considering also the general 
political and social situation- the Radical government would not have the necessary 
credibility to implement a new economic strategy. 
By June, it was clear that the government could not deal with the economic, 
social and political aspects of the crisis. Alfonsin began a negotiation process to move 
forward the Presidential hand-over. When Alfonsin and Menem's team were 
discussing the new date, one of Menem advisors announced that a very high exchange 
rate would be fixed under the Peronist administration (Päginall2,11-6-1989, p. 
3). This provoked a new run against the austral. As Menem did not deny this 
statement, Alfonsin interrupted the negotiation process. On the 12th of June, 
Alfonsin announced that he would resign from the 30th of June (Clarin, 13-7- 
1989, p. 2-3). 
Ill. Alfonsin's economic legacy 
Alfonsin's downfall began in September 1987 when the Radical party lost the 
elections. The government's incapacity to resolve the economic crisis was the cause 
of its fall. Under Alfonsin, GDP never reached its 1980 level, which represented a 
fall of 71 per cent from the 1974 level. Table n° 8 shows the performance of the 
Gross Domestic Product under the democratic regime. 
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Table n2 8 
Gross Domestic Product 
(1980=100) 
1 981 93.6 
1 982 88.8 
1983 91.5 
1984 93.9 
1985 89.8 
1986 94.9 
1987 97.0 
1988 94.5 
1989 90.2 
Source: Sociedad Rural Argentina (1992) Indicadores (Buenos Aires: Sociedad Rural 
Argentina). 
In addition to the fall from 1974 to 1980, under Alfonsin GDP fell a further 
10 per cent. Moreover, after the failure of the Austral Plan the Radical government 
could not prevent price increases. In June 1989, the last month of Alfonsin's 
administration, the CPI was 114.5 per cent and the WPI, 132.3 per cent. In the last 
twelve months the first index reached 1472 per cent and the second, 1983 per cent. 
Table n2 9 shows the price evolution under Alfonsin administration. 
Table n° 9 
Price indices 
(from December to December) 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
CPI 688.0 385.4 81.9 174.8 387.7 4923.8 
WPI 585.0 363.9 57.9 181.8 431.6 5386.4 
Source: CEPAL (1991) Notas sobre la evoluciön de la economfa argentina en 1990, 
Doc. de Trabajo n° 39 (Buenos Aires: CEPAL). 
The table demonstrates that the best performance was in the first year of the 
Plan Austral. As soon as the plan was abandoned prices begun to rise. Regarding the 
fiscal deficit, the table confirms this tendency. 
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Table n° 10 
Fiscal Deficit as a percentage of GDP 
1 984 1 2.5 
1985 5.4 
1 986 4.3 
1987 6.4 
1988 6.4 
Source: Argentinian Central Bank (Banco Central de la Republica Argentina), 
unpublished data. 
The fiscal deficit also began to rise after dropping 65.6 per cent between 
1984 and 1986. As indicated earlier, one of the causes of this rise was the 
increasing interest payments on the external debt. 
Table n° 11 
External debt (US$ million) 
1984 46903 
1985 49326 
1986 51422 
1987 54700 
1988 57000 
Source: Argentinian Central Bank (Banco Central de la Republica Argentina), 
unpublished data. 
Table n2 12 
Total debt as a percentage of Gross National Product 
1 984 67.5 
1 985 84.2 
1986 70.5 
1987 76.4 
1988 66.5 
1989 121.9 
Source: Organizaciön de Estados Americanos (1992) Boletfn Estadistico de la OEA, 
vol II, n° 1-2, January-December 1992 (Washington: OEA, Departamento de 
Asuntos Econömicos y Sociales). 
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Table n° 13 
Interest paid as a percentage of Gross National Product 
1 984 5.8 
1 985 8.4 
1986 5.8 
1987 5.3 
1988 3.5 
1989 4.0 
Source: Organizaciön de Estados Americanos (1992) Boletfn Estadistico de la OEA, 
vol II, n° 1-2, January-'December 1992 (Washington: OEA, Departamento de 
Asuntos Econömicos y Sociales). 
As these tables demonstrate, Argentina's growth potential was severely 
constrained by the servicing of the external debt. The Austral Plan contained 
inflation and the fiscal deficit, but after its abandonment no substitute measures 
were found to stem the worsening economic crisis and the deteriorating in workers' 
conditions. 
Table n° 14 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Source: Banco Central de la 
(Buenos Aires: BCRA). 
Real wages by sector 
1986=100 
Private Sector 
115.83 
112.45 
100.00 
92.06 
88.74 
72.23 
Repü'biica Argentina 
Public Sector 
119.51 
107.05 
100.00 
92.26 
92.73 
84.84 
(1992) Indicadores Econömicos 
As shown above, the CPI and the WPI indexes increased after the failure of the 
Austral, which, together with the decrease in real wages, produced a decline in the 
workers purchasing power. 
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Table n215 
Purchasing Power by sector 
(1986=100) 
Private Sector Public Sector 
1984 101.62 105.29 
1985 98.50 100.17 
1986 100.00 100.00 
1987 89.63 89.78 
1988 81.40 84.98 
1989 64.63 67.95 
Source: Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (1992) Indicadores EconOmicos 
(Buenos Aires: BCRA). 
From 1986 to 1987 the purchasing power fell by 10.37 per cent for the 
private sector and 10.22 per cent for the public sector. This shows that the 
disciplinamiento social achieved by the military dictatorship was intensified under 
the democratic government. Although the democratic government could not politically 
subordinate the working class, it maintained its economic subordination. Indeed, the 
unemployment and underemployment rates confirm that the democratic government 
did not improve the workers' situation. 
Table n° 16 
Unemployment -1- and underemployment12 -2- rates 
(October each year) 
1 981 1 982 1 983 1 984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
1 5.3 4.6 3.9 4.4 5.9 5.2 5.7 6.1 7.1 
2 6.0 6.4 5.9 5.9 7.1 7.4 8.5 8.0 8.6 
Source: Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (1992) Indicadores Econömicos 
(Buenos Aires: BCRA). 
After the democratic government one dollar cost 560 australes. After Black 
Monday, it rose by 3069 per cent. The interest rate was 84.36 per cent per month. 
The internal debt was US$ 3000 million, US$ 2000 million of bank reserves and 
US$ 1000 million of government bonds. The external debt was US$ 67000 million 
and the arrears on interest payments reached US$ 6500 million (Majul, 1990, p. 
249). 
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Domestic investment declined from an average of 21.4 per cent of GDP in the 
1970s to 12.2 per cent in 1988. Subsidies from the state to the private sector - 
such as industrial promotion or tax exemption- represented US$ 3134 million per 
year (Verbitsky, 1990, p. 102). The industrial sector's physical output declined by 
11.9 per cent from 1974 to 1983; from 1983 to 1988 the growth in production 
was only 0.6 per cent. From 1974 to 1983, the number of workers employed in 
manufacturing declined by 39.4 per cent; from 1983 to 1988 the decrease was 5.2 
per cent. 
Under the democratic government economic stagnation and inequality became 
more firmly rooted. Thus, the reasons for the CGT's opposition were to be found in 
the government's incapacity to transform the economic structure and the 
disciplinamiento social implemented by the Proceso. Let me now turn to analyse the 
role of the CGT after the 1987 electoral defeat. 
IV. The CGT's opposition 
After the September 1987 electoral defeat, the replacement of Carlos 
Alderete by Ideler Tonelli signalled the collapse of the government's alliance with the 
grupo de los 15 (Clarin, 12-9-1987, p. 1). It also represented the beginning of a 
new period of confrontation between trade unions and the government. Finally, it 
meant that the main objective of the alliance between the government and the grupo 
de los 15 -that is, the neutralisation of the CGT's confrontational policy- was 
defeated. Nevertheless, Alderete had actually achieved his objective: free collective 
bargaining would begin in 1988 (Beliz, 1988, p. 22). 
After Alderete's replacement and the October economic measures, the CGT 
called a general strike for the 4th of November (La Naciön, 5-11-1987, p. 1). The 
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strike was successful, with almost 90 per cent adherence in the industrial sector 
(La Naciön, 5-11-1987, p. 1). The demonstration at which Ubaldini gave a speech 
was not so successful -15.000 people attended according to Federal Police 
estimations (La Naciön, 5-11-1987, p. 1). This would deepen internal divisions 
within the trades union movement over the organisation of general strikes and social 
demonstrations. As explained above, one of the most important differences between 
the CGT and the grupo de los 15 was over the utility of general strikes and social 
demonstrations in achieving the labour movement's objectives. The grupo de los 15 
had achieved most of its objectives by negotiating with the government, while the 
CGT's more confrontational policy was much less fruitful. An example was the free 
collective bargaining legislation achieved by Alderete's appointment which was 
agreed by the grupo de los 15 and the government. 
Despite these internal divisions, Alfonsin's refusal to meet the CGT's 
leadership to discuss wage increases (La Naciön, 9-12-1987, p. 1) provoked the 
CGT to organise another general strike for the 8th and 9th of December(La Naciön, 
10-12-1987, p. 1). The strikes had total adherence in both the industrial and the 
tertiary sectors (Fraga, 1991, p. 25). 
In February 1988, the government provided regulations for the free 
collective bargaining law which would begin to be applied in March (Clarin, 14-2- 
1988, p. 2). By April, the government passed the labour legislation which had been 
opposed by the employers organisations before the September 1987 elections 
(Clarin, 15-4-1988, p. 11). Despite all these measures, the CGT organised another 
general strike for the 14th of April, demanding economic measures to prevent the 
rise of inflation -in the first three months of 1988 the CPI increased by 38.2 per 
cent (Clarin, 9-4-1988, p. 17). The general strike had total adherence mainly in 
the industrial sector (Fraga, 1991, p. 25). This month also saw a teacher's strike 
which lasted 33 days seriously disrupting the school year (Clarin, 20-4-1988, p. 
2). 
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After the internal elections of the Peronist Party, the role of the CGT was 
undermined. There were two Presidential candidates, Antonio Cafiero and Carlos 
Menem. Cafiero's policies were viewed as a continuation of Alfonsin's policies. 
Caf'ero, as Alfonsin did at the beginning of his government, emphasised the 
importance of an agreement among the government, the labour movement and the 
business organisations as an instrument to resolve the crisis (Gaudio et al, 1990, p. 
224). By this time, Menem's policies were viewed as 'populist'. They promoted a 
redistribution of income as a tool to achieve economic growth. Menem's policies were 
based on a massive wage increase (salariazo) which would promote a revoluciön 
productiva (productive revolution). As said above, Menem later changed his policies 
to a 'monetarist' approach. 
The sindicalismo peronista was divided between the two candidates. The CGT 
supported Cafiero and the grupo de los 15 supported Menem (Gaudio et al, 1990, p. 
217). The main agreement between the CGT and Cafiero was that the latter was 
promoting a 'unilateral moratorium' on the external debt, and an agreement between 
the government, the trade unions, and the business organisations as a means to attain 
economic growth (Clarin, 25/25-4-1988). 
After Cafiero's defeat, the influence of the CGT was undermined. The grupo de 
los 15 and Carlos Menem argued that their victory was a response to the CGT's 
confrontational policy (Gaudio et a!, 1990, p. 230). Once again, the grupo de los 15 
affirmed that the CGT's confrontational policy did not achieve the trades union 
movement's main objectives. Therefore, the CGT decreased its level of confrontation 
mainly by stopping the organisation of general strikes. Likewise, the CGT began to 
priorise the issue of the general elections and therefore became more passive in 
order to facilitate Menem's electoral campaign. The CGT's new objective was to avoid 
Menem being accused of giving power to trade unions, an accusation which could be 
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used by the Radical Party to undermine Menem's image, bringing back memories of 
Isabel's government13 
In August the government launched the Primavera Plan. After the launching 
the CGT began discussing with the government an increase in the 'minimum wage' 
(salario minimo). As they could not agree on the size of the increase, the CGT called a 
general strike to be held on the 9th of September (Ambito Financiero, 10-9-1988, 
p. 1). The general strike was followed by a social demonstration at Plaza de Mayo. 
Although the strike was widely criticised among trade unionists and the Peronist 
presidential candidate refused to participate in the social demonstration (Clarin, 7- 
9-1989, p. 2-3), it became the most important action and let to a further general 
strike, called for the 12th of September (Ambito Financiero, 10-9-1988, p. 1). 
The meeting at Plaza de Mayo ended with a violence previously unseen during 
Alfonsin's government. The Federal Police were particularly brutal and one hundred 
people were injured (Ambito Fisianciero, 13-9-1988, p. 1). After the 
demonstration, there were accusations between the government, the CGT and the 
Peronist Party regarding the results of the strike. For the CGT and the Peronist 
Party, the government agitators had promoted the violent break-up of the 
demonstration in order to prove that a Peronist government -closely related to trade 
unions- would represent a return to the violence of the earlier seventies. The 
government held that the police had to intervene due to looting in the area of the 
square (Clarin, 14-9-1988, p. 2). 
Carlos Menem did not support the general strike of the 12th of September. He 
argued that the Peronist Party did not agree with the CGT's decision (Gaudio et a/, 
1990, p. 34). The CGT confrontational policy was criticised by the Peronist Party 
and divided the sindicalismo peronista. Due to this, and despite the hyperinflation 
process and the looting, the CGT did not organise more general strikes or social 
demonstrations. The CGT became a passive actor. 
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Despite the CGT's change of policies, there were national strikes. In October 
railway services were virtually paralysed; postal-workers began a work-to-rule 
campaign and planned an indefinite strike for December; gas workers went on strike 
from November; and others sectors such as customs, hospitals, and the prison 
service organised strikes (Clarin, 5,6,10,15,27-11-1988, p. 1). Thus, despite 
the neutralisation of the CGT, the Radical government was still unable to politically 
demobilise the labour movement. The last two years of the Radical government 
showed the gradual neutralisation of the CGT role by the Peronist Presidential 
candidate, Carlos Menem. Despite this, the working class was able to organise itself 
against the consequences of Black Monday. Therefore, the Radical government was 
unable to politically demobilise not only the the trades union movement but also the 
working class. 
In economic terms this was not the case. Under Alfonsin's government real 
wages had dramatically fallen; if in January 1984 real wages were 100 in June 
1989 they were 55.14. The purchasing power of real wages was, starting from of a 
base of 100 for January 1984,44.60 in June 1989 (Garfunkel, 1990, p. 72). Per 
capita GDP was 12 per cent less in 1988 than that in 1975. In 1975, wages and 
salaries accounted 53.8 per cent of GDP; in 1983,41 per cent, and in 1988 only 30 
per cent of GDP (Smith, 1990, p. 30). 
As the CPI and the WPI began to increase after the failure of the Plan Austral, 
real wages decreased. From 1986 to 1989, the CPI rose by 5911.9 per cent, and the 
real wage in the private sector decreased by 27.77 per cent and in the public sector 
by 15.16 per centl4. From 1988 to 1989 purchasing power fell by 20.60 per cent 
for the private sector and 20.04 per cent for the public sector as a result of the 
hyper- inflations 5. The situation of the workers was damaged by the failure of the 
Plan Austral and the incapacity of the democratic government to prevent high 
inflation rates. This damage was done after the overwhelming redistribution of 
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income at the beginning of the military dictatorship; as said above, from 1974 to 
1976 the inflation rate increased by 772.5 per cent while the real wage of the 
industrial sector feil by 37 per cent. The workers situation deteriorated 
progressively under both the dictatorship and the democratic government. 
By 1989 unemployment and underemployment rates had risen. Combining 
both rates, the 1989 level reached approximately 16 per cent of the population of 
working age. Under the military dictatorship the figure had been only 11 per cent. In 
1974 industrial unemployment rate was 1.3 per cent; for the construction sector, 
2.4 per cent; for the commercial sector, 3.1; and for services, 1.4 per cent. In 
October 1989, the rates were 6 per cent, 18.1 per cent, 5.5 per cent and 4.4 per 
cent, respectively (Morales Solä, 1990, p. 293). The labour force was, in 1989, 
12.2 million: 7.69 million were employed, 3.6 million were underemployed, and 
910000 were unemployed (Pägina112,10-6-1990, p. 11). 
From a population of 32 million, 10 million were, after Alfonsin's 
administration, beneath the 'poverty line' -that is a family income of US$100 or 
below per month. Fifteen million were only slightly above the line. In Greater 
Buenos Aires, out of a population of 7.3 million people, 36.7 per cent of all 
households -and 44.3 per cent of individuals- 
lived in poverty. Of the poor 
householders, 31.3 per cent were 'structurally poor' and 68.7 per cent were 
pauperizados (Smith, 1990, p. 31). 
Fifty per cent of the national income was concentrated in the 
hands of 20 per 
cent of the population. In 1974, the richest 20 per cent possessed 
39.5 per cent of 
the national wealth, and the poorest 20 per cent, 8.8 per cent. 
Under Videla the gap 
widened, the figures being 42 per cent and 7 per cent, respectively. 
The last year of 
the dictatorship, the richest 20 per cent reached 47.7 per cent and the poorest 
20 
per cent took only 5.9 per cent of the national wealth. 
By 1988 the gap had widened 
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even further, with figures of 52.4 per cent for the wealthiest fifth, 5.3 per cent for 
the poorest fifth of the population (Verbitsky, 1990. p. 244). 
Table n° 17 
Income Distribution 
(September each year) 
30 per cent lowest 60 per cent middle 
1974 11.40 60.60 
1976 1 2.1 0 59.80 
1978 10.20 53.70 
1981 10.50 54.50 
1985 9.90 56.80 
1988 9.20 54.90 
1989 7.90 50.50 
10 per cent highest 
28.10 
28.00 
36.10 
35.00 
33.30 
35.90 
41.60 
Source: Boron, A. (1992) La pobreza de las naciones. La economia politica del 
neoliberalismo en la Argentina, mimeograph. 
The economic legacy of the Alfonsin's government was a further 
impoverishment of the working class. The government did not politically demobilise 
the workers but it did, economically, subordinate them. 
The CGT's confrontational policy maintained the politically powerful role of 
the trades union movement but it could not avoid a deepening of the disciplinamiento 
social begun under the military dictatorship. 
V. From military rebellions to guerrilla attack 
i. The military rebellions 
In January 1988 a second military rebellion occurred, provoked by Aldo 
Rico's refusal to accept the detention imposed by a military judge (Clarin, 15-1- 
1988, p. 2). This detention was due to the fact that Aldo Rico had led the former 
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military rebellion. This time, Rico took an infantry regiment in Monte Caseros, 
located in the Corrientes province, and repudiated General Caridi's authority. Rico 
demanded a solution for the human rights violations judgements, since the Semana 
Santa's agreements had not been fulfilled (Clarin, 17-1-1988, p. 2-3). General 
Caridi was ordered to mobilise a number of key army units from several provincial 
locations. The repression was periodically interrupted by rains and the information 
that Rico's followers had laid mines on access bridges -these mines injured three 
'loyal' officials (Clarin, 18-1-1988, p. 2-3). After four days, without resisting, 
Rico surrendered unconditionally (Clarin, 19-1-1988, p. 1). 
The reason why Rico failed in his second attempt was that the main objective 
of the rebellion was his refusal to accept the military court's decision. After the 
passing of 'due obedience' law the demand for suspending the human rights trials lost 
most of its followers within the Army. An attack on the Army's hierarchy based on a 
rejection of a military court's decision did not find many sympathisers. Rico could 
convince few people that Monte Caseros had any objective other than his own judicial 
predicament. 
After Monte Caseros, 396 members of the Army were accused of undermining 
the hierarchy of the Army, and 127 out of them were imprisoned (Clarin, 22-1- 
1988, p. 2). However, the main consequence of the January rebellion was the 
'politicisation' of a faction of the carapintadas. This was a result of the defeat of 
Monte Caseros. Rico and his followers understood that either they began to fight 
against their comrades -taking the risk of loosing support when they began to kill- 
or they began a 'politicisation' process to confront the hierarchy of the Army and to 
win civilian support. The latter was chosen and so the carapintadas started to 
publicly criticise the Army hierarchy, the economic strategy of the government, 
education policy, increasing poverty, corruption, and the lack of political leadership. 
Different sectors approached the carapintadas, from the nationalist right-wing 
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groups to the Montoneros. Rico became a political actor who began to play a role 
inside the democratic game (Acuna and Smulovitz, 1991, p. 25). 
In April, new defense legislation was approved (Ambito Financiero, 14-4- 
1988, p. 10). One of the objectives of this law was to annul the previous legislation 
established by the military dictatorship of Lt. General Juan Carlos Ongania. Ongania's 
law represented the institutionalisation of the National Security Doctrine which 
defined the participation of the Armed Forces in internal matters. This law gave the 
Armed forces the 'right' to fight against the armed urban guerrillas, and to 
concentrate their intelligence services on the investigation of Argentinian citizens. 
This law was supposed to be the juridical framework of State Terrorism. Therefore, 
the new defense legislation attempted to abolish Ongania's law in order to prevent 
military coups and human rights violations. The new law defined a different role for 
the Armed Forces. It established that the Armed Forces would act to confront 
aggressions of external origin. It also refused a military seat on the Consejo de 
Defensa Nacional (National Defence Council), constituted by the vice-president, 
ministers and the head of the Intelligence Service (Ambito Financiero, 14-4-1988, 
p. 10). Finally, the law clearly stated that "matters related to the country's domestic 
politics can not, in any case, constitute working hypotheses for military intelligence 
organisms" (Latin American Weekly Report, 28-4-1988, p. 2). The main objective 
of this law was to limit the actions of the Armed Forces to the defence of the country 
from external aggressions and to avoid their participation in domestic political 
matters -which was, historically, their main activity. 
At the end of 1988, another personal situation provoked a military rebellion. 
This time, Colonel Mohamed Ali Seineldin, who was in Panama training a special 
force of Manuel Noriega's Army, began a rebellion due to the Army's refusal to 
promote him to General (Clarin, 5-12-1988,4). Seineldin was supposed to be the 
'moral leader' of the carapintadas, therefore the refusal was viewed as another 
measure to neutralise the role of the movement within the Army. The 30th of 
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November, members of the Albatros unit of the Prefectura Naval left their base 
armed and in combat gear (Clarin, 1-12-1988, p. 2-3). Two days latter they took 
the infantry school at Campo de Mayo, and announced that they were under Seineldin's 
orders. The Colonel left Panama to lead the rebellion in Buenos Aires (Clarin, 5-2- 
1988, p. 4). The carapintadas' main demand was an amnesty for those accused of 
human rights violations and of participating in the previous rebellions. General 
Caridi, in a meeting with Seineldin, accepted this demand as a general demand of the 
Army. Alfonsin refused to establish an amnesty, and ordered the Army to quash the 
rebellion (Clarin, 6-12-1988, p. 2-3). The Congress called for an emergency 
session which was attended by several ambassadors showing their support for the 
democratic government (Clarin, 6-12-1988, p. 2). The CGT and business 
organisations called for a general strike to support democracy while the population 
was demonstrating against the rebellion in the main squares of Argentina (Clarin, 6- 
12-1988, p. 2-3). 
Once the repression began, the rebels went from Campo de Mayo to Villa 
Martelli barracks, located in a suburb close to Buenos Aires. Once at Villa Martelli, 
Seineldin announced his demands which went from budget increases to the 
establishment of an amnesty. General Isidro Caceres was leading the repression, 
when he arrived with his troops at Villa Martelli, he -with the approval of General 
Caridi- went into the barracks to meet Colonel Seineldin (Clarün, 6-12-1988, p. 
1). Outside the barracks, there was a social demonstration against the carapintadas. 
This provoked fights between the population and the carapintadas, leaving three 
people dead and forty three injured (Clarin, 5-12-1988, p. 5). As Argentina was 
waiting for the fight to start, General Caridi announced that the operations had ended 
(Clarin, 6-12-1988, p. 1). 
Soon after the end of the rebellion, the carapintadas publicly announced the 
terms of the agreement reached with General Caceres: the replacement of 
General 
Caridi by General Caceres before the 23rd of December, a wage increase, that the 
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carapintadas not be judged, the recognition of the 'dirty war' as a positive event and 
a general amnesty between the elections and the change of administration (Acuna and 
Smulovitz, 1991, p. 27). 
After Villa Martelli, the hierarchy of the Army decided a new strategy to 
neutralise the carapintadas' power. It decided to make the main demands of the 
carapintadas its own, leaving the latter with only the plea that they be spared from 
trial. Therefore, the carapintadas would only deal with their particular juridical 
situation, while the Army as a whole would led the negotiations with the government 
to achieve the main demands (Acufla and Smulovitz, 1992, p. 28). The government, 
in order to decrease the level of confrontation with the Army, increased the wages of 
the members of the Armed Forces and replaced General Gaudi by General Gassino, a 
follower of Caridi's strategy (Acuna and Smulovitz, 1992, p. 28). 
ii. The guerrilla attack 
The reappearance of the guerrilla issue would, finally, improve the public 
image of the Armed Forces and give them, once again, a role in the internal security 
of the country. The 23rd of January, an armed group occupied the barracks of an 
infantry regiment in La Tab/ada (Ambito Financiero, 24-1-1989, p. 1). The attack 
was lead by the Movimiento Todos por la Patria -MTP- (Movement of All for the 
Fatherland) constituted mainly by members of the ERP (People's Revolutionary 
Army) one of the main guerrilla movements of the earlier seventies. Apparently, 
Enrique Gorriarän Merlo, a well known ERP member who had collaborated in the 
Nicaraguan Revolution and is supposed to have killed Anastasio Somoza in Paraguay, 
was leading the attack and escaped before the defeat (Pdgina/12,25-1-1989, p. 6). 
Paradoxically, the MTP was known as an organisation for the defense of human 
rights. One of its leaders, Jorge Banos, was a lawyer who had represented relatives 
of desaparecidos and had promoted the defense of human rights. Banos was found dead 
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in La Tablada (Pägina/l 2,25-1-1989, p. 6). A few days before the attack, Pat os 
had appeared on the state TV channels alleging an alliance between the carapintadas 
and Menem against Alfonsin's government (Pägina/12,20-1-1989, p. 6). Due to 
this, Menem accused Alfonsin's government of being connected with the guerrilla 
attack, as a means of undermining Menem's possibilities of winning the elections 
(Ambito Financiero, 27-1-1989, p. 6). 
The real objective of the attack was never clarified. As the survivors 
explained, the objective of the attack was to avoid a new military rebellion. However, 
documents suggested that it tried to simulate a military rebellion, scattering 
pamphlets praising Colonel Seineldin. Once the participants had taken the barracks 
they would call for rebellion, announcing that they had become the representatives of 
the 'popular resistance' since they had managed to abort the military rebellion. 
Finally, they would called for a 'popular' demonstration at Plaza de Mayo to ask 
Alfonsin to place himself at the head of this 'armed popular movement' (Pägina/ 12, 
25-1-1989, p. 6-9). The attack took everybody -including the government and the 
Intelligence Service- by surprise, and afterwards it was difficult to understand the 
reasons behind the attack. It was easy to identify the bodies since most of them went 
to organise the 'armed popular movement' with their credit cards in their pockets, a 
quite unusual detail for a guerrilla attack (Pagina/12,25-1-1989, p. 6). 
The real victour of La Tablada attack was the Army. First, the Generals 
repaired their image as soldiers after having been accused by the carapintadas of 
being 'desk Generals'. Second, the Army would, again, participate in internal 
conflicts and internal intelligence activities. Finally, as the organisations for human 
rights had been discredited by the participation of some of their members in the 
attack, the Army began to accuse these organisations of guerrilla activities 
(Pägina/12,24-1-1989, p. 1). 
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A few days after the attack, Alfonsin created the Consejo Nacional de Seguridad 
(National Security Council) constituted by the Ministers of Defense, Home Affairs 
and Foreign Affairs, the head of the Intelligence Services, the chiefs of staff of the 
three Armed Forces and the chief of the Armed Forces (Ambito Financiero, 26-1- 
1989, p. 1). The objective of the Council was to advise the government on guerrilla 
matters. Alfonsin also established by decree the permission to use the Armed Forces 
against internal attacks that could not be repelled by the police or by security forces 
(Ambito Financiero, 26-1-1989, p. 1). The decree stated that guerrilla actions 
whose objective was the destruction of the constitutional order would warrant 
defense measures "that will be graduated, depending upon the magnitude of the 
aggression" (Pion-Berlin, 1991, p. 568). This represented a setback for the 
government's position, which had been expressed in the Defense Law approved in 
April 1988. No one had so far done so much to achieve the 'vindication' of the 'dirty 
war' and the Armed Forces than the MTP and its incomprehensible attack to La 
Tablada. 
Between the guerrilla attack and the change of administration, the conflict 
with the Armed Forces was at an impasse. The amnesty question would arise in the 
meetings between Alfonsin and Menem. The former wanted Menem to sign a joint 
decree establishing the amnesty for officials accused, but yet not condemned, of 
human rights violations. Therefore, the Commander-in-Chief would remain in 
prison. Menem wanted to include the carapintadas, something that Alfonsin would not 
accept since they had threatened the democratic regime three times in two years. 
Nevertheless, Menem did not accept Alfonsin's proposal mainly because he wanted to 
keep this measure for his government and to monopolise its benefits. Such decision 
would facilitate Menem's relationship with the Armed Forces (Acura and 
Smulovitz, 
1991, p. 34). 
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iii. The gradual neutralisation of the 'carapintadas' power 
After Villa Martelli, the carapintadas had lost support within the Armed 
Forces. Their confrontation was based on personal grievances rather than general 
demands for the Armed Forces. The 'due obedience' law neutralised the role of the 
carapintadas since it had given them what they were requiring: the end of human 
rights trials. 
In order to avoid the collapse of the democratic system, Alfonsin made 
concessions to the Armed Forces. From the Punto Final to 'due obedience' he conceded 
more than he actually wanted to. Aldo Rico's example showed the outcome of these 
concessions. He threatened democracy with the Semana Santa rebellion and then 
achieved his real objective: the 'due obedience' law and the end of the trials. As he 
achieved his objectives the carapintadas movement lost its power, evident in the 
failure of Monte Caseros. The only way to have a 'voice' was, then, by joining the 
'democratic game'. The cost of Aldo Rico's integration into the democratic process was 
very high: the freedom of torturers and killers. However, the earlier defeat of 
Alfonsin's objectives -that is, the Consejo Supremo sentence and the Sapag 
amendment- rendered the relationship with the Armed Forces very difficult. This 
defeat meant that Alfonsin could no longer control the policy towards the Armed 
Forces. His government started to react rather than to decide. The defeat also 
signified that Alfonsin could not move quickly and decisively when, at the beginning 
of his government, public opinion supported him (Huntington, 1993, p. 224). 
Gradually the economic crisis became more important than human rights 
violations. Public opinion turned against the government. The economic crisis also 
strained the government's relationship with the trade unions. Thus, Alfonsin did not 
have significant domestic support to confront the Armed Forces. He could not 
maintain an open conflict with the Armed Forces indefinitely. However, he was also 
unable to put an end to all human rights trials. Alfonsin faced a dilemma: to prosecute 
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and to punish or to forgive and forget. He chose a compromise path between these 
extremes. He prosecuted and punished the Commanders-in-Chief, while excusing the 
crimes of low ranking officials. What became difficult, or almost impossible, was to 
achieve domestic support to forgive low ranking officials. When -through the 
CONADEP report and the public judgement of the Juntas- the truth about the 'dirty 
war' emerged, Argentinian public opinion, the organisations of human rights, and 
political parties -among them, the Radical Party- required, through social 
mobilisations, the punishment for low rank officials. The Judiciary, anyway, did 
just this, through point 30 of the sentence for the Commanders-in-Chief. 
It was after the Easter rebellion when Alfonsin achieved his objective of 
passing the 'due obedience' law. However, this undermined his power over the Armed 
Forces and his political credibility. 
The concessions that Alfonsin made have to be understood in the context of 
Argentina's history and the circumstances of the new democracy. Without domestic 
and trade unions support, due to the economic crisis, an open conflict with the Armed 
Forces seemed to be a real threat to the consolidation of democracy. For Alfonsin, it 
was crucial that during the Easter rebellion, he obtained the support of the CGT. If 
the CGT had not repudiated the rebellion, the latter could have finished in a very 
different fashion. Although the appointment of Alderete complicated the economic 
strategy, Alfonsin believed that this was necessary in order to consolidate 
democracyl 6. 
The economic crisis reduced Alfonsin's margin of manoeuvre: his domestic 
support was undermined and the conflict with the trade unions was intensified. 
Therefore, in order to consolidate democracy, he had to make some concessions. His 
policy towards the Armed Forces gave many concessions. I believe that after having 
imprisoned the Commanders-in-Chief, he could not go further in his confrontation 
with the Armed Forces without threatening democracy. The economic crisis and trade 
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union opposition limited Alfonsin's ability to maintain an open conflict with the 
Armed Forces. 
Vt. Conclusion 
During its last two years, the Radical government did not attempt to resolve 
the crisis of the Argentinian state, intensifying the economic crisis and accelerating 
the implementation of a 'monetarist' restructuring of the state. The government 
deepened the economic subordination of the working class without politically 
demobilising it. Finally, it managed to prevent the seizure of state power by the 
Armed Forces. The consolidation of democracy was its main achievement. However, 
democracy was consolidated by deepening the military dictatorship's 
disciplinamiento social. In this sense, the military dictatorship succeeded since its 
economic structural reform and the disciplinamiento social lasted longer than the 
dictatorship itself, and the democratic government succeeded since democracy was 
consolidated. By the end of the first democratic government, although the crisis of the 
Argentinian state was acute, one of its main political features had been modified: the 
democratic regime was not threatened by the Armed Forces. 
1 interview with Jose Luis Machinea, 25-10-1993, Buenos Aires. 
2 The current account deficit amounted US$ 4236 million (Banco Central de la 
Republica Argentina, unpublished data). 
3 Machinea points out (1990, p. 71) that from the second quarter of 1987 to the 
second quarter of 1988 international prices rose around 30 per cent mainly as a 
result of the drought in the US and the large devaluation of the dollar in the two 
previous years. This has a beneficial effect in the balance of payments, however as 
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Argentina 'eats' the same goods that exports, it also has a negative impact on food 
prices in the domestic market. 
4 Carlos Menem, a lawyer from the University of Cordoba, belonged to the non-union 
wing of the Peronist Party which is particularly strong in the provinces. He was 
three times governor of La Rioja. He had been imprisoned under Videla's presidency 
and re-arrested in 1982 for joining an anti-government demonstration. Menem, 
together with Antonio Cafiero and Carlos Grosso, represented the Peronist 
Renovaciön, which one of its main pillars was to be a non-union sector of Peronism. 
Menem and Cafiero wanted to be the Peronist presidential candidate for the 1989 
general election. For the first time in its history, on the 9th of July of 1988, 
Peronism nominated its presidential candidate by direct primary election. Cafiero 
had the support of the CGT, while Menem was supported by los 15. Menem obtained 
53 per cent of the total vote cast and Cafiero, 46 per cent (McGuire, 1992, p. 48). 
5 Interview with Adolfo Canitrot and . lose Luis Machinea, 19-10-1993 and 1-11- 
1993, respectively, Buenos Aires. 
6 As indicated earlier, Domingo Cavallo was President of the Central Bank during the 
last period of the military dictatorship. He implemented the last step of the 
nationalisation of the private external debt. 
7 Most of the enterprises were those which constituted the group of Capitanes de is 
Industria such as Grupo Macri, Loma Negra, Grupo Bulgheroni as well as 
transnational corporations as Bunge y Born and Techint. 
8 The Grupo de los Ocho succeeded the Grupo de los Once, it was constituted by the 
UTA, CAC, ADEBA, Chamber of Construction, Commerce Stock, Union of the 
Construction, SRA and ABRA. 
9 He was Economics Minister during the military dictatorship, under Galtieri's 
presidency during the Malvinas war. 
10 Roberto Alemann explained the reasons why the liberalisation was 'expected' by 
the economic establishment on an article in La Naciön, 7-8-1988, p. 1, Suplemento 
Econdmico. 
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11 After the failures of his first economic strategies, Menem would name Domingo 
Cavallo as Economics Minister. 
12 'Under-employees' (subempleados) means those who work less than eight hours 
per day. They are also without any kind of social security since they are 'black 
employees' (trabajadores no efectivizados). 
13 For an excellent analysis of the role of the trade unionists between 1973-1976 
see Torre (1989). 
14 Calculated from table n2 9 and n214. 
15 Calculated from table n° 15. 
16 Interview with Jose Luis Machinea and Adolfo Canitrot, 25-10-1993 and 19- 
10-1993, Buenos Aires. 
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Conclusions 
I. Implications for the state theory debate 
The analysis of state theory has showed the inability of pluralist, realist, and 
some Marxist approaches -namely the Miliband/Poulantzas debate- to conceptualise 
the capitalist state, its relation to economic policy and to global economy, as well as 
the notion of crisis. 
This thesis shows that in order to conceptualise the capitalist state, the usual 
distinction which orthodox political science draws between 'economics' and 'politics' 
must be reassessed. Indeed, to fully understand the development of the Argentinian 
capitalist state, the analysis must look at the state as a social relation which 
expresses the instability arising from capital-labour relation. An 'economic' 
analysis of the Alfonsin government is misplaced, in the sense that it looses the 
conceptualisation of the barrier represented by the strength of the working class f or 
the successful implementation of economic reforms. In addition, a 'political' analysis 
Iot ses the consequences of the economic crisis and the constraint of the external debt. 
Thus, this thesis argues that the capitalist state, understood as a social relation 
offers, a more productive framework for the analysis of contemporary crisis. 
This conceptualisation of the capitalist state also includes a crucial feature, 
that is the notion of class struggle. This thesis indicates that class struggle not only 
impinges on the development of the capitalist state but that the state itself is an 
aspect and a site of class struggle. Indeed, the income distribution struggle between 
Argentina's international creditors and its upper -t)öürgeois0e, and 'the working class 
was the ultimate reason why the Radical government was unable to resolve the crisis 
of the Argentinian state. 
Finally, this thesis suggests that it is indispensable to view The state' as an 
aspect of an international state system in the context of global economy. It affirms 
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that the capitalist state can no longer be studied in isolation. This is clearly 
demonstrated by the analysis of the Alfonsin government. Indeed, the external debt 
crisis, a consequence of the globalisation of capital, constrained the decision making 
capacity of the Radical government. The debt crisis was subsequently employed as a 
means of imposing, and legitimising the imposition of 'monetarism' upon Latin 
American countries. Thus, the development of the capitalist state must be studied in 
relation to the development of the global economy itself. 
Regarding the notion of crisis, I have sought to show that the 
conceptualisation of crisis as either 'economic' or 'political' is misplaced. Crisis 
expresses the instability of the labour-capital relation on which capitalist society is 
based. Thus, the Argentinian crisis must be analysed as a crisis of the Argentinian 
state, a crisis of a particular historical form of class domination. 
Hence, theoretically, this thesis indicates the need for a conceptualisation of 
the capitalist state, its relation to the global economy, and of the notion of crisis of 
the capitalist state. This conceptualisation is still being developed within the Marxist 
tradition but it will become more sophisticated through empirical studies such as 
this 
II. Conclusions on the crisis of the Argentinian state 
success of the 1976 military dictatorship 
-rv dictatorship attempted to resolve the crisis of the 
economic structural reform and State Terrorism. 
.; mpted 
to modify the role of the state and its class 
. errorism intended 
to politically demobilise the working 
_t the armed urban guerrilla campaign. 
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The state was viewed as a barrier to the resolution of the economic crisis of 
the 1970s. The first tool to undermine its economic role was the 1977 financial 
reform which liberalised the financial market. Likewise, the undermining of the 
industrial sector, which had been promoted by the state during the 1 950s and 
1960s, was another means of decreasing the direct economic role of the state. 
Finally, the privatisation and closing down of state enterprises was also intended to 
cut down the participation of the state as an actor in the economy. These measures 
were an attempt to restructure the state and its relation to the economy according to 
the 'monetarist' approach. The ultimate objective was to give to the market the power 
to discipline society. 
The economic reform of 1976 also modified wider class relations. In general 
its aim was to economically subordinate the working class. Its specific objective was 
to prevent a return to Peronism. To this end, by dismantling the industrial sector, 
the military dictatorship undermined the economic power of the industrial working 
class. The process of pauperizaciön, desasalarizaciön and terciarizaciön increasingly 
subordinated the working class to market discipline. 
Likewise, State Terrorism was not only directed at the armed urban guerrilla 
movement but also at the working class and the trades union movement. Through 
State Terrorism, the military dictatorship achieved a temporary political 
demobilisation of large section of the workers. 
Thus, the economic structural reform undermined the Keynesian role of the 
state as the regulator of the economy, and the institutionalised economic and political 
power of the working class. The military government thereby attempted to 
implement a 'monetarist' restructuring of the state and of its class relations. In this 
sense, the military dictatorship, through confrontation intended to directly resolve 
Argentina's crisis situation. However, the economic reform could neither prevent 
high inflation rates nor reduce the fiscal deficit. Moreover, one of the features of the 
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economic reform was the increase of external debt. By the end of the military 
dictatorship, Argentina had difficulty in servicing its external debt and negotiations 
began with the IMF. In this respect therefore the military dictatorship was 
unsuccessful. 
Nevertheless, the 1976 military dictatorship did achieve many of its 
political objectives: the political subordination of the working class, and the 
elimination of Peronism, an alliance between the workers and the 'domestic' 
bourgeoisie. The last point is especially significant. The economic structural reform 
was an attempt to undermine the role of the 'domestic' bourgeoisie by promoting the 
concentration of capital in the biggest conglomerates at the expense of small and 
medium size companies. The political demobilisation of the workers seemed to be 
temporary since, under the democratic government, the trades union movement and 
the working class possessed the possibility of blocking state policies. However, the 
economic subordination of the workers lasted longer than the dictatorship itself, and 
thus can be considered as an achievement of the military dictatorship. This is also the 
case regarding the role of the 'domestic' bourgeoisie. The study of the democratic 
government shows that the concentration of capital in the biggest conglomerates could 
not be modified. Likewise, the Peronist movement did not win the 1983 general 
elections and the Peronism of the 1990s seems to be very different from that based 
on an alliance between the workers and the 'domestic' bourgeoisie. Indeed, Carlos 
Menem is currently continuing the 'monetarist' restructuring of the state which 
seems to be the culmination of developments started by the military dictatorship. 
Moreover, one of the main objectives of the dictatorship was to defeat the 
armed urban guerrilla movement. Through the implementation of State Terrorism, 
the armed urban guerrilla 'disappeared' from Argentina's political scenario. Indeed, 
the armed urban guerrilla, despite the isolated attack of 1989, did not have any 
significance during the 1980s. In this sense the military dictatorship achieved 
another political objective. 
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Thus, one of the conclusions of this thesis is that the military dictatorship, 
despite being unable to control high inflation and to reduce the fiscal deficit, did, in 
fact, achieve its political objectives. Despite the defeat of the Malvinas war, the high 
inflation rates, the high fiscal deficit, and the 'horrors' of the 'dirty war', the 1976 
military dictatorship achieved a 'successful' and bloody partial restructuring of 
political relations in Argentina. The legacy of its economic structural reform also 
constrained the incoming democratic government. I suggest that the economic legacy 
of the dictatorship was constituted by a huge external debt, a high concentration of 
capital, and the impoverishment of the working class. 
ii. The paradoxical legacy of the democratic government 
The main political objective of the democratic government was the 
consolidation of democracy. It also attempted to politically demobilise the trades 
union movement and the Armed Forces. It attempted to demobilise the trades union 
movement since the Radical Party viewed the movement to be a 'threat' to democratic 
consolidation due to its authoritarian roots, and its past record in blocking state 
policies. It also attempted to undermine the political role of the Armed Forces and to 
bring them to trial due to the human rights violations committed during the military 
dictatorship. 
The Radical government did not initially have a specific strategy to deal with 
the main problems facing the Argentinian economy. Alfonsin attempted to apply an 
economic strategy similar to that of the 1963 Radical government. This strategy soon 
proved to be unable to cope with the pressures facing the Argentinian economy in the 
1980s. 
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a. The Radical government's inability to resolve the economic crisis 
In 1983, the economic crisis was characterised by the burden of the external 
debt, high inflation rates and a high fiscal deficit. The external debt not only 
constrained economic growth but also limited the options available to deal with the 
economic crisis. The external debt did not threaten democracy, but it did impose a 
'monetarist' restructuring of the state as the first step to the consolidation of 
democracy. In this sense, the debt constrained the decision making policy choices of 
Latin American governments. The external debt crisis gave to the IMF and the World 
Barak a significant role as regulators of the domestic economy of the debtor countries. 
This thesis demonstrates that the economic 'u-turn' of the Radical government was in 
large part a consequence of the pressure from international creditors to service the 
debt. There was no choice for a liberal democratic government other than to pay the 
debt and to apply an IMF plan. Regarding this dilemma, the Radical government chose 
an alternative path: it neither fully applied nor fully rejected an IMF plan. This 
alternative solution confronted the government with the trades union movement 
which demanded a full rejection of an IMF plan, and with the international creditors 
who demanded a full implementation of an IMF plan. Together the two actors were 
able to block state policies and finally provoked Alfonsin's downfall. 
The external debt constrained the decision making policies of Alfonsin's 
government. In addition, the 'monetarist' restructuring of the state, which according 
to the international creditors was the solution to the economic crisis, could not be 
fully or even partially applied due to the power of the working class to block state 
policies. Thus, in the context of the external debt crisis Alfonsin was constrained by 
the incompatible demands of the international creditors and the working class. 
The high inflation rates and the high fiscal deficit were significant features of 
the economic crisis. Inflation is the monetary expression of the income distribution 
struggle. The fiscal deficit, which caused high inflation rates, was a consequence of 
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the burden of the external debt, tax evasion, and state subsidies to the private sector. 
It is the monetary expression of the appropriation of wealth by the international 
creditors and the wealthiest sector of Argentina's population. Inflation was also 
understood as a cause of wage increases. However, the thesis demonstrates that the 
workers rather than provoking inflation were quite often reacting to it. The 
government was able to control the inflation rate, while it was unable to reduce the 
fiscal deficit. The government did not confront the wealthiest sector of Argentina's 
population and the international creditors, but it did maintain and deepen the 
economic subordination of the workers. Thus, the Radical government began to 
gradually implement a 'monetarist' restructuring of the state, deepening the 
disciplinamiento social of the military dictatorship. 
The downfall of the Radical government was caused by the pressures from the 
international creditors and the upper bourgeoisie for the full implementation of the 
'monetarist' restructuring, and by the barrier presented by the working class to 
such a restructuring. 
b. The strength of the trades union and the working class 
The Radical government could neither control nor demobilise the trades union 
movement. In this sense, the political demobilisation of the trade unions achieved by 
the military dictatorship was only temporary. However, the trade unions could not 
avoid a deepening of the economic subordination of the working class. Nevertheless, 
they did achieve most of their objectives: most notably the free collective bargaining 
legislation, the enlargement of strikers rights, and the participation of the trade 
unions in the management of the Health Service Funds (Obras 
Sociales). They also 
achieved short-term objectives, like many wage increases, which undermined the 
government's economic strategy. Thus, the trade unions, however unable to prevent a 
deepening in the economic subordination of the workers, proved to be able to achieve 
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their main organisational objectives and to block state policies. Between 1983 and 
1988, the strength of the trade unions was the ultimate barrier to a 'monetarist' 
restructuring of the state and its class relations. 
However, after the Peronist internal elections, the CGT's confrontational 
policies were neutralised by the Peronist Presidential candidate who did not support 
the CGT strategy. Thus, the last period of the democratic government saw the 
exploitation of the divisions within the working class and the trades union movement 
as the basis upon which to secure their political demobilisation. Indeed, Carlos 
Menem, by dividing the sindicalismo peronista achieved, during the last period of the 
Radical government, its political demobilisation. Carlos Menem was preparing the 
ground for his 'monetarist' restructuring of wider class relations. 
c. The Radical government's success: the political demobilisation of the 
Armed Forces 
The Radical government modified an historical feature of the crisis of the 
Argentinian state. Historically, the response to the crisis of the Argentinian state 
was the seizure of the power of the state by the Armed Forces. This was notably the 
case of the 1966 and 1976 military dictatorships . 
As the democratic governments of 
1963 and 1973 were unable to resolve the crisis, the Armed Forces, through 
military coups, took office in order to impose `their' order. Despite the 
fact that the 
1983 democratic government was also unable to resolve the crisis, the Armed Forces 
could not successfully threaten democratic stability. 
Alfonsin's policies towards the 
Armed Forces not only discredited them but also aggravated their internal 
divisions. 
This secured their political demobilisation and constituted the 
first step towards the 
consolidation of democracy. By the end of the 
democratic government, although the 
economic crisis and class conflict had deepened, 
the Armed Forces did not attempt to 
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overthrow the democratic government. The Armed Forces were discredited and 
internally divided due to Alfonsin's policies. 
I argue that democracy was maintained due to Alfonsin's policies towards the 
Armed Forces. Even taking into account the international wave of democratisation, I 
suggest that Alfonsin's policies undermined the historically powerful role of the 
Armed Forces, mainly by the acknowledgment of the 'dirty war' through the 1985 
public judgement on the Juntas Militares and the publishing of the Comisiön 
Nacional de Desapariciön de Personas -CONADEP- report. These policies deepened the 
internal division of the Armed Forces rendering them unable to act as a political 
alternative. However, the degree of concessions granted to the military seemed to 
undermine Alfonsin's earlier achievements. These concessions were made to 
guarantee Alfonsin's objective of consolidating democracy. Alfonsin argues that in 
order to defend human rights which had been violated in the past, he thought he was 
threatening human rights in the present and the future (Alfonsin, 1992, p. 91). In 
other words, he did not want to put democracy at risk today for the defense of the 
human rights violations carried out under the military dictatorship. 
The Radical government was unable to resolve its economic crisis or 
politically demobilise the trade unions, although it partially achieved its objectives 
with regard to the Armed Forces. By the end of Alfonsin's government, Argentinian 
society had considerable social divisions. Nevertheless, all were free to speak, to 
demonstrate for and against the government, to organise themselves in political 
parties or social movements, to publish without censorship, defend rights, and vote 
to choose Argentina's government. Paradoxically the Alfonsin government presided 
over a deepening of the military dictatorship's disciplinamiento social accompanied 
by the consolidation of democracy: democracy was consolidated but in a context of 
increasing poverty. Human rights however were no longer violated in Argentina. For 
a country with a history of dictatorships and human rights atrocities, this was not a 
secondary issue. This was Alfonsin's main achievement. 
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Argentina's 
GDP growth (percentages) 
1 970 5.4 
1 971 4.8 
1 972 3.1 
1973 6.1 
1974 5.7 
1975 (0.5) 
1976 (0.5) 
1977 6.3 
1978 (3.3) 
1979 6.5 
1980 1.0 
1981 (7.0) 
1982 (5.8) 
1983 2.6 
1984 2.2 
1985 (4.6) 
1986 5.8 
1987 1.8 
1988 (3.0) 
1989 (4.6) 
Appendix one 
main economic indicators 
Source: Argentinian Central Bank (Banco Central de la Republica Argentina), 
unpublished data. 
() means negative 
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Inflation rate (percentages) 
1 970 21.7 
1971 39.1 
1972 64.1 
1973 43.7 
1974 40.0 
1975 335.1 
1976 349.0 
1977 160.0 
1978 169.0 
1979 140.1 
1980 87.5 
1981 1 31 .2 1982 209.7 
1983 433.6 
1984 686.8 
1985 385.4 
1986 81.9 
1987 174.8 
1988 387.7 
1989 4.923.3 
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas 
y Censos, INDEC), unpublished data. 
Fiscal Deficit as a _percentage_of 
GDP 
1 976 11.7 
1977 4.7 
1 978 6.5 
1979 6.5 
1980 7.5 
1981 13.3 
1982 15.1 
1983 15.2 
1984 12.5 
1985 5.4 
1986 4.3 
1987 6.4 
1988 6.4 
Source: Argentinian Central Bank (Banco Central de la Republica Argentina), 
unpublished data. 
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National income, saving and investment (percentages of GDP) 
GDP National Consumption National External 
Income Savings Savings 
1980 100 100.0 83.2 16.8 6.9 
1981 100 97.7 85.4 12.3 7.1 
1982 100 92.6 80.3 12.3 4.1 
1983 100 90.9 81.0 9.9 4.4 
1984 100 91.6 83.7 7.9 4.3 
1985 100 90.4 82.1 8.4 2.0 
1986 100 90.8 83.8 6.8 4.7 
1987 100 90.1 83.1 7.0 6.1 
1988 100 90.3 80.6 9.7 2.8 
Gross 
Domestic 
Investment 
23.7 
1 9.4 
16.4 
14.3 
12.4 
10.3 
11.6 
13.0 
12.5 
Source: Machinea, J. (1990) Stabilisation under Alfonsin's Government: a 
Frustrated Attempt (Buenos Aires: CEDES). 
Terms of Trade (1970=100} 
1 970 1 00.0 
1 971 113.3 
1972 125.3 
1973 1 41 .9 
1974 113.4 
1975 95.2 
1976 89.5 
1977 93.6 
1978 91.9 
1979 100.2 
1980 117.7 
1981 124.6 
1982 105.2 
1983 1 01 .9 
1984 110.3 
1985 95.0 
1986 80.8 
1987 69.4 
1988 76.9 
Source: World Bank (1989) Argentina: Reforms for Price Stability and Growth 
(Washington: World Bank). 
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Trade Balance (current US$ million) 
Exports Imports 
1970 1773 1694 
1971 1740 1868 
1972 1941 1905 
1973 3266 2229 
1974 3931 3635 
1975 2961 3946 
1976 3916 3033 
1977 5655 4165 
1978 6399 3834 
1979 7813 6711 
1980 8020 10539 
1981 9143 9430 
1982 7626 5337 
1983 7836 4504 
1984 8107 4585 
1985 8396 3814 
1986 6852 4724 
1987 6360 5819 
1988 9133 5322 
1989 9577 4201 
Trade Surplus 
79 
(128) 
36 
1037 
296 
(985) 
883 
1490 
2565 
1102 
(2.519) 
(287) 
2289 
3332 
3522 
4582 
2128 
541 
3811 
5376 
Source: Secretaria de Industria y Comercio Exterior (1990) Boletin de Comercio 
Exterior (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Economia). 
() means negative 
Balance of payments (current US$ million) 
Trade Surplus 
1 970 79.1 
1971 (127.7) 
1972 36.4 
1973 1036.5 
1974 295.8 
1975 (985.2) 
1976 883.1 
1977 1409.3 
1978 2565.8 
1979 1109.9 
1980 (2.519.2) 
1981 (287.0) 
1982 2286.8 
1983 3320.0 
1984 3523.0 
1985 4351.0 
1986 1555.0 
1987 257.0 
1988 3550.0 
Source: Argentinian Central Bank 
unpublished data. 
() means negative 
Financial 
Service Surplus 
(225.5) 
(255.9) 
(333.6) 
(394.4) 
(333.4) 
(429.6) 
(492.5) 
(578.5) 
(680.8) 
(920.0) 
(1.531.4) 
(3.699.7) 
(4.718.5) 
(5.407.9) 
(5.712.0) 
(5.305.0) 
(4.416.0) 
(4.485.0) 
(5.181.0) 
(Banco Central de la 
Current 
Account Surplus 
(158.9) 
(388.7) 
(222.9) 
720.7 
127.2 
(1.284.6) 
649.6 
1289.9 
1833.6 
(536.4) 
(4.767.8) 
(4.714.0) 
(2.657.7) 
(2.437.5) 
(2.390.9) 
(952.8) 
(2.859.0) 
(4.236.0) 
(1.631.0) 
Republica Argentina), 
274 
External debt (US$ million) 
Total Public Private 
1975 7875 4021 3854 
1976 8279 5189 3090 
1977 9678 6044 3634 
1978 12496 8357 4139 
1979 19034 9960 9074 
1980 27162 14459 12703 
1981 35671 20024 15703 
1982 43634 28616 15018 
1983 45069 31709 13360 
1984 46903 36139 10764 
1985 49326 39868 8444 
1986 51422 44000 7400 
1987 54700 nd nd 
1988 57000 nd nd 
Source: Argentinian Central Bank (Banco Central de la Republica Argentina), 
unpublished data. 
Total debt as a percentage of Gross National Product 
1 980 48.4 
1984 67.5 
1985 84.2 
1986 70.5 
1987 76.4 
1988 66.5 
1989 121.9 
Source: Organizaciön de Estados Americanos (1992) Boletin Estadistico de la OEA, 
vol 11, n° 1-2, January-December 1992 (Washington: OEA, Departamento de 
Asuntos Econömicos y Sociales). 
Service Payment on the Total External Debt (US$ million) 
1981 5391 
1982 4975 
1983 6805 
1984 5197 
1985 6089 
1986 6741 
1987 6244 
1988 5057 
1989 5237 
Source: Wilkie, J (ed) (1993) Statistical Abstract of Latin America, vol. 30, part 
II, (Los Angeles: UCLA) 
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Service Payments on the Interest of the Total External Debt 
1981 3441 
1982 3581 
1983 5438 
1984 4373 
1985 5071 
1986 4302 
1987 4056 
1988 3146 
1989 21 28 
Source: Wilkie, J (ed) (1993) Statistical Abstract of Latin America, vol. 30, part 
II, (Los Angeles: UCLA) 
Interest Paid as a Percentage of Gross National Product 
1 980 4.2 
1 984 5.8 
1 985 8.4 
1986 5.8 
1987 5.3 
1988 3.5 
1989 4.0 
Source: Organizaciön de Estados Americanos (1992) Boletin Estadistico de la OEA, 
vol II, n2 1-2, January-December 1992 (Washington: OEA, Departamento de 
Asuntos Econömicos y Sociales). 
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Appendix two 
AIfonsin's Ministers 
Defense Ministers 
R. Borräs December 1983-April 1985* 
R. Carranza April 1985-November 1985* 
G. Löpez November 1985-June 1986 
H. Jaunarena June 1986-June 1989 
Economics 
B. Grinspun 
J. Sourrouille 
J. C. Pugliese 
J. Rodriguez 
Ministers 
December 1983-February 1985 
February 1985-April 1989 
April 1989-May 1989 
May 1989-June 1989 
Education and Justice Ministers 
C. A. Aramburü December 1983-June 1986 
J. Rajneri June 1986-September 1987 
J. Sabato September 1987-June 1989 
Foreign Affairs Ministers 
D. Caputo December 1983-May 1989 
E. Kelly May 1989-June 1989 
Home Affairs 
A. Tröccoli 
E. Nosiglia 
J. C. Pugliese 
Ministers 
December 1983-September 1987 
September 1987-May 1989 
May 1989-June 1989 
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Labour Minister 
A. Mucci 
J. M. Casella 
H. Barrionuevo 
C. Alderete 
1. Tonelli 
December 1983-March 1984 
March 1984-October 1984 
October 1984-March 1987 
March 1987-September 1987 
September 1987-June 1989 
Public Works Ministers 
R. Carranza December 1983-April 1985 
R. Tomassini April 1985-June 1986 
P. Trucco June 1986-September 1987 
R. Terragno September 1987-June 1989 
Social Welfare Ministers 
A. Neri December 1983-June 1986 
C. Storani June 1986-September 1987 
R. Barrios Arrechea September 1987-June 1989 
President of the Central Bank 
E. Garcia Vasquez December 1983-February 1985 
A. Concepciön February 1985-August 1986 
J. L. Machines August 1986-April 1989 
E. Garcia Vasquez April 1989-June 1989 
* Died in April 1985 
* Died in November 1985 
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Appendix Three 
The research process 
The purpose of this appendix is to describe the problems encountered in PhD 
research process, emphasising in particular the problems experienced by a foreign 
student. 
The first problem is not the PhD but the language. Even if your English is 
very fluent -which was not my case-, you have to get used to express yourself in a 
foreign language, to read all the bibliography in English, to talk with your 
supervisor in English, to live speaking a foreign language. The problem of the 
language can not be quickly resolved, it is a matter of time. In the first term of my 
PhD I took a course of Academic Writing which was not very useful. You learn how to 
write by reading and looking how they write. However, I believe it is impossible to 
get it completely correct. I always write in English with Spanish style, the most 
difficult task is to adapt English grammar and style. This is something which is 
impossible to modify. Thus, the main problem that a foreign student faces is that the 
writing process is much more difficult simply because of the language. In addition, 
we face this problem completely by ourselves. However, this is a risk that foreign 
students take deciding to do a PhD abroad. But it is hard to think, especially when one 
is still at home, how difficult the writing process will be. 
Another problem of the language is that you can not enjoy your writing. I used 
to enjoy writing (even when I made a research on the squid around the Malvinas), 
but when my supervisor (in the first term! ) asked me to write a book review, I 
could not believe how difficult it was. I have to read in English, try to understand 
and, then, to explain by writing the main ideas and by giving my own opinion! I was 
terrified. However, the book reviews were a very useful exercise. They forced me to 
understand what I was reading and to think about it. However, the most useful point 
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was that I got used to writing in English from the very beginning of the PhD. This is 
not just useful for a foreign student but also for a native speaker. To start writing 
from the very beginning -although many of the things you write will not be of later 
use- gives you useful skills about how to read and write. 
The books reviews were discussed every Friday with my supervisor. This was 
invaluable. During the first year of my PhD, I had weekly meetings with my 
supervisor. I was working on state theory and also trying to define the topic of my 
thesis. Now, I am sure that it would have been very easy to get lost if I did not have 
his advice. Now I am convinced that the role of a supervisor is crucial especially at 
the very beginning of the PhD. If you do not have the proper help, it might be very 
easy to get lost between so many books to read and so many topics to chose. 
After I had got used to reading in English and to writing two or three pages by 
week, I had to write an essay on state theory. This was a very good experience. I 
realised that after reading for six months and discussing with my supervisor all the 
book reviews I had written, it was quite easy to have an idea on what to write. 
Therefore, I realised that the first six months of my PhD had been highly productive. 
These first months were full of different experiences. In addition to the 
already mentioned, I had to learn how to use the Library. This could be very simple 
for an English person or any European but is not quite the same for an Argentinian. 
In Argentina, there are no such libraries so I had to learn how to take advantage of it. 
To learn how to use the Library can become a difficult task. If I asked for help, I 
usually did not understand the answer and was ashamed to ask again. Therefore, this 
is not the way. It is simpler to sit in front of the Computer or the CD-Rom and start 
using the old method of 'trial and error'. After few weeks, one understand how it 
works. However, it takes longer to take advantages of all the services that the 
Library provides you. 
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As a foreign student one must take advantage of being in a British University 
by taking different courses. In my first years, I undertook three different courses 
(International Political Economy, International Law and some lectures of European 
Integration). One realises that it is impossible to combine the research of the PhD 
and the courses. I was unable to read most of the bibliography for the lectures, so I 
lost a lot of the discussion. However, I still thinks that it was good for me to take 
these courses. Not only have I learned about the issues taught by the courses, but also 
I have realised about the main differences between this educational system and the 
Argentinian one. I now can appreciate the advantages of the British system and the 
advantages of the Argentinian one. 
To take courses is also a way of escaping from the isolation of a PhD student 
and for the specialisation of your research. I thought it was unproductive to 
concentrated all my years in England studying about Argentina. Therefore, in my 
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second year, I took one course on International State and I regret that I was unable to 
take any course in my last year since I was most of the academic year in Argentina. 
For a foreign student I believe it is essential to try to combine the research of the 
PhD and some courses. 
A PhD in a foreign country is not just a degree, it means a whole experience 
of life. Another country, another language, another culture, one can not reject the 
different environment, on the contrary, one has to learn from it. Even when you have 
not idea of the topic of your thesis!. To choose the topic of the thesis is one of the 
hardest tasks of the first year of the PhD. When I was leaving Argentina, most of my 
colleagues who had gone abroad to do a PhD told me that a day will come -especially in 
winter time! - when I will ask myself: what am i doing here?!. They advised me not to 
try to find an answer because it would be almost impossible: the topic of the thesis is 
still not clear in your mind, you read bibliography that you will probably not use in 
the end, everything takes you longer because of the language, it is cold, it is dark, it 
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is raining. When that day came -and my colleagues told me about one single day, 
however I have experienced a plurality of them- the best is to take a very nice Latin 
American novel and calm down. 
There is nothing you can do about the insecurities of a PhD, even if you are in 
your own country, at the beginning a PhD sounds like something you will never get, 
that you will never finish. This feeling is always there, you know you have to do 
something original and this is very intimidating. The topic of the thesis is a crucial 
point of the research and it is the most difficult part: to define it in your mind is a 
very isolated task and put you under considerable intellectual pressure. It would be 
easier to know that the topic should be loosely defined at the beginning because it will 
take its definitive form only during the research process. 
To choose the topic 
Originally I proposed to study the problematic which arises between an 
integration process, such as the one undertaken by Brazil and Argentina, and national 
sovereignty. Soon I understood that the topic was too theoretical and that it would be 
quite difficult to develop a proper research since the integration process in Latin 
America was just starting. By this time I was already working on my second chapter 
about the political economy of the military dictatorship. I realised then how the 
structural reform applied by the military government constrained the economic 
policy of the democratic government. 
A journey to Argentina to look for new material and to do some interviews 
with academics involved in the study of the economic policy of the military 
dictatorship helped me to decide the definitive topic of the thesis. On the one hand, it 
was then clear that it would be impossible to find material (primary as well as 
secondary sources) about the integration process between Argentina and Brazil from 
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the perspective that i wanted to emphasise. On the other hand, it was clear that the 
first democratic government was understudied, despite many articles about its 
economic policy, its human rights policies and its relation with trade unions. 
However, there was not an extensive study of the years of the first democratic 
government. Moreover, after having studied the economic policy of the military 
dictatorship, it seemed to me clear that the democratic government was constrained 
by the structural reform applied by the Proceso. 
The topic of the thesis started to appear clearer: the constraints of the 
Argentinian state's economic policy during the democratisation process. For this 
topic, primary and secondary sources would be available. However, at this point it is 
useful to point out the problem of the primary sources. 
If it is not a feature of all the Third World countries, it is undoubtedly a 
feature of Argentina. A country which was jumping for the last fifty years from a 
military dictatorship to a democratic government does not have, of course, a 
tradition of keeping official documents. Democratic governments were aware of the 
next military government, the military dictatorships intentionally destroyed official 
documents. Therefore, there is no Public Record Office. Anyway, the period I decided 
to study was too recent. Therefore, my primary sources were mainly interviews, 
newspapers, some official documents (such as the speeches of the President or his 
Cabinet members), statistics from the Central Bank, the IMF and the World Bank. 
From all of them, I believe that the most useful ones, for this research, have been 
the interviews. 
The interviews were undertaken in a second journey to Argentina during the 
last part of my second and the first part of my third year. Before going to Argentina, 
I had a draft of all the chapters of the thesis, excluding the introduction and the 
conclusion. This was essential since I went to Argentina knowing what kind of 
information I needed and what kind of interviews I had to make. I arranged all the 
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interviews from England, sending letter to those I wanted to interview. Some of them 
refused my request, however, most of the seniors member of the democratic 
government accepted. Throughout the interviews I was learning a lot and my research 
was developing some more useful orientations. The interviews gave me the basic idea 
of the democratic government's main problem. 
In the meantime, I was also searching for other primary and secondary 
sources. In addition, before leaving England my supervisor had read and corrected the 
drafts of all the chapters. Therefore I was also re-reading the thesis and considering 
his corrections. 
By the end of the second term of my third year I was back in England. I gave 
my supervisor all the corrected drafts and I started to work on the theoretical part of 
the thesis, going back to the essay on state theory which was written in my first 
year 
By this time I felt that the thesis was finished. Soon I realised how wrong I 
was. The main tasks was now to conceptualise the main argument of the thesis and to 
relate it to my essay on state theory. Thus, the main argument of the thesis began to 
slightly change. The empirical information and the state theory essay suggested that 
the 'constraints of the Argentinian state's economic policy during the democratisation 
process' can be conceptualise as a 'crisis of the Argentinian state'. Therefore, as said, 
the main argument of the thesis took its definitive form during the research process. 
The thesis was defined as a study of the crisis of the Argentinian state during the 
democratisation process. Having organised my thoughts I was able to write the 
introduction and the conclusion, which are central parts of the thesis. 
The final editing of the thesis consumes a considerable amount of time and is 
as important as the research process itself. It is essential to read all the drafts to 
check that the main idea of the thesis is clear and that the work as whole is coherent. 
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It is also important to correct all the repetitions that one makes, and most notably it 
is the time to correct the writing style. 
The writing process 
Each individual has his own way of writing. For me, it was very difficult to 
learn through books how to write. However, it was very useful to read some 
bibliography1 especially since I was writing in a foreign language. 
When I was working in Argentina I got used to writing after having read a 
couple of articles or books. I did the same here, especially at the beginning of the PhD 
through the weekly book reviews. However, when I started to write about Argentina, 
I stopped to do book reviews; I preferred to read more before starting to write. My 
experience was that I read for three or four weeks and afterwards wrote for the same 
period of time. However, the writing took me less time than the reading. This is due 
to my method of writing in English. 
As a foreign student one can not pay much more attention to the style, the 
mistakes, the vocabulary or the English grammar. The easiest thing is to write the 
ideas you have in your mind and, after a careful reading, to correct them. Here there 
is another problem -you might not even realise your own mistakes!. And here is 
when a foreign student can be very isolated. As said, it is a matter of time, and 
patience. One easy mistake to find is the constant repetition. I believe this is so 
because you are not sure if the reader will understand what you want to say. In 
Spanish, I say it once and clearly, and I know that is enough. In English I always 
doubt. 
Another difficult task is to decide the limits of the topic. While writing it is 
very tempting to write about all you have read. However, while reading it, it is clear 
how the argument gets lost amidst too many facts. The thesis must be understood as a 
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limited objective. Most PhD students think of the thesis as the work of their life. It 
is hard to realise that the thesis is just the beginning. 
I found also very useful to decide deadlines and not allow myself to take 
extensions. This made my research more organised and gave me a general overview of 
the possibilities of reaching the final deadline. It is also helpful to limit the reading 
since there are so many things you can read. Indeed, I used to read a lot more, simply 
to avoid the day when I had to start writing. 
Another problem that I found when the drafts were being written is that my 
thesis began to seem very obvious. I believe that after three years with Alfonsin's 
government in my mind I thought that everything was very obvious. I hope this was 
only just for me! I thought it was also related to the fact that I was living in 
Argentina during Alfonsin's government so I could also remember what I was reading 
and writing and I also have my own point of view of those days. I now think that this 
is because after three years everything seems to be very clear for myself, although I 
hope there is still some original observations for the reader. 
I have learned a lot during these three years. While I believe that originality 
is one of the main objectives of a PhD thesis, I think that it is much more important 
to contribute to the knowledge of the reader. I hope this thesis is clear enough to 
make the reader understand the development and the consequences of the crisis of the 
Argentinian state during the democratisation process. I hope the reader now 
understands why the amazing experience of living under democracy after seven years 
of military dictatorship ended in hyperinflation, looting and a sad disappointment. 
1 Most notably Becker (1986), Burgess (1982) Lichtman and French (1978). 
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